


Kraken's two Domain Generation Algorithms

web.archive.org/web/20160324035554/https://www.johannesbader.ch/2015/12/krakens-two-domain-generation-algorithms/



Kraken (also known as *Oderoor* or *Bobax*) was once a large, if not the largest, botnet. It was primarily used to send spam messages. Kraken features a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) which appeared in July 2007 and was first mentioned in 2008. This makes it one of the first ever widely used DGA.

The original DGA of Kraken is time-independent, i.e., a specific sample will at all times generate the same domains. There are various reports on how to determine the domains. Michael Ligh and Greg Sinclair showed how to use instrumented execution with Immunity debugger in their DEFCON 16 talk "*Malware RCE: Debuggers and Decryptor Development*" (skip to 18:24). The same method is also described in *The Malware Analyst's Cookbook*, recipe 12-11 on page 476. This report by Damballa lists the domains for one parameterization of the DGA.

Much later — the first samples on Malwr are from 2003 — Kraken's DGA changed. Probably recognizing the problem with generating the ever same domains, the authors added a time dependent input to the DGA. They also deviated from dynamic DNS providers and used four regular top level domains instead. A few samples, maybe from the transitional stage, still rely on the DDNS providers even with the new algorithm. Kraken infections with newer DGAs peaked in July 2014 (also see the list of samples in Section *Samples*).

The later version of Kraken's DGA is much less reported on. Here is a analysis of the malware with the new domains. But neither the domains nor the domain generating algorithm are shown. For me, good enough grounds to look at both DGA in this short blog post. I'm aware that the DGA is irrelevant today, as Kraken is currently dead or inactive, but hopefully the post might still be interesting for the keen DGA historian.

Reverse Engineering

This section shows some reverse engineering insights of the DGA. Skip to Python Implementations to see reimplementations of the two algorithms.

Both the old and new version of the DGA have parameters that can change from sample to sample and cause disjoint sets of domains. I therefore looked at multiple samples to identify the variable parts of the DGA. For the old DGA I reversed two samples:

source [virusshare](#)

uploaded 2012-09-04 03:44

SHA-256 5f004bd36715225c22ddb27d109a2b5f1c5215a6ce2df2e111c5fb49bc7161f9

MD5	10fd78f9681d66d2dd39816b5f7f6ea6
source	malwr

uploaded	2014-12-08 15:04
----------	------------------

SHA-256	4606a621922b28be1ff7f4621713aaafd988b8c5f1153720200c5e6dad0c5416
---------	--

MD5	60838eeb3f8cd311de0faef80909632d
-----	----------------------------------

As far as the new version goes, I looked at these samples:

source	malwr
--------	-----------------------

uploaded	2013-08-05 04:16
----------	------------------

SHA-256	0fed48972c9b5c7fc6735db2b8764c45c95d45bde3764933b4a4909656c1ed47
---------	--

MD5	f2ae73d866bb4edd14ee96cf74fbb423
-----	----------------------------------

source	virusshare
--------	----------------------------

uploaded	2012-04-12
----------	------------

SHA-256	e83bc2ec7975885424668171c2e106f7982bd409e01ce6281fb0e6e722e98810
---------	--

MD5	04966960f3f5ed32ae479079a1bcf6e9
-----	----------------------------------

All listed offsets are from the first sample respectively.

Pseudo Random Number Generator

Both Kraken's DGA use a linear congruential generator (LCG) as pseudo random number generator (PRNG). The parameters are the same found in many `rand()` implementations:

The bits 23 to 8 are used, i.e., $r/256 \bmod 32768$.

Seeding

The DGA of both versions first initializes the pseudo random number generator (PRNG). Two values are used to determine the seed of the PRNG:

1. A running counter that starts at 0 and increases in steps of one (version 1) and one or two (version 2). In version 2 the increment depends on the outcome of the DNS response for the domain. The details of the counter are discussed in Section [Domain Counter](#).
2. Whether or not a list of hardcoded IPs could be contacted. These network connections are performed by `hardcoded_success` at offsets `001BE832` and `0x408D6C` respectively in the following images. The routine returns `True` if the attempts were successful.

The following graph views are from the beginning of both DGAs. Both snippets initialize the random number — `ecx` in version 1 and `ebx` in version 2 — depending on the counter value and success of contact to hardcoded IPs. On left-hand side is the old version of the DGA, on the right-hand side the newer release (click to enlarge the images).

version 1

version 2

```

001BE808 ; Attributes: bp-based frame
001BE808 ; int __cdecl dga(int pDomain, signed int counter)
001BE808 dga proc near
001BE808 pTld= byte ptr -20h
001BE808 tmp= byte ptr -18h
001BE808 domain_object= byte ptr -10h
001BE808 var_8= byte ptr -8
001BE808 length2= dword ptr -4
001BE808 pDomain= dword ptr 8
001BE808 counter= dword ptr 0Ch
001BE808 push ebp
001BE809 mov ebp, esp
001BE80B sub esp, 24h
001BE80E push ebx
001BE80F push esi
001BE810 mov esi, [ebp+counter]
001BE813 sar esi, 1
001BE815 add esi, 1000015
001BE81B push edi
001BE81C lea ecx, [ebp+domain_object]
001BE81F mov [ebp+counter], esi
001BE822 call new_object
001BE827 and [ebp+length2], 0
001BE82B rdtsc
001BE82D add eax, edx
001BE82F mov [ebp+length2], eax
001BE832 call hardcoded_success
001BE837 test al, al
001BE839 push 9
001BE83B jz short loc_1BE85C

```

```

00408043 ; Attributes: bp-based frame
00408043 dga proc near
00408043 pEncTld= byte ptr -28h
00408043 tmp2= byte ptr -20h
00408043 tmp= byte ptr -18h
00408043 domain_object= byte ptr -10h
00408043 tmp3= byte ptr -8
00408043 length= dword ptr -4
00408043 pDomain= dword ptr 8
00408043 counter= dword ptr 0Ch
00408043 push ebp
00408044 mov ebp, esp
00408046 sub esp, 28h
00408049 mov eax, [ebp+counter]
0040804C cdq
0040804D push ebx
0040804E sub eax, edx
00408050 mov ebx, eax
00408052 push esi
00408053 sar ebx, 1
00408055 push edi
00408056 lea ecx, [ebp+domain_object]
00408059 mov [ebp+counter], ebx
0040805C call new_object
00408061 and [ebp+length], 0
00408065 rdtsc
00408067 add eax, edx
00408069 mov [ebp+length], eax
0040806C call hardcoded_success
00408071 imul ebx, 3
00408074 test al, al
00408076 jz short loc_408080

```

```

001BE83D lea ecx, [esi+7]
001BE840 lea eax, [esi+0Ch]
001BE843 imul eax, ecx
001BE846 imul eax, esi
001BE849 cdq
001BE84A pop ecx
001BE84B idiv ecx
001BE84D lea ecx, [esi+1]
001BE850 imul ecx, esi
001BE853 lea ecx, [eax+ecx-265273224]
001BE85A jmp short loc_1BE87C

001BE85C loc_1BE85C:
001BE85C lea ecx, [esi+2]
001BE85F lea eax, [esi+7]
001BE862 imul eax, ecx
001BE865 imul eax, esi
001BE868 cdq
001BE869 pop ecx
001BE86A idiv ecx
001BE86C mov ecx, esi
001BE86E imul ecx, 3
001BE871 inc ecx
001BE872 imul ecx, esi
001BE875 lea ecx, [eax+ecx+143803713]

```

```

00408078 add ebx, 17C874Ah
0040807E jmp short loc_408086

00408080 loc_408080:
00408080 add ebx, 17C8748h

```

The hardcoded values -265273224 and 143803713 on the left, as well as -1FCFBF87h and 7924542h on the right might change from sample to sample. These parameters can be used to generate different sets of domains.

For the first version of the DGA, the snippet above boils down to the following, rather elaborate, formula:

I found two different parameter sets. Notice that the changes are very subtle, only the first and last nibble vary:

version 1	C _s	C _f
Seed a	-0x0FCFBF88	0x8924541
Seed b	-0x1FCFBF87	0x7924542

The second version uses a much simpler formula to initialize the random number:

Again I found two parameter sets:

version 2	C _s	C _f
Seed a	24938314	24938315
Seed b	1600000	1600001

Notice that in both versions the *counter* input to the DGA is first divided by two. The *Malware Analyst's Cookbook* (page 480) considers this as a flaw of the DGA:

There are two weaknesses in Kraken's DGA that are worth mentioning: (...) Odd numbers cause Kraken's algorithm to generate the same domain names as the even numbers that precede them. This effectively cuts the number of possible domains generated by the DGA in half.


Section [Domain Counter](#) explains why I think this is by design and not a flaw of the DGA.

Discarding (only version 2)

Next follows code that is only present in the new version of Kraken's DGA. The code incorporates a timestamp, which is determined by making an HTTP request to a randomly picked, legitimate website. The date is extracted from the http date header of the response and converted to unix timestamp format. For the analysed samples, the domains used to determine the time are: *yahoo.com*, *google.com*, *live.com*, *msn.com*, *aol.com*, *amazon.com*, *go.com*, *bbc.co.uk*, *cnn.com*, *news.com*, *download.com*, *weather.com*, *comcast.net*, *mozilla.com* and *hp.com*. The timestamp sets the variable *discards*:

version 1 version 2

not present



```
00408086 loc_408086:
00408086 call get_timestamp
00408088 mov edi, 12435
00408090 mov esi, 32767
00408095 test eax, eax
00408097 jz short skip_timestamp


00408099 add eax, 3087967296
0040809E xor edx, edx
004080A8 mov ecx, 604800
004080A5 div ecx
004080A7 push 9
004080A9 pop ecx
004080AA add eax, 2
004080AD mov [ebp+discards], eax
```

The divisor is the number of seconds in a week, so only every 7 days the value *discard* changes.

The *discard* value, along with the current domain number, determines how many of the PRNG cycles are discarded:

version 1 version 2

not present



In Pseudocode this is:

```
discards = timestamp / 604800 + 2
IF domain_nr % 9 < 8
  IF domain_nr % 9 >= 6
    discards -= 1
  REPEAT discards TIMES
    r = rand(r)/256 % 32768
```

Notice that for every ninth domain discarding is skipped. Since the discards are the only time-dependent part of the DGA, those domains are invariants and prime targets for sinkholing.

Length of Random Domain

After the PRNG is initialized, the length of the random part of the domain is randomly picked. The two versions use almost the same algorithm:

version 1

version 2

```

001BE87C
001BE87C loc_1BE87C:
001BE87C imul ecx, 1103515245
001BE882 mov edi, 12435
001BE887 add ecx, edi
001BE889 mov eax, ecx
001BE88B imul ecx, 1103515245
001BE891 add ecx, edi
001BE893 ror eax, 8
001BE896 mov edx, ecx
001BE898 imul ecx, 1103515245
001BE89E mov esi, 32767
001BE8A3 and eax, esi
001BE8A5 ror edx, 8
001BE8A8 and edx, esi
001BE8AA imul eax, edx
001BE8AD add ecx, edi
001BE8AF mov ebx, ecx
001BE8B1 ror ecx, 8
001BE8B4 and ecx, esi
001BE8B6 sub eax, ecx
001BE8B8 push 6
001BE8BA cdq
001BE8BB pop ecx
001BE8BC idiv ecx
001BE8BE add edx, ecx
001BE8C0 test edx, edx
001BE8C2 jle short loc_1BE901

001BE8C4 mov [ebp+length2], edx

```

```

00408DDA
00408DDA skip_timestamp:
00408DDA imul ebx, 1103515245
00408DE0 add ebx, edi
00408DE2 mov edx, ebx
00408DE4 imul ebx, 1103515245
00408DEA add ebx, edi
00408DEC ror edx, 8
00408DEF and edx, esi
00408DF1 mov ecx, ebx
00408DF3 imul ebx, 1103515245
00408DF9 ror ecx, 8
00408DFC and ecx, esi
00408DFE imul ecx, edx
00408E01 add ebx, edi
00408E03 mov eax, ebx
00408E05 ror eax, 8
00408E08 and eax, esi
00408E0A add eax, ecx
00408E0C push 6
00408E0E cdq
00408E0F pop ecx
00408E10 idiv ecx
00408E12 add edx, 7
00408E15 test edx, edx
00408E17 jle short loc_408E59

00408E19 mov [ebp+length], edx

```

Both versions first generate three random numbers (r_i is the random number after initialization and, for the second version, discarding):

The first version uses the three random values to set the length as follows:

The second version works almost the same, apart from (a) the third random number being added rather than subtracted and (b) the minimum length being 7 instead of 6:

This gives lengths between 6 and 11 characters for the first version, and 7 and 12 characters for the second version.

Building the Random Domain

Kraken uses straightforward calls to the random number generator to determine the characters of the random domain. All characters a-z are about equally likely picked. Both versions use the exact same algorithm:

version 1

version 2

```

001BE8C7
001BE8C7 next_char:
001BE8C7 imul ebx, 1103515245
001BE8CD add ebx, edi
001BE8CF mov eax, ebx
001BE8D1 ror eax, 8
001BE8D4 and eax, esi
001BE8D6 push 26
001BE8D8 pop ecx
001BE8D9 cdq
001BE8DA idiv ecx
001BE8DC lea ecx, [ebp+tmp]
001BE8DF add dl, 'a'
001BE8E2 push edx
001BE8E3 call char_to_string
001BE8E8 lea eax, [ebp+tmp]
001BE8EB push eax
001BE8EC lea ecx, [ebp+domain_object]
001BE8EF call concat
001BE8F4 lea ecx, [ebp+tmp]
001BE8F7 call free_0
001BE8FC dec [ebp+length2]
001BE8FF jnz short next_char

```

```

00408E1C
00408E1C next_letter:
00408E1C imul ebx, 1103515245
00408E22 add ebx, edi
00408E24 mov eax, ebx
00408E26 ror eax, 8
00408E29 and eax, esi
00408E2B push 26
00408E2D cdq
00408E2E pop ecx
00408E2F idiv ecx
00408E31 lea ecx, [ebp+tmp]
00408E34 add dl, 'a'
00408E37 movzx eax, dl
00408E3A push eax
00408E3B call char_to_string
00408E40 lea eax, [ebp+tmp]
00408E43 push eax
00408E44 lea ecx, [ebp+domain_object]
00408E47 call concat_0
00408E4C lea ecx, [ebp+tmp]
00408E4F call free_1
00408E54 dec [ebp+length]
00408E57 jnz short next_letter

```

In Pseudocode this is:

```

domain = ""
REPEAT domain_length TIMES
    r = rand(r)
    domain += (r/256 % 32768) % 26 + 'a'

```

Base Domain

The final step of the domain generation algorithm is to append the base domain. For the first version, these base domains are four dynamic DNS providers. A few of the samples with the second DGA version use the same DDNS providers, for the most part the base domains are regular top level domains though. Domains are picked one after another from a hard-coded list:

version 1

version 2

The image displays two side-by-side screenshots of assembly code from a debugger. The left screenshot, labeled 'version 1', shows assembly for 'loc_1BE901' and 'loc_1BE91D'. The right screenshot, labeled 'version 2', shows assembly for 'loc_408E59' and 'loc_408E79'. Colored arrows (red, green, blue, yellow) indicate control flow between different code blocks across the two versions.

The base domains are:

version 1, some samples	version 2	“dyndns.org” → “yi.org” → “dynserv.com” → “mooo.com”	Free DDNS Providers
version 2		“com” → “net” → “tv” → “cc”	Top Level Domains

Domain Counter

As seen above, both DGA take a running counter as input. The counter starts at zero. Instead of an upper bound, the counter is reset after 30 minutes of trying to contact the C&C servers. There is some wait time between contacting domains which I did not examine; the expected number of generated domains is therefore unknown to me.

version 1

version 2

The old DGA always increments the index by one, regardless of the call-home attempt for the generated domains. For version 2 things are a little more complicated; the DGA can increment the counter by one or two:

version 1

version 2

The counter in version 2 is incremented depending on the DNS response to the generated domain. The IP is compared to various hard-coded domains. For example:

```

0040AFB9 cmp     eax, 127           ; eax first tuple of IP
0040AFBC jz      short private_ip
0040AFBE
0040AFBE loc_40AFBE:
0040AFBE cmp     eax, 192
0040AFC3 jnz     short loc_40AFCD
0040AFC5 cmp     ecx, 168
0040AFCB jz      short private_ip
0040AFCD
0040AFCD loc_40AFCD:
0040AFCD cmp     eax, 172
0040AFD2 jnz     short loc_40AFDE
0040AFD4 cmp     ecx, 16           ; ecx second tuple of IP
0040AFD7 jl      short loc_40AFEB
0040AFD9 cmp     ecx, 31
0040AFDC jle     short private_ip
...

```

All IPs from the following list are treated specially (I do not know why 66.116.125.150 and 72.51.27.51 get special treatments, maybe those were sinkholes in the past).

range	comment
127.x.x.x	reserved range
192.168.x.x	reserved range
172.16.0.0 - 172.31.255.255	reserved range
0.x.x.x	includes failed queries
1.1.1.1, 2.2.2.2, ... , 255.255.255.255	unlikely answers? Sandbox detection?

range	comment
66.116.125.150	IP in US
72.51.27.51	IP in Canada

If the IP matches with one of above the subnets, the counter grows to the next multiple of two, i.e., even counters are increased by two, and odd counters are increased one.

Since inside the DGA routine, odd counters are rounded down to the same number as their previous (even) counters, every domain that returned an IP that was not in a “blacklisted” range will be checked *twice*. I, for one, don’t think that’s a flaw of the DGA, but a — overly complicated — way to recheck domains.

Algorithm and Samples

Python Implementations

Version 1

The following Python Code generates 1000 domains for a provided seed (either `a` or `b`). The code alternately generates domains for when the hardcoded IP callback failed and succeeded.

```

import time
from ctypes import c_int, c_uint
import argparse

def rand(r):
    t = c_int(1103515245 * r + 12435).value
    return t

def crop(r):
    return (r // 256) % 32768

def dga(index, seed_set, temp_file=True):

    seeds = {'a': {'ex': -0x0FCFBF88, 'nex': 0x8924541},
            'b': {'ex': -0x1FCFBF87, 'nex': 0x7924542}}

    tlds = ["dyndns.org", "yi.org", "dynserv.com", "moo.com"]
    domain_nr = int(index/2) + 1000015

    if temp_file:
        x = int(c_int(domain_nr*(domain_nr + 7)*(domain_nr+12)).value /9.0)
        y = domain_nr*(domain_nr+1)
        r = c_int(x + y + seeds[seed_set]['ex']).value
    else:
        x = int(c_int((domain_nr + 2)*(domain_nr + 7)*domain_nr).value/9.0)
        y = (domain_nr*3 + 1)*domain_nr
        r = c_int(x + y + seeds[seed_set]['nex']).value

    rands = 3*[0]
    for i in range(3):
        r = rand(r)
        rands[i] = crop(r)
    domain_length = (rands[0]*rands[1] - rands[2]) % 6 + 6
    domain = ""
    for i in range(domain_length):
        r = rand(r)
        ch = crop(r) % 26 + ord('a')
        domain += chr(ch)
    domain += "." + tlds[domain_nr % 4]
    return domain

def get_domains(nr, seed_set):
    domains = []
    for i in range(nr):
        for temp_file in range(2):
            domains.append(dga(i*2, seed_set, temp_file))
    return domains

if __name__=="__main__":
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument('-s', '--seed', choices=['a','b'], default='a')
    args = parser.parse_args()
    for domain in get_domains(1000, args.seed):
        print(domain)

```

For example:

```
$ python dga_v1.py -s b
hmhxnupkc.mo00.com
quowesuqbbb.mo00.com
rffcteo.dyndns.org
adrcgmzrm.dyndns.org
bdubefoeug.yi.org
bpdyttrlp.yi.org
hovdworcxd.dynserv.com
dljemwae.dynserv.com
nllylxvrbel.mo00.com
dcdkfq.mo00.com
gyuzohut.dyndns.org
lfiavsbyntu.dyndns.org
waxmtzkqblh.yi.org
zvfctvkdng.yi.org
hshfmrobjfr.dynserv.com
uaqjtycx.dynserv.com
prifhjstv.mo00.com
csukibyyt.mo00.com
ghcxncadj.dyndns.org
iskqsufrft.dyndns.org
```

These are also the domains from *The Malware Analyst's Cookbook*.

Version 2

The second DGA also takes the current date and top level set

```

import time
import argparse
from datetime import datetime

def rand(r):
    t = (1103515245 * r + 12435) & 0xFFFFFFFF
    return t

def crop(r):
    return (r // 256) % 32768

def dga(index, date, seed_set, temp_file=True, tld_set_nr=1):
    tld_sets = {1: ["com", "net", "tv", "cc"],
                2: ["dyndns.org", "yi.org", "dynserv.com", "mooo.com"]}

    seeds = {'a': {'ex': 24938314, 'nex': 24938315},
             'b': {'ex': 1600000, 'nex': 1600001}}
    tlds = tld_sets[tld_set_nr]

    domain_nr = int(index/2)
    if temp_file:
        r = 3*domain_nr + seeds[seed_set]['ex']
    else:
        r = 3*domain_nr + seeds[seed_set]['nex']

    discards = (int(time.mktime(date.timetuple())) - 1207000000) // 604800 + 2
    if domain_nr % 9 < 8:
        if domain_nr % 9 >= 6:
            discards -= 1
        for _ in range(discards):
            r = crop(rand(r))

    rands = 3*[0]
    for i in range(3):
        r = rand(r)
        rands[i] = crop(r)
    domain_length = (rands[0]*rands[1] + rands[2]) % 6 + 7
    domain = ""
    for i in range(domain_length):
        r = rand(r)
        ch = crop(r) % 26 + ord('a')
        domain += chr(ch)
    domain += "." + tlds[domain_nr % 4]
    return domain

def get_domains(nr, date, seed, tld_set):
    domains = []
    for i in range(nr):
        for temp_file in range(2):
            domains.append(dga(i*2, date, seed, temp_file, tld_set))
    return domains

if __name__=="__main__":
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument("-d", "--date",
                        help="date for which to generate domains")
    parser.add_argument("-t", "--tld", choices=[1,2], type=int,
                        help="tld set", default=1)
    parser.add_argument("-s", "--seed", choices=['a','b'], default='a')
    args = parser.parse_args()
    if args.date:
        d = datetime.strptime(args.date, "%Y-%m-%d")
    else:
        d = datetime.now()
    for domain in get_domains(1000, d, args.seed, args.tld):
        print(domain)

```

For example:

```
$ python dga_v2.py -d 2013-12-12 -t 1 -s a
gwbgmsmhgsp.com
bizysslscs.com
egbmbdey.net
ogoqxbevdeqm.net
iuhqhbmq.tv
iuhqhbmq.tv
wedlgyvplmt.cc
zoipmnr.cc
gktdtghza.com
toogdpdiekh.com
iuhqhbmq.net
oxfjukumll.net
vwm1cid.tv
glmvhcm.tv
pgmryukdb.cc
egbmbdey.cc
vsdvzt.com
wixcaiktigew.com
xewokii.net
lvctmusxcyz.net
```

You also find the code on my [GitHub page](#).

Properties of the DGA

The properties of the two DGAs are:

	version 1	version 2
time dependent	no	yes
granularity	-	1 week
domains per seed and day	variable, as many as can be generated in 30 minutes	see version 1
sequence	sequential	see version 1
wait time between domains	unknown	see version 1
top level domains	.dyndns.org, yi.org, dynserv.com, mooo.com	some as version 1, but mostly com, .net, .tv, .cc
second level characters	lower case a-z	see version 1
second level domain length	6 to 11	7 to 12

Samples

The following table shows reports on malwr.com that contact at least one domain generated by the second version of Kraken's DGA. Many samples seem to be downloader, e.g., Vobfus, and the domains are actually generated by the Kraken payload.

md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
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md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
<u>04966960f3f5ed32ae479079a1bcf6e9</u>	16 Jul. 2013	1 ^A	¹ Oderoor.gen!C	Email-Worm.Win32.Agent.fe	² EncPk-DJ
<u>f2ae73d866bb4edd14ee96cf74fbb423</u>	05 Aug. 2013	1 ^A	Clean	³ Generic	¹ Generic-S
<u>c13abb6be8a1c7fc9b18c8fd0a9488b7</u>	09 Oct. 2013	1 ^A	⁴ Rimecud.A	² Generic	⁵ Rimecud-DD
<u>c13abb6be8a1c7fc9b18c8fd0a9488b7</u>	10 Oct. 2013 ^R	1 ^A	³ Rimecud.A	² Generic	⁴ Rimecud-DD
<u>1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513</u>	22 Oct. 2013	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁶ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
<u>1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513</u>	28 Nov. 2013 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
<u>1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513</u>	18 Dec. 2013 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
<u>04966960f3f5ed32ae479079a1bcf6e9</u>	24 Jan. 2014 ^R	2 ^B	⁰ Oderoor.gen!C	² Generic	¹ EncPk-DJ
<u>1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513</u>	24 Jan. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
<u>1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513</u>	25 Jan. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
<u>04966960f3f5ed32ae479079a1bcf6e9</u>	27 Jan. 2014 ^R	2 ^B	⁰ Oderoor.gen!C	² Generic	¹ EncPk-DJ
<u>1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513</u>	05 Feb. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
<u>1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513</u>	13 Feb. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
<u>1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513</u>	21 Feb. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
<u>c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16</u>	03 Mar. 2014	1 ^A	Clean	² Generic	¹ Generic-S
<u>c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16</u>	17 Mar. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	¹ Generic-S
<u>c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16</u>	19 Mar. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	¹ Generic-S
<u>c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16</u>	25 Mar. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	¹ Generic-S
<u>c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16</u>	01 Apr. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	⁴ Agent-AGLO
<u>c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16</u>	22 Apr. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	Clean	⁵ Agent.hegf	⁴ Agent-AGLO
<u>c413f1a0738a3b475db2ed44aecbf3ba</u>	16 Jun. 2014	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	¹ EncPk-CK

md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
<u>0bfd909d651a11e3d3cdf5b091ee12a1</u>	28 Jun. 2014	1 ^A	⁷ Vobfus	⁸ Win32.Agent.agdmx	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>15993254499407fd7cbe701be11106f1</u>	01 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZV	⁷ Win32.Agent.ageop	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>1598723f88c6432e8ceee68336a08b01</u>	01 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcvt	¹ VB-ALW
<u>17d4b6b618f7576023dd3b983416a180</u>	01 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.escx	¹ VB-ALW
<u>1bfac857a733ec498fc1efc0ebb6a236</u>	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZO	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcnq	¹ VB-ALW
<u>1cfb3882d79b42f2f881ea20cca0f780</u>	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esdv	¹ VB-ALW
<u>1e291e57c007acd5aecbcddd156c46e6</u>	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.escj	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>1fafa36c436af003b28fd9d7befddf01</u>	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agerc	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>20ff4c7b6265bc2b7e9b66bbfe4c8ee6</u>	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZZ	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esdw	¹ VB-ALW
<u>22a5ce2602e8a0f76e4ab1db713098c6</u>	03 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esaj	¹ VB-ALW
<u>26e7996626da3fbf66b78c0b5969efc1</u>	03 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZM	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.urjq	¹ VB-ALW
<u>272577cdcd11389a4b95d5eae8f3c5b1</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>27549feb774b058fde65bc3936a0bf36</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcvt	¹ VB-ALW
<u>2807aafab5a799ff261b3f614aecbf91</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZC	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.erwz	¹ SillyFDC-AH
<u>2812ce13236087c1a5b30f63ae33c7a0</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>2825b9e636ad7a9304ea97981b68bf20</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YS	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.uqif	¹ SillyFDC-AH
<u>292028779b7c4c2e525ccbad0e0f5161</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agere	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>2bc4df2819c8983b1511814809c2c641</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esdv	¹ VB-ALW
<u>28d89ceb348459fd7d1468e130b1a706</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZD	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.ercx	¹ SillyFDC-AH
<u>2c3b96ca3a18140dfcd42434f3e03020</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZQ	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.erzx	¹ VB-ALW
<u>2c931871fef3b50c0bd2b4961419a311</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esat	¹ VB-ALW

md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
<u>2cae6bd4e939b318726eebb347db0a26</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>2cc5ad6770250338bd5844904fb18181</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcsv	¹ VB-ALW
<u>2d07ba427df9cd2c4af815015a484391</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YY	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.ervr	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>2d321324e9a28c834a750860122233c6</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcvt	¹ VB-ALW
<u>2db1a991aea1664e3dcbc5e75e108131</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.erwv	¹ Generic-S
<u>2f2a752f96ecb251efdc275f0ec8ea80</u>	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZV	?	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>2fab042f7b482e8aa2c5ecd413f2eff1</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcvt	¹ VB-ALW
<u>2fcae2e2a9ed2f36bd399c77da2470c6</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>30cc569d95b4401aa0681b8e01299981</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YU	?	?
<u>30cf2bf448db73c75e153216d4cd4fc0</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.uron	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>302471280652d2d1817757ef0f8ad656</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esdv	¹ VB-ALW
<u>3127e3127a2a206a8dc6bc21f4693386</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>33bf61ebeb41d157b45d3180d1f71b76</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZN	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.urkc	¹ VB-ALW
<u>33c739e7d6aa599c05ff9f94a5768921</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZR	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcpv	¹ VB-ALW
<u>32d5e945a82fb6fb511e7bdd32cf8c21</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.eseu	¹ Generic-S
<u>34defe58f6d305960fff8c295bd9b851</u>	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	?	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>383977446a2a42bd1427703974265606</u>	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>39408e199dd996cbe915c5c32261c490</u>	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZN	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.urkc	¹ VB-ALW
<u>395df008604e98e228ed41ce67f213b1</u>	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZV	⁷ Win32.Agent.ageop	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>3d6d6bbe37b37be79c43dc6a7b052a46</u>	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agere	¹ SillyFDC-S
<u>38ab4d2cda29c4ba1346da4b85c81800</u>	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S

md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
3ca13a5648d4f2573f28b37638333701	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YF	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.uprs	¹ SillyFDC-AH
3bc39b3af9f13317744fd0548503baa6	07 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YU	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.erwm	¹ VB-ALR
c413f1a0738a3b475db2ed44aecbf3ba	30 Sep. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	Clean	¹ EncPk-CK
675d97e5cdd3b7e07c7945fa5398e599	21 May. 2015	1 ^A	?	?	?

Prefixes: ⁰Backdoor:Win32/, ¹Mal/, ²HEUR:Trojan.Win32., ³Trojan:Win32/, ⁴Troj/, ⁵Trojan-Downloader.Win32., ⁶Worm:Win32/, ⁷Trojan.

TLDS: ^A com, net, tv, cc. ^Bdyndns.org, yi.org, dynserv.com, mooo.com

DGArchive

The DGA in this blog post has been implemented by the [DGArchive](#) project.