nao-sec.org /2024/10/IcePeony-with-the-996-work-culture.html

# IcePeony with the '996' work culture





This blog post is based on "IcePeony with the '996' work culture" that we presented at VB2024. We are grateful to Virus Bulletin for giving us the opportunity to present.

https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2024/abstracts/icepeony-996-work-culture/

# tl;dr

We have discovered a previously unknown China-nexus APT group, which we have named "IcePeony". Due to operational mistakes, they exposed their resources, allowing us to uncover details of their attacks.


- IcePeony is a China-nexus APT group that has been active since at least 2023. They have targeted government agencies, academic institutions, and political organizations in countries such as India, Mauritius, and Vietnam.
- Their attacks typically start with SQL Injection, followed by compromise via webshells and backdoors. Interestingly, they use a custom IIS malware called "IceCache".
- Through extensive analysis, we strongly believe that IcePeony is a China-nexus APT group, operating under harsh work conditions.

# IcePeony

IcePeony is an unknown attack group. Our research shows that they have been active since at least 2023. They mainly target Asian countries, such as India and Vietnam. In the log files we analyzed, there were over 200 attempts to attack various government websites in India.

They use SQL injection attacks on public web servers. If they find a vulnerability, they install a webshell or malware. Ultimately, their goal is to steal credentials.

We believe IcePeony works for China's national interests. It is possible that they prioritize China's maritime strategy.



Our research found that IcePeony targeted government and academic institutions in India, political parties in Vietnam, and government institutions in Mauritius. Recently, they may have also attacked Brazil. It is likely that they will expand their targets in the future.

# **OPSEC** fail

In July, we identified a host that was publicly exposing various attack tools, including CobaltStrike and sqlmap, via an open directory. What made this discovery even more compelling was the presence of a zsh\_history file.

# Directory listing for /

- . CobaltStrike4.8
- .aliases
- <u>.bashrc</u>
- .cache/
- .cloud-locale-test.skip
- <u>.config/</u>
- <u>.local/</u>
- <u>.oh-my-zsh/</u>
- <u>.profile</u>
- <u>.ssh/</u>
- <u>.viminfo</u>

One of the most interesting findings was the zsh\_history file. Similar to bash\_history, the zsh\_history file records command history. However, zsh\_history also logs timestamps, allowing us to pinpoint the exact time each command was executed. This enabled us to construct a highly detailed timeline of the attack.

Unlike a typical timeline created by an IR or SOC analyst, this one offers insight from the attacker's perspective. We could observe their trial-and-error process and how they executed the intrusion.

1	: 17195
2	: 17195■ ■ :0;vim 1.txt
3	: 17195 - 0;python sqlmap.py -r 1.txt -p txtOfficerNamedbs
4	: 17195
5	: 17195 - 0;curl <u>https://</u>
6	: 17195 ■ ■ :0;python sqlmap.py -r 1.txt -p txtOfficerNamedbs
7	: 17195:0;python sqlmap.py -r 1.txt -p txtOfficerNamedbsrandom-agent
8	: 17195 - 0;nmap -sV -p1-65535 -T4 -vv 💵 📲 💵
9	: 17195 0;ls
10	: 17195 🚥 :0;curl <u>https://</u> -a
11	: 17195 - 0;ls
12	: 17195 🔄 📲 :0;apt-get install lrzsz
13	: 17195 - 0;rz -E
14	: 17195
15	: 17195 ;chmod +x suo5-linux-amd64
16	: 17195 0;./suo5-linux-amd64 -h
17	: 171950;./suo5-linux-amd64 -t <u>https://</u> -TT
18	: 17195 📷 📷 0;./suo5-linux-amd64 -t https:// 🎫 📲 💶 📭 🗤 💷 📲 🖬 📲 🖬 1 0.0.0.0:8080

The zsh\_history was not the only interesting file. There were many others.


For example, IcePeony had configured several helper commands in their alias file, including shortcuts to simplify lengthy commands and commands to quickly access help information.

Here is an example with Mimikatz. By typing "hPass," the attacker could display basic tutorials for Mimikatz. This improved their effectiveness during attacks.




# **Intrusion Timeline**

We obtained two weeks' worth of command history from the zsh\_history. Let's go through the events of each day.



On day-1, the attacker attempted SQL injections on several government websites. When the exploit succeeded, they installed a webshell or IceCache, establishing a foothold for the attack. On day-2, they reviewed the domain information of compromised hosts and created accounts for further exploitation. On day three, which was a Sunday, no actions were taken. On day-3, which was a Sunday, they did not perform any actions. It seems the attacker does not work on Sundays. On day-4, they used IceCache to configure proxy rules. We will explain this in more detail later. On day-5, the attacker expanded their reach by attempting more SQL injections on other government websites. On day-6, they used various tools, including IcePeony's custom tool called StaX and a rootkit called Diamorphine. On day-7, they continued to attack other hosts using tools like URLFinder and sqlmap.



On day-8, they used IceCache to steal information from the compromised environment, especially focusing on domain users. On day-9, they were quiet and only performed connection checks. On day-10, they did nothing since it was a Sunday. On day-11, they used tools like craXcel and WmiExec. They used craXcel, an open-source tool, to unlock password-protected Microsoft Office files. On day-12, they used

IceCache to add proxy rules and set persistence with scheduled tasks. On day-13 and day-14, they explored other hosts for further exploitation.


Over the course of two weeks, the attacker utilized a variety of tools and commands to compromise government websites and exfiltrate information.

# Tools

IcePeony uses a wide range of tools, with a particular preference for open-source ones. Here, we will highlight only the most distinctive tools they use.

# StaX

StaX is a customized variant of the open-source tool Stowaway, a high-performance proxy tool. The attacker enhanced Stowaway with custom processing. Based on development strings, we called this version StaX.



StaX included encryption for communication targets specified in active mode using Custom Base64 and AES.

./sta -c sOIEUlDF9pDpLeXjPtDRbLnnGRJPuTP9tsNwmSYauDzhPF-g1kYElceYCK8
./agent -c sOIEUlDF9pDpLeXjPtDRbLnnGRJPuTP9tsNwmSYauDzhPF-g1kYElceYCK8

```
v24 = (void *)encoding_base64__ptr_Encoding_DecodeString(
                 (_DWORD)qword_9789B8,
                 v14,
                 v19,
                 ( DWORD)v10,
                 ( DWORD)v11,
                 v15,
                 v16,
                 v17,
                 v18);
 if ( v10 )
   return OLL;
 v47 = v24;
 v45 = v25;
 v29 = runtime_stringtoslicebyte((unsigned int)&v46, a3, a4, 0, (_DWORD)v11, v26, v27);
 v35 = StaX_crypto_KeyPadding(v29, a3, v30, 0, (_DWORD)v11, v31, v32, v33, v34);
v40 = (unsigned int)StaX crypto_AESDecrypt(v47, v23, v45, v35, a3, v36, v37, v38, v39);
 v48 = v35;
 return runtime slicebytetostring(0, v40, v23, v35, a3, v41, v42, v43, v44);
```

## **ProxyChains**

ProxyChains is an open-source proxy tool. The attacker used ProxyChains to run script files on victim hosts.

<pre>ip=REDACTED</pre>	
proxychains sshpass	'Admin@123' scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no /root/web/info.sh root@\$ip:/tmp/
proxychains sshpass	'Admin@123' scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no /root/linux_back.sh root@\$ip:/tmp/
proxychains sshpass	'Admin@123' scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no /root/linux_seo.sh root@\$ip:/tmp/
proxychains sshpass	'Admin@123' ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no root@ <b>\$ip</b>

info.sh is a script that collects system information from the compromised environment. It gathers environment information, user information, installed tool versions, network settings, SSH configuration files, and command history.


linux\_back.sh is a script for backdoors and persistence. It downloads and runs a backdoor shell script from the server and creates backdoor users.

Interestingly, they installed a rootkit called Diamorphine, which is available on GitHub.



# Malware

The IcePeony server contained malware targeting IIS, which we named IceCache. They used IceCache to attack the attack surface server. Additionally, during the investigation, we discovered another related malware, which we called IceEvent. Although no logs of using IceEvent were found. We believe it was used to compromise another computer that was not connected to the internet.



## IceCache

IceCache is an ELF64 binary developed in Go language. It is customized based on the open-source software reGeorge.

0S	EM_X86_64
Arch	amd64
Compiler	1.21.1 (2023-09-06)
Build ID	OgqOCbNX2DLflV4n7GIq/STkDyn
Main root	reGeorgGo
# main	1
# std	100
# vendor	2
-buildmode	exe
-compiler	gc
-trimpath	true
DefaultGODEBUG	panicnil=1
CG0_ENABLED	0
GOARCH	amd64
GOOS	linux
GOAMD64	v1

To facilitate their intrusion operations, they added file transmission commands and command execution functionality.

Usage: iisClient [OPTION	S]
Basic: -u,url= to= -v,verbose ua= -H,host= admin -V,version	The url containing the tunnel script Specify the target param Show verbose debug message Set header User-Agent Set header Host Whether to use the Administrator to exec Version
setCache=	Enable/Disable proxy function, 1 (enable) or 0 (disable) (default: -1) List proxy rules Add a proxy rule, foward 'to' target host Del a proxy rule Clear all proxy rules Show the count statistics Set the cache time(in second), set 0 to disable cache (default: -1) Clear cache data(not change cacheable status)
Socks: socks -l,listen= -p,port=	Start a Socks server Socks listen address (default: 0.0.0.0) Socks listen port (default: 8888)
File: up= down=	Upload a local file 'to' remote server Download a remote file 'to' local
Cmd: -c,cmd= -t,timeout=	The command to execute, example: whoami Timeout of the command execution in seconds (default: 5)
Help Options: —h, ——help	Show this help message

IceCache module is installed and run on IIS servers. The number of commands change, but they are classified into two types based on authentication tokens. We found files with remaining PDB information. These files were developed by a user named "power" in a project called "cachsess"

#### PDB Path

C:\Users\power\documents\visual studio 2017\Projects\cachsess\x64\Release\cachsess.pdb C:\Users\power\Documents\Visual Studio 2017\Projects\cachsess\Release\cachsess32.pdb

The number of commands changes over time, but it includes command execution functions, SOCKS proxy functions, and file transmission functions.

TYPE-A	Description
EXEC / EXEC_PRO	Command to the execution of a process
SOCKS_HELLO	Command to SOCKS protocol initial handshake message
SOCKS_CONNECT	Command to indicate a connection request with the SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_DISCONNECT	Command to indicate disconnection with SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_READ	Command to reading of data in SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_FORWARD	Command to instruct data transfer via SOCKS protocol

#### TYPE-A

#### Description

PROXY_ADD	Command to add a proxy
PROXY_LIST	Command to list a proxy
PROXY_DEL	Command to del a proxy
PROXY_CLEAR	Command to clear all proxy settings
PROXY_SET_JS	Set the JavaScript
PROXY_GET_JS	Get set the JavaScript
PROXY_ALLOW_PC	Allowed PC settings
PROXY_CACHE_CLEAR	Command to clear the proxy cache
PROXY_CACHE_TIME	Command to set proxy cache time
FILE_UPLOAD	Upload Files
FILE_DOWNLOAD	Download Files

#### TYPE-B

#### Description

	•
EXEC / EXEC_PRO	Command that directs the execution of a process
SOCKS_HELLO	SOCKS protocol initial handshake message
SOCKS_CONNECT	Command to indicate a connection request with the SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_DISCONNECT	Command to indicate disconnection with SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_READ	Command that directs reading of data in SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_FORWARD	Command to instruct data transfer via SOCKS protocol
PROXY_ADD	Command to add a proxy
PROXY_LIST	Command to list a proxy
PROXY_DEL	Command to del a proxy
PROXY_CLEAR	Command to clear all proxy settings
FILE_UPLOAD / FILE_UPLOAD_PRO	Upload Files
FILE_DOWNLOAD / FILE_DOWNLOAD_PRO	Download Files
IIS_VERSION	Show IIS version

These are the IceCache modules found so far. The first sample we are aware of was compiled in August 2023 and submitted to VirusTotal in October. Since there is no discrepancy between the compile time and the first submission, we believe the dates are reliable.

Many new samples have also been found since 2024. Most of the submitters are from India, which matches the victim information we have gathered from OpenDir data.

The number of commands has change over time. It is show that the malware's developers have made improvements while continuing their intrusion operations.

sha256[:8]	Compile Time	First Submission	Submitter	Cmd Num	X-Token	TYPE
5b16d153	2024-07-17 09:11:14	2024-08-03 04:58:20	c8d0b2b9 (ID)	) 20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	В
484e2740	2024-06-21 03:05:15	2024-08-07 09:25:53	39d4d6d2 - email	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	зB

sha256[:8]	Compile Time	First Submission	Submitter	Cmd Num	X-Token	TYPE
11e90e24	2024-06-05 03:52:48	2024-06-18 12:21:50	d9cb313c (ID)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	В
b8d030ed	2024-06-05 03:52:41	2024-06-18 10:47:18	408f1927 (ID)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	В
ceb47274	2024-04-25 09:53:26	2024-08-02 21:50:50	06ac9f47 (BR)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	В
d1955169	2024-04-21 11:29:25	2024-06-18 12:24:39	d9cb313c (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	В
de8f58f0	2024-04-21 11:29:10	2024-06-18 10:49:53	408f1927 (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	В
53558af	2024-03-27 05:08:50	2024-04-19 07:57:19	c2440bbf (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	В
0b8b10a2	2024-03-27 05:08:57	2024-04-18 13:54:16	c2440bbf (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	В
a66627cc	2024-02-20 09:36:12	2024-03-12 15:17:55	a6412166 (VN)	16	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
e5f520d9	2024-02-01 09:32:21	2024-07-17 09:30:54	24761b38 (SG)	24	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
3eb56218	2023-12-07 03:04:16	2024-02-20 13:54:02	0f09a1ae (ID)	24	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
5fd5e99f	2023-09-27 00:50:46	2024-03-24 08:59:02	Ca43fb0f (ID)	24	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
0eb60e4c	2023-08-23 09:11:24	2023-10-18 10:11:00	0e8f2a34 (VN)	18	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A

## IceEvent

IceEvent is a simple passive-mode backdoor that installed as a service.

#### PDB Path

C:\Users\power\Documents\Visual Studio 2017\Projects\WinService\x64\Release\WinService.pdb

Two types have been identified based on the command format. Both types only have the minimum necessary commands. The older type was discovered in September 2023, and several new types were found in April of this year. All of these were submitted from India.

## TYPE-A Description

- FILE: Command to Reading files via sockets
- CMD: Command to the execution of a process

## TYPE-B Description

UPFILE Upload Files DOWNFILE Download Files CMD Command to the execution of a process

sha256[:8]	Compile Time	First Submission	Submitter	Cmd Num TYPE
80e83118	2024-04-25 09:50:58	2024-07-25 05:43:08	INDIA (99003aca)	3 B
9aba997b	2024-04-30 04:48:48	2024-06-14 05:46:49	INDIA (060734bd)	3 B
9a0b0439	2024-04-25 09:50:58	2024-06-14 05:00:08	INDIA (060734bd)	3 B
bc94da1a	2023-08-23 08:52:46	2023-09-05 03:03:57	INDIA (81f8b666)	2 A

## Similarities

We believe that IceEvent was developed because a simple passive backdoor was needed during intrusions, based on code similarities with IceCache. Both IceCache and IceEvent use the same key for XOR to encode communication data. And PDB information shows that the same developer created both malware.


This is the XOR-based data encoding process used for communication data, which is equal to both malware.



This is the command execution process equal to both malware. Since the function calls and branching processes are exactly the same, we believe they were compiled from the same source code. Other commands also match perfectly.




The communication data of IceCache and IceEvent is only encoded using the XOR process mentioned earlier, making it easy to decode. Here is an example of decoding the data during command execution.




# Attribution

We investigated the attacker's activity times based on the timestamp information in the zsh\_history file. As a result, we found that the attacker is likely operating in the UTC+8 time zone. Surprisingly, the attacker works from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m., which is a 14-hour workday. They are remarkably diligent workers.



Similarly, we investigated the changes in activity based on the day of the week. It seems that the attackers work six days a week. While they are less active on Fridays and Saturdays, their only full day off appears to be Sunday. This investigation suggests that the attackers are not conducting these attacks as personal activities, but are instead engaging in them as part of organized, professional operations.



By the way, have you heard of the term "996 working hour system"? This term originated in China's IT industry. In China's IT industry, long working hours see as a problem. It refers to working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m.,six days a week. Such hard work conditions are called the "996 working hour system". IcePeony might be working under the 996 working hour system.

## 996 working hour system

Article Talk

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article **is missing information** about background on other (especially nontech) overwork cultures in China; legitimized "special work hour" system in Shenzhen. Please expand the article to include this information. Further details may exist on the talk page. (*July 2021*)

The **996 working hour system** (Chinese: 996工作制) is a work schedule practiced illegally by many companies in China. It derives its name from its requirement that employees work from **9**:00 am to **9**:00 pm, **6** days per week; i.e. 72 hours per week, 12 hours per day.<sup>[1][2][3][4][5][6]</sup> A number of Mainland

Chinese internet companies have adopted this system as their official work schedule. Critics argue that the 996 working hour system is a violation of the Labour Law of the People's Republic of China and have called it "modern slavery".<sup>[7][8]</sup>

In March 2019, an "anti-996" protest was launched via GitHub.<sup>[9][10][11]</sup> Since then, the 996 issue has been met with growing discontent in China, but despite official promises to get rid of the system, it is still widespread as of 2024.<sup>[12][13][14]</sup>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/996\_working\_hour\_system

Next, There is a very simple example to consider when discussing attribution. IcePeony sometimes includes Simplified Chinese comments in the tools they use. Here, we provide an example of a wrapper script for the IceCache Client. From this, we can conclude that IcePeony is a threat actor from a region where Simplified Chinese is commonly used.

1	#!/bin/bash
2	
3	# 逐行读取1.txt
4	while IFS= read -r line; do
5	# 执行 ./x 命令并传递每一行的内容作为参数
6	echo \$line
7	./iisClient -u <a href="https://\$line/1.txt">https://\$line/1.txt</a>
8	done < "1.txt"

IcePeony uses an original malware called IceCache. As previously mentioned, IceCache is based on reGeorge. More specifically, IceCache contains a string referring to a project named reGeorgGo.

Upon investigating reGeorgGo, We found that it was developed by a Chinese security engineer. There is no other information about this project on the internet, aside from the developer's blog. It was a not well-known tool. However, the publicly available reGeorgGo is a tool with only three arguments, where as IceCache has more commands added to it.

■ Q "reGeorgGo"						
Filter by			6 files (951	ms)		
<>	Code	6	🗸 💽 z	z1gg/secdemo · proxy/reGeorgGo/README.md		
Ļ	Repositories	0	5			
$\odot$	lssues	0	6			
រោ	Pull requests	0		``bash sage: ./ <mark>reGeorgGo</mark> [OPTIONS]		
Ċ)	Discussions	0		<pre>/reGeorgGo [-l addr] [-p port] [-u http tunnel url]</pre>		
શ્ર	Users	0		kample:		

#### https://github.com/zz1gg/secdemo/tree/main/proxy/reGeorgGo

Let's examine attribution from another side. In this attack campaign, IcePeony targeted India, Mauritius, and Vietnam. While attacks on India and Vietnam are generally not uncommon. What about Mauritius?



Mauritius is a small country located in the Indian Ocean. Interestingly, Mauritius has recently formed a cooperation with India. They are wary of China's expansion into the Indian Ocean and have begun

various forms of collaboration to counter this influence.

#### 🛗 February 29, 2024

Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and Prime Minister of Mauritius, H.E. Mr. Pravind Kumar Jugnauth virtually inaugurated the new Airstrip, Saint James Jetty and six Community Development Projects at the Agalega island of Mauritius




https://www.mea.gov.in/newsdetail1.htm?12042/

We summarize the attribution information using the Diamond Model.

IcePeony consists of Simplified Chinese speakers who show interest in the governments of Indian Ocean countries and work under the 996 working hour system.

They prefer open-source software developed in Chinese-speaking regions and use their original malware, IceCache and IceEvent. In attacks on the Indian government, they used VPSs located in the Indian region. Additionally, the governments and education sectors in Mauritius and Vietnam were also targeted.



# Wrap-Up

In this blog post, we introduced IcePeony. IcePeony is a newly emerging attack group. Our investigation shows that they have been active since at least 2023. Their primary targets are countries in Asia, such as India and Vietnam.

The log files we analyzed recorded attempts to attack over 200 different Indian government websites. IcePeony typically attempts SQL Injection attacks on publicly accessible web servers. If vulnerabilities are found, they install web shells or execute malware. Ultimately, they aim to steal credentials.

We suspect that IcePeony operates as a group of individuals conducting cyberattacks in support of China's national interests, possibly in connection with China's maritime strategy. They remain active, and we must continue monitoring their activities closely moving forward.

# loCs

## IP

- 165[.]22.211.62
- 64[.]227.133.248
- 173[.]208.156.19
- 173[.]208.156.144
- 154[.]213.17.225
- 103[.]150.186.219
- 63[.]141.255.16
- 204[.]12.205.10
- 107[.]148.37.63
- 103[.]99.60.119
- 154[.]213.17.237
- 45[.]195.205.88
- 154[.]213.17.244
- 103[.]99.60.93
- 149[.]115.231.17
- 149[.]115.231.39
- 103[.]99.60.108

## Domain

- d45qomwkl[.]online
- k9ccin[.]com
- k8ccyn[.]com
- 88k8cc[.]com
- googlesvn[.]com

## IceCache

484e274077ab6f9354bf71164a8edee4dc4672fcfbf05355958785824fe0468f

- 5b16d1533754c9e625340c4fc2c1f76b11f37eb801166ccfb96d2aa02875a811
- ceb47274f4b6293df8904c917f423c2f07f1f31416b79f3b42b6d64e65dcfe1b
- e5f520d95cbad6ac38eb6badbe0ad225f133e0e410af4e6df5a36b06813e451b
- d1955169cd8195ecedfb85a3234e4e6b191f596e493904ebca5f44e176f3f950
- 11e90e2458a97957064a3d3f508fa6dadae19f632b45ff9523b7def50ebacb63
- de8f58f008ddaa60b5cf1b729ca03f276d2267e0a80b584f2f0723e0fac9f76c
- b8d030ed55bfb6bc4fdc9fe34349ef502561519a79166344194052f165d69681
- 535586af127e85c5561199a9a1a3254d554a6cb97200ee139c5ce23e68a932bd
- 0b8b10a2ff68cb2aa3451eedac4a8af4bd147ef9ddc6eb84fc5b01a65fca68fd
- 5fd5e99fc503831b71f4072a335f662d1188d7bc8ca2340706344fb974c7fe46
- 3eb56218a80582a79f8f4959b8360ada1b5e471d723812423e9d68354b6e008c
- a66627cc13f827064b7fcea643ab31b34a7cea444d85acc4e146d9f2b2851cf6
- 0eb60e4c5dc7b06b719e9dbd880eb5b7514272dc0d11e4760354f8bb44841f77

## IceEvent

- 80e831180237b819e14c36e4af70304bc66744d26726310e3c0dd95f1740ee58
- 9a0b0439e6fd2403f764acf0527f2365a4b9a98e9643cd5d03ccccf3825a732e
- 9aba997bbf2f38f68ad8cc3474ef68eedd0b99e8f7ce39045f1d770e2af24fea
- bc94da1a066cbb9bdee7a03145609d0f9202b426a52aca19cc8d145b4175603b