Lampion trojan disseminated in Portugal using COVID-19 template

seguranca-informatica.pt/lampion-trojan-disseminated-in-portugal-using-covid-19-template/

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The fresh release of the Latin American Lampion trojan was updated with a new C2 address. Lampion trojan disseminated in Portugal using COVID-19 template.
In the last few days, a new release of the Latin American Lampion trojan was released in Portugal using a template related to COVID-19. This trojan has been distributed in Portugal in different ways, but this time the pandemic situation and the ongoing vaccination process is the reason behind this campaign to drop the beast in the wild.

In detail, the threat is impersonating the domain "*min-saude.pt*" and the link to the zip file is also distributed in the email body.

```
Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.zip
```

The *modus operandi* is the same as observed in **previous releases**, only the addresses of the DLLs used during the side-loading process and C2 server geolocalized in Russia have been changed.

DLLs used during the DLL side-loading process downloaded from Google storage

```
encrypted_string="n\s^[j]jef9ig0`%Y%|ipjweWh+WM]2[W$}]MeRee]8bc[{W<f6_$iH$iYLe]c|%
[email protected];h/W*]M[o(g&c(_'P%=FZ#R(I#1'8/'$dZtb^bOg"
decrypted_string="hxxps://storage.googleapis.]com/mystorage2021/P-2-19.dll"

encrypted_string="iP/^*j6jvfpiV0O%A%*i;j+eLh(W\]K[N$0];e.ep]&br[gW+f/_)ik$+Y&excs%=cJc

decrypted_string="hxxps://storage.googleapis.]com/mystorage2021/0.zip"
```

When the malware is executed, it communicates with the C2 server and the browser overlay process begins every time a target home banking portal is accessed on the victim side.

```
0x4e7e210 (22): <|AppClip|>
<br />0x4e7e344 (38): Server Mandou====> <br />0x4e7e37c (36): <|FECHAR_RECORTE|>
<br />0x4e7e3b0 (72): Server manda====> Fecahando Recorte!
<br />0x4e7e408 (30): <|ALINHA_TELA|>
<br />0x4e7e434 (34): ServRecebeu====> <br />0x4e7e474 (8): ><|>
<br />0x4e7e4b4 (40): ClienteRecebeu====> <br />0x4e7e500 (44):  Erro Encontrado====>


0x4e71f98 (28): banco montepio
0x4e71fc4 (16): montepio
0x4e71ff8 (26): millenniumbcp
0x4e72034 (18): Santander
0x4e72054 (14): BPI Net
0x4e72070 (18): Banco BPI
0x4e720a4 (24): Caixadirecta
0x4e720cc (42): Caixadirecta Empresas
0x4e72118 (20): NOVO BANCO
0x4e72150 (14): EuroBic
0x4e72186 (16): Credito Agricola
0x4e721b0 (20): Login Page
0x4e721d4 (22): CA Empresas
0x4e7220c (18): Bankinter
0x4e72240 (38): navegador exclusivo
0x4e74abc (14): TravaBB
0x4e74ada (32):  Banco do Brasil
0x4e74b08 (16): Traazure
0x4e74b2a (32):  Caixa Economica
0x4e74b58 (20): Travsantos
0x4e74b7e (20):  Santander
0x4e74ba0 (14): Travsic
0x4e74bbe (14):  Sicred
0x4e74bdc (14): Travite
0x4e74bfa (8):  Ita
0x4e74c14 (18): Travdesco
0x4e74c36 (18):  Bradesco
0x4e74c58 (22): BANRITRAVAR
0x4e74c7e (18):  Banrisul
0x4e74ca0 (20): TravaBitco
0x4e74cc6 (32):  Mercado Bitcoin
0x4e74cf4 (14): Travcit
0x4e74d12 (18):  Citibank
0x4e74d34 (18): Travorigs
0x4e74d56 (30):  Banco Original
0x4e74d84 (18): SICTRAVAR
0x4e74da6 (14):  Sicoob
```

Communication process

```
0x64d637c (246): <|Info|><|>Microsoft Windows 10 Home (64)bit<|><|><|>
<<|@[email protected]|DESKTOP-xxxxxxxxx - xxxx|Microsoft Windows 10 Home
(64)bit|||MP|N
0x64d6474 (108): O|210X|..|FF|############00000000|5.188.9.28|||@[email protected]
0x64d64fc (360):
##35977722363232BA77922081E8A8B11D252207F6A##############173E26057E4840ABCD03FFE2D3BAC

0x64d667c (364):
##35977722363232BA77922081E8A8B11D252207F###############A0053CCA9187D90E173E26057E4840

0x64dc5cc (264):
##35977722363232BA77922081E8A8B11D252207F############90E173E26057E4840ABCD0##
0x64dc6ec (260):
44A46F92B11004144D5DFA2DF86AAF66###############C8690B55C83A03225F22BBC12B17BDD3AD94E
```



C2 server geolocated in Russia

C2: 5.188.9.]28



Banking overlay windows

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

```
sample: A0217751E21918083A8B9A6DD3916EDD
https://app.any.run/tasks/d3d7faf4-1d88-449a-812b-d34714ecf924/

Zip file: hxxps://transfer.pcloud]com/download.html?
code=5Z3YkhXZI6WMHp985xzZaomKZGOMp6DsTf9jKump5wPGzlVLzHrJV&label=Transfer%20-
%20files%20sent%20(to%20recipient)#

DLLs:
hxxps://storage.googleapis.]com/mystorage2021/0.zip
hxxps://storage.googleapis.]com/mystorage2021/P-2-19.dll

C2 server - RUSSIA -:
5.188.9.]28
```

Pedro Tavares

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In recent years he has invested in the field of information security, exploring and analyzing a wide range of topics, such as pentesting (Kali Linux), malware, exploitation, hacking, IoT and security in Active Directory networks. He is also Freelance Writer (Infosec. Resources Institute and Cyber Defense Magazine) and developer of the 0xSI_f33d – a feed that compiles phishing and malware campaigns targeting Portuguese citizens.

Read more here.