

# Honda and Enel impacted by cyber attack suspected to be ransomware

---

[blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/06/honda-and-enel-impacted-by-cyber-attack-suspected-to-be-ransomware/](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/06/honda-and-enel-impacted-by-cyber-attack-suspected-to-be-ransomware/)

Threat Intelligence Team

June 10, 2020



Car manufacturer Honda has been hit by a cyber attack, according to a [report](#) published by the BBC, and later confirmed by the company in a [tweet](#). Another similar attack, also [disclosed on Twitter](#), hit Edesur S.A., one of the companies belonging to Enel Argentina which operates in the business of energy distribution in the City of Buenos Aires.

Based on samples posted online, these incidents may be tied to the EKANS/SNAKE ransomware family. In this blog post, we review what is known about this [ransomware](#) strain and what we have been able to analyze so far.

## Honda Ransomware Attack with a liking for ICS

---

First public mentions of EKANS ransomware date back to January 2020, with security researcher Vitali Kremez [sharing](#) information about a new targeted ransomware written in GOLANG.

The group appears to have a special interest for Industrial Control Systems (ICS), as detailed in this [blog post](#) by security firm Dragos.

```

-----
| What happened to your files?
-----

We breached your corporate network and encrypted the data on your computers. The encrypted data includes documents, databases, photos and more -
all were encrypted using a military grade encryption algorithms (AES-256 and RSA-2048). You cannot access those files right now. But dont worry!

You can still get those files back and be up and running again in no time.

-----
| How to contact us to get your files back?
-----

The only way to restore your files is by purchasing a decryption tool loaded with a private key we created specifically for your network.

Once run on an effected computer, the tool will decrypt all encrypted files - and you can resume day-to-day operations, preferably with better
cyber security in mind. If you are interested in purchasing the decryption tool contact us at email@email.com

-----
| How can you be certain we have the decryption tool?
-----

In your mail to us attach up to 3 files (up to 3MB, no databases or spreadsheets).

We will send them back to you decrypted.

```

Figure 1: EKANS ransom note

On June 8, a researcher [shared](#) samples of ransomware that supposedly was aimed at Honda and ENEL INT. When we started looking at the code, we found several artefacts that corroborate this possibility.

89 E6	mov esi,esp	
E8 95 89 EF FF	call honda.44B3EE	
8B 05 14 99 7C 00	mov eax,dword ptr ds:[7C9914]	
8B 0D 10 99 7C 00	mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[7C9910]	ecx:"EKANS", 7C9910:&"EKANS"
89 0C 24	mov dword ptr ss:[esp],ecx	[esp]:"EKANS"
89 44 24 04	mov dword ptr ss:[esp+4],eax	
E8 DF 12 00 00	call honda.553D50	DNS_Resolver_Mutex_check
0F B6 44 24 08	movzx eax,byte ptr ss:[esp+8]	
84 C0	test al,al	
0F 84 3D 01 00 00	je honda.552BBB	
E8 7D 16 00 00	call honda.554100	
E8 78 91 02 00	call honda.57BC00	
8B 04 24	mov eax,dword ptr ss:[esp]	[esp]:"EKANS"
8B 4C 24 04	mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+4]	[esp]:"EKANS"
C7 04 24 00 00 00	mov dword ptr ss:[esp],0	
89 44 24 04	mov dword ptr ss:[esp+4],eax	
89 4C 24 08	mov dword ptr ss:[esp+8],ecx	
E8 ED 7E EE FF	call honda.43A990	
8B 44 24 14	mov eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+14]	
8B 4C 24 10	mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+10]	
8B 54 24 0C	mov edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+C]	[esp]:"EKANS"
89 14 24	mov dword ptr ss:[esp],edx	
89 4C 24 04	mov dword ptr ss:[esp+4],ecx	
89 44 24 08	mov dword ptr ss:[esp+8],eax	
E8 B1 6B F9 FF	call honda.4E9670	
8B 44 24 0C	mov eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+C]	
89 44 24 1C	mov dword ptr ss:[esp+1C],eax	
85 C0	test eax,eax	
0F 84 C5 00 00 00	je honda.552B94	
E8 4C 93 02 00	call honda.57BE20	
8B 04 24	mov eax,dword ptr ss:[esp]	[esp]:"EKANS"
8B 4C 24 04	mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+4]	
8B 54 24 1C	mov edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+1C]	
8B 1A	mov ebx,dword ptr ds:[edx]	

Figure 2: Mutex check

When the malware executes, it will try to resolve to a hardcoded hostname (mds.honda.com). If, and only if it does, will the file encryption begin. The same logic, with a specific hostname, also applied to the ransomware allegedly tied to Enel.

```

83 EC 4C      sub esp,4C
8D 05 01 F3 61 00  lea eax,dword ptr ds:[61F301]
89 04 24      mov dword ptr ss:[esp],eax
C7 44 24 04 0D 00  mov dword ptr ss:[esp+4],D
E8 01 7F F5 FF  call honda.4ABC80
8B 44 24 08   mov eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+8]
8B 4C 24 14   mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+14]
8B 54 24 0C   mov edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+C]
85 C9        test ecx,ecx
0F 85 14 01 00 00  jne honda.553EA7
85 D2        test edx,edx
0F 84 0C 01 00 00  je honda.553EA7
89 54 24 20   mov dword ptr ss:[esp+20],edx
31 C9        xor ecx,ecx
31 DB        xor ebx,ebx
EB 16        jmp honda.553DBB
8B 6C 24 48   mov ebp,dword ptr ss:[esp+48]
83 C5 0C     add ebp,C
8B 74 24 24   mov esi,dword ptr ss:[esp+24]
8D 4E 01     lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[esi+1]
8B 54 24 20   mov edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+20]
89 C3        mov ebx,eax
89 E8        mov eax,ebp
39 D1        cmp ecx,edx
7D 5E        jge honda.553E1D
89 4C 24 24   mov dword ptr ss:[esp+24],ecx
88 5C 24 1F   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+1F],b1
89 44 24 48   mov dword ptr ss:[esp+48],eax
8B 48 04     mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[eax+4]
8B 10       mov edx,dword ptr ds:[eax]
8B 58 08     mov ebx,dword ptr ds:[eax+8]
89 14 24     mov dword ptr ss:[esp],edx
89 4C 24 04   mov dword ptr ss:[esp+4],ecx
89 5C 24 08   mov dword ptr ss:[esp+8],ebx

```

mds.honda.com  
D: '\r'  
net\_lookupIP

0046FDF3  
#15316F

Dump 3 | Dump 4 | Dump 5 | Watch 1 | Struct

ASCII	
41 2E 43 4F 4D 4D	MDS.HONDA.COM
6C 65 4D 61 73 61	ViewOfFileMasar
65 6E 64 65 5F 4B	m Gondimende K

Figure 3:

Function responsible for performing DNS query

### Target: Honda

- Resolving internal domain: mds.honda.com
- Ransom e-mail: CarrolBidell@tutanota[.]com

### Target: Enel

- Resolving internal domain: enelint.global
- Ransom e-mail: CarrolBidell@tutanota[.]com

## RDP as a possible attack vector

Both companies had some machines with Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access publicly exposed (reference [here](#)). RDP attacks are one of the main entry points when it comes to targeted ransomware operations.

- RDP Exposed: /AGL632956.jpn.mds.honda.com
- RDP Exposed: /IT000001429258.enelint.global

However, we cannot say conclusively that this is how threat actors may have gotten in. Ultimately, only a proper internal investigation will be able to determine exactly how the attackers were able to compromise the affected networks.

## Detection

We tested the ransomware samples publicly available in our lab by creating a fake internal server that would respond to the DNS query made by the malware code with the same IP address it expected. We then ran the sample alleged to be tied to Honda against Malwarebytes Nebula, our cloud-based endpoint protection for businesses.

Name	Action Taken	Category
Ransom.Ekans	Quarantined	Ransomware
Malware.Ransom.Agent.Generic	Quarantined	Ransomware

Figure 4: Malwarebytes Nebula dashboard showing detections

We detect this payload as ‘Ransom.Ekans’ when it attempts to execute. In order to test another of our protection layers, we also disabled (not recommended) the malware protection to let the behavior engine do its thing. Our anti-ransomware technology was able to quarantine the malicious file without the use of any signature.

Ransomware gangs have shown no mercy, even in this period of dealing with a pandemic. They continue to target big companies in order to extort large sums of money.

RDP has been called out as some of the lowest hanging fruit preferred by attackers. However, we also recently learned about a new SMB vulnerability allowing remote execution. It is important for defenders to properly map out all assets, patch them, and never allow them to be publicly exposed.

We will update this blog post if we come across new relevant information.

## Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Honda related sample:

d4da69e424241c291c173c8b3756639c654432706e7def5025a649730868c4a1  
mds.honda.com

Enel related sample:

edef8b955468236c6323e9019abb10c324c27b4f5667bc3f85f3a097b2e5159a  
enelint.global