

# Retefe unpacker

 [github.com/Tomasuh/retefe-unpacker](https://github.com/Tomasuh/retefe-unpacker)

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## Tomasuh/retefe-unpacker

Retefe static unpacker



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
This is a writeup on how to implement an unpacker for current versions (at the time of publication) of the banking malware Retefe.

Resources about the threat:

- [Retefe banking Trojan leverages EternalBlue exploit in Swiss campaigns](#)
- [The Retefe Saga](#)
- [Reversing Retefe](#)
- [New version of Retefe Banking Trojan Uses EternalBlue](#)

Historically there seems to be some variance of ways the malware has stored its Javascript payload. Some sources mentions self extracting ZIP files and other XORed data. The current version makes use of a 4 byte XOR key which is generated based on the scripts length and a few mathematical operations performed on it. The post [Reversing Retefe](#) from about two months back (2018-11-08) shows use of a one byte XOR key which indicates that the threat actor has changed its code base after the release of that post. This post is made with the intention to shed some light on the current way the threat Retefe stores its payload.

Looking at the mapped binary image with IDA shows a large amount of unexplored data that is in the `.data` segment.



Browsing the `.data` segment with Binary Ninja shows a large segment of data whose top is referenced in a copy instruction:

```
mov rcx, qword [rsp+0x20 {write_encoded_buffer_to}]
lea rdx, [rel 0x140050960]
mov rdi, qword [rcx]
mov rsi, rdx {0x140050960}
mov ecx, eax
rep movsb byte [rdi], [rsi] {0x0}
```

The copy instruction is part of a function that passes the address of this copied data as an argument to a decoding function together with the length of the buffer:

```
sub_140005b70:
mov dword [rsp+0x20 {arg_20}], r9d
mov qword [rsp+0x18 {arg_18}], r8
mov qword [rsp+0x10 {arg_10}], rdx
mov qword [rsp+0x8 {arg_8}], rcx
push rsi {__saved_rsi}
push rdi {__saved_rdi}
sub rsp, 0x68
mov ecx, 0x10
call sub_140006110
mov qword [rsp+0x38 {var_40}], rax
mov rax, qword [rsp+0x38 {var_40}]
mov qword [rsp+0x20 {write_encoded_buffer_to}], rax
mov rax, qword [rsp+0x20 {write_encoded_buffer_to}]
mov dword [rax+0x8], 0x1691f // hard coded buffer size
mov rax, qword [rsp+0x20 {write_encoded_buffer_to}]
mov eax, dword [rax+0x8]
mov ecx, eax
call sub_1400066a0
mov qword [rsp+0x40 {var_38}], rax
mov rax, qword [rsp+0x20 {write_encoded_buffer_to}]
mov rcx, qword [rsp+0x40 {var_38}]
mov qword [rax], rcx
mov rax, qword [rsp+0x20 {write_encoded_buffer_to}]
mov eax, dword [rax+0x8]
mov rcx, qword [rsp+0x20 {write_encoded_buffer_to}]
mov rdx, [rel 0x140050960]
mov rdi, qword [rcx]
mov rsi, rdx {0x140050960}
mov ecx, eax
rep movsb byte [rdi], [rsi] {0x0}
mov rax, qword [rsp+0x20 {write_encoded_buffer_to}]
mov eax, dword [rax+0x8]
dec eax
mov edx, eax // buffer length argument
mov rax, qword [rsp+0x20 {write_encoded_buffer_to}]
mov rcx, qword [rax] // encoded buffer address value
call decoder
```

Copy data

Buffer size

Calling decoder

The `decoder` function passes the `buffer length` and another `int` to a function that takes `buffer length` to the power of that `int`. Then a shift and subtraction is performed. The result is the XOR key that is used to decode the buffer.

```

decoder:
mov     dword [rsp+0x10 {buffer_size-1}], edx
mov     qword [rsp+0x8 {the_buffer}], rcx
sub     rsp, 0x58
mov     edx, 0x6
mov     ecx, dword [rsp+0x68 {buffer_size-1}]
call   _lndarg_to_the_power_of_2ndarg
shl     eax, 0x3
mov     ecx, 0x7fffffff
sub     ecx, eax
mov     eax, ecx
mov     dword [rsp+0x2c {xor_key}], eax


```

More actions on result

(Buffer length - 1) ^ 6

Store result

Later on the decode operation is performed:



That the data actually becomes decoded can be verified with a debugger, watching the memory of the buffer after the decoder function has ran:

The screenshot shows a debugger window with assembly code on the right and a hex dump on the left. A red arrow points from the assembly instruction `mov ecx, 20` to the hex value `20` in the dump. The assembly code includes instructions like `rep movsb byte ptr ds:[rdi], byte ptr ds`, `mov rax, qword ptr ss:[rsp+20]`, and `call` instructions with a long hash: `call 1a3f25f4067e50aa113dfd9349fc4bdcf34`. The hex dump shows the memory contents starting from address `0000000002E1690`.

With the above research its possible to write an unpacker.

The actions performed by the unpacker:

- Use yara rules to find buffer location buffer length, number of shifts, subtraction value and power to value of it.
- Calculate the buffer RVA as the extracted location is relative to the LEA instruction that references it
- Calculate XOR array based on values extracted with the help of the yara rules
- Extract and decode the script

The sourcecode to do this is available in [this github repo](#).

Recent hashes that it has been confirmed to work on:

352b78b8ed38be7ada1d9f4d82352da5015a853bf3c3bdb8982e4977d98f981c  
 5c548447203104e9a26c355beaf2367a8fa4793a1b0d3668701ee9ba120b9a7b  
 1a3f25f4067e50aa113dfd9349fc4bdcf346d2e589ed6b4cebbbc0a33e9eea50d

Example run:

```
crunch:retefe tom$ python3 exporter.py 1a3f25f4067e50aa113dfd9349fc4bdcf346d2e589ed6b4cebbc0a33e9eea50d
Found seed (and buffer size) value 0x1691e
Found power to value 0x6
Found shift left value 0x3
Found subtract value 0x7fffffff
Found buffer place arg 0x4ad90
XOR array that will be used for decryption [255, 189, 120, 68]
Calculated RVA for encoded buffer is 0x50960
Extracted file written to 1a3f25f4067e50aa113dfd9349fc4bdcf346d2e589ed6b4cebbc0a33e9eea50d.extracted
crunch:retefe tom$
crunch:retefe tom$
crunch:retefe tom$ cut -c-100 1a3f25f4067e50aa113dfd9349fc4bdcf346d2e589ed6b4cebbc0a33e9eea50d.extracted
(function(e,r){"object"==typeof exports?module.exports=r():"function"==typeof define&&define.amd?def
crunch:retefe tom$
crunch:retefe tom$
crunch:retefe tom$
```

Screenshots in this post are based on the sample

[1a3f25f4067e50aa113dfd9349fc4bdcf346d2e589ed6b4cebbc0a33e9eea50d](#) .