Debugging coroutine handles: Looking for the source of a one-byte memory corruption

devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20220930-00

September 30, 2022



A team was chasing a one-byte use-after-free memory corruption bug. These bugs are really frustrating to chase down because the memory corruption typically doesn't trigger an immediate crash, but rather results in a delayed crash, which means that the culprit has done the damage and run away long before the problem is detected.

We join the debugging session already in progress. We have determined that the corruption is to a memory block that previously contained a coroutine frame at offset $0 \times c0$.

The state machine of a coroutine exists in the **__ResumeCoro\$2** function, so we can start there:

```
contoso!DoStuffLater$_ResumeCoro$2:
    mov
            r11, rsp
    ... stack frame nonsense ...
            rsi,rcx
                                    // rsi = coroutine frame pointer
    mov
            [rsp+28h], rcx
    mov
            eax,word ptr [rcx+8]
                                    // eax = coroutine state
    movzx
            [rsp+20h],ax
    mov
                                    // artificially add 1
    inc
            ax
    cmp
            ax,8
    ja
            contoso!DoStuffLater$_ResumeCoro$2+0x3e5
                                    // invalid index, die (jump to int 3)
    ja
            00007ffc`e777a5b5
    movsx
            rax,ax
            rdx,[contoso!__ImageBase]
    lea
            ecx,[rdx+rax*4+1BA5E0h] // look up jump table RVA
    mov
                                    // convert to absolute address
    add
            rcx,rdx
    jmp
            rcx
                                    // jump there
```

contoso!DoStuffLater\$_ResumeCoro\$2+0x3e5:

int

3

We see from the disassembly that the jump table starts at relative offset **0x1ba5e0**. We won't dig into the jump table yet; let's see if we can find the corruption point, which is a single-byte corruption at offset **0xc0** from the start of the coroutine frame. Maybe we'll be lucky and the access is directly into the frame.

```
0:026> #c0h contoso!DoStuffLater$_ResumeCoro$2
contoso!DoStuffLater$_ResumeCoro$2+0x136:
    mov [rsi+0C0h],al
```

Oh my goodness, we found a single-byte write at offset $0 \times c0$ in the coroutine frame! Let's see who is doing it.

```
mov eax,6
mov [rsi+8],ax
mov rdx,rsi
mov rcx,rbx
call
contoso!winrt::impl::notify_awaiter<`winrt::resume_foreground'::`2'::awaitable>::
```

await_suspend<std::experimental::coroutine_traits<winrt::fire_and_forget>::promise_typ

mov [rsi+0C0h],al // WRITE HAPPENS HERE

The first two instructions set the coroutine state to 6, which happens as part of coroutine suspension.

The second group of instructions call the await_suspend for a resume_foreground awaiter. This is in code that is moving forward to state 6, and we know that the Microsoft compiler records coroutine states as even numbers starting at 2 (for the initial state), and then increases by two for each suspension point. Therefore, moving to state 6 means suspending for the second time.

```
winrt::fire_and_forget DoStuffLater()
{
    co_await winrt::resume_after(100ms);
    co_await winrt::resume_foreground(GetDispatcherQueue());
    DoStuff();
}
```

Okay, good, that second suspension theory lines up with the code: The second suspension is a call to resume_foreground, and the code showed that we were calling resume_foreground.

And we see the bug: The code is storing the result of await_suspend into the coroutine frame. This is something I called out in my <u>C++ coroutines: Getting started with awaitable objects</u> article:

Therefore, it is important that your awaiter not use its this pointer once it has arranged for the handle to be invoked somehow, because the this pointer may no longer be valid.

In this case, not only did the awaiter get destructed, the entire coroutine frame was destructed!

The compiler team confirmed that this is a known code-generation bug, <u>fixed in versions</u> <u>16.11 and 17.0</u>.

If you are stuck on 16.10 or older, you will have to work around the problem. From my investigation, it seems that the code generation problem occurs when you have an await_suspend that returns bool. In C++/WinRT, there are only four places where this happens:

- resume_foreground(Windows::System::CoreDispatcher)
- resume_foreground(Microsoft::System::CoreDispatcher)
- deferrable_event_args.wait_for_deferrals()
- final_suspend

In the first two cases, you can work around the problem by switching to <u>the</u> <u>wil::resume_foreground function</u>, which addresses this and other design issues with the original <u>winrt::resume_foreground</u> function.

If you'd rather not pull in another library, and you don't want to upgrade your compiler, you can work around the problem by using an explicit continuation-passing model:

```
winrt::fire_and_forget DoStuffLater()
{
    co_await winrt::resume_after(100ms);
    GetDispatcherQueue().EnqueueAsync([=]()
    {
        DoStuffLater();
    });
}
```

In the last case (final_suspend), my exploration suggests that the code generation problem does not occur in that case, so we're okay there.

But upgrade your compiler if you can.

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