

Defeating macOS Malware Anti-Analysis Tricks with Radare2

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In this second post in our series on intermediate to advanced macOS malware reversing, we start our journey into tackling common challenges when dealing with macOS malware samples. Last time out, we took a look at [how to use radare2 for rapid triage](#), and we'll continue using r2 as we move through these various challenges. Along the way, we'll pick up tips on both how to beat obstacles put in place by malware authors and how to use r2 more productively.

Although we can achieve a lot from static analysis, sometimes it can be more efficient to execute the malware in a controlled environment and conduct dynamic analysis. Malware authors, however, may have other ideas and can set up various roadblocks to stop us doing exactly that. Consequently, one of the first challenges we often have to overcome is working around these attempts to prevent execution in our safe environment.

In this post, we'll look at how to circumvent the malware author's control flow to avoid executing unwanted parts of their code, learning along the way how to take advantage of some nice features of the r2 debugger! We'll be looking at a [sample of EvilQuest](#) (password: infect3d), so fire up your VM and download it before reading on.

A note for the unwary: if you're using Safari in your VM to download the file and you see "decompression failed", go to Safari Preferences and turn off the 'Open "safe" files after downloading' option in the General tab and try the download again.

Getting Started With the radare2 Debugger

Our sample hit the [headlines in July 2020](#), largely because at first glance it appeared to be a rare example of macOS ransomware. SentinelLabs quickly analyzed it and [produced a decryptor](#) to help any potential victims, but it turned out the malware was not very effective in the wild.

It may well have been a PoC, or a project still in early development stages, as the code and functionality have the look and feel of someone experimenting with how to achieve various attacker objectives. However, that's all good news for us, as EvilQuest implements several anti-analysis features that will serve us as good practice.

The first thing you will want to do is remove any extended attributes and codesigning if the sample has a revoked signature. In this case, the sample isn't signed at all, but if it were we could use:

```
% sudo codesign --remove-signature <path to bundle or file>
```

If we need the sample to be codesigned for execution, we can also sign it (remember your VM needs to have installed the Xcode command line tools via `xcode-select --install`) with:

```
% sudo codesign -fs - <path to bundle or file> --deep
```

We'll remove the extended attributes to bypass Gatekeeper and Notarization checks with

```
% xattr -rc <path to bundle or file>
```

And we'll attempt to attach to the radare2 debugger by adding the `-d` switch to our initialization command:

```
% r2 -AA -d patch
```

Unfortunately, our first attempt doesn't go well. We already removed the extended attributes and codesigning isn't the issue here, but the radare2 debugger fails to attach.

```

user@reversing-lab-10 ~ % cd ~/Downloads/EvilQuest
user@reversing-lab-10 EvilQuest % ls -al
total 21440
drwxr-xr-x@  5 auser  staff      160 30 Jun  2020 .
drwx-----@ 20 auser  staff      640 20 Sep 15:02 ..
-rw-r--r--@  1 auser  staff 10880309 30 Jun  2020 Mixed In Key 8.dmg
-rwxr-xr-x@  1 auser  admin   87920 27 Jun  2020 patch
-rw-r--r--@  1 auser  staff    208 30 Jun  2020 readme.txt
user@reversing-lab-10 EvilQuest % shasum patch
efbb681a61967e6f5a811f8649ec26efe16f50ae  patch
user@reversing-lab-10 EvilQuest % r2 -AA -d patch
Child killed
unknown error in debug_attach
Child killed
ptrace: Cannot attach: Invalid argument
Possibly unsigned r2. Please see doc/macOS.md
ERRNO: 22 (EINVAL)
[w] Cannot open 'dbg://./patch' for writing.
user@reversing-lab-10 EvilQuest %

```

Failing to attach the debugger.

That `ptrace: Cannot Attach: Invalid argument` looks ominous, but actually the error message is misleading. The problem is that we need elevated privileges to debug, so a simple `sudo` should get us past our current obstacle.

```

user@reversing-lab-10 EvilQuest % sudo r2 -AA -d patch
Password:
[x] Analyze all flags starting with sym. and entry0 (aa)
[x] Analyze function calls (aac)
[x] Analyze len bytes of instructions for references (aar)
[x] Check for objc references (aao)
[x] Finding and parsing C++ vtables (avrr)
[x] Skipping type matching analysis in debugger mode (aaft)
[x] Propagate noreturn information (aanr)
[x] Finding function preludes
[x] Enable constraint types analysis for variables
-- Helping siol merge? No way, that would be like.. way too much not lazy. - vi
fino
[0x112ae0000]>

```

The debugger needs elevated privileges


Yay, attach success! Let's take a look around before we start diving further into the debugger.

A Faster Way of Finding XREFS and Interesting Code

Let's run `afll` as we did when analyzing `OSX.Calisto` previously, but this time we'll output the function list to file so that we can sort it and search it more conveniently without having to keep running the command or scrolling up in the Terminal window.

```
> afll > functions.txt
```

Looking through our text file, we can see there are a number of function names that could be related to some kind of anti-analysis.



Some of EvilQuest's suspected anti-analysis functions

We can see that some of these only have a single cross-reference, and if we dig into these using the `axt` command, we see the cross-reference (XREF) for the `is_virtual_mchn` function happens to be `main()`, so that looks a good place to start.

```
:-> axt?
Usage: axt[?gq*] find data/code references to this address
| axtj [addr] find data/code references to this address and print in json format
| axtg [addr] display commands to generate graphs according to the xrefs
| axtq [addr] find and list the data/code references in quiet mode
| axt* [addr] same as axt, but prints as r2 commands
:->
```

Getting help on radare2's `axt` command

```
> axt sym._is_debugging
main 0x10000be5f [CALL] sys._is_virtual_mchn
```



```
[0x1000bd80]> axt sym._is_
sym._is_lfsc_target      sym._is_executable      sym._is_debugging      sym._is_virtual_mchn    sym._is_carved
sym._is_file_target
[0x1000bd80]> axt sym._is_debugging
sym._ei_persistence_main 0x1000b89a [CALL] call sym._is_debugging
[0x1000bd80]> axt sym._is_virtual_mchn
main 0x1000be5f [CALL] call sym._is_virtual_mchn
[0x1000bd80]>
```

Many commands in r2 support tab expansion

Here's a useful powertrick for those already comfortable with r2. You can run any command on a for-each loop using `@@`. For example, with

```
axt @@f:<search term>
```

we can get the XREFS to any function containing the search term in one go.

In this case I tell r2 to give me the XREFS for every function that contains “_is_”. Then I do the same with “get”. Try `@@?` to see more examples of what you can do with `@@`.

```
[0x100007bc0]> axt @@f:_is_
sym._get_targets 0x10000e516 [CALL] call sym.__is_target
sym._ei_forensic_thread 0x1000018d4 [DATA] lea rcx, [sym._is_lfsc_target]
sym._ei_loader_thread 0x10000c9a8 [DATA] lea rcx, [sym._is_executable]
sym._ei_persistence_main 0x10000b89a [CALL] call sym._is_debugging
main 0x10000be5f [CALL] call sym._is_virtual_mchn
sym._carve_target 0x10000eea8 [CALL] call sym._is_carved
sym._uncarve_target 0x10000f2c0 [CALL] call sym._is_carved
sym._ei_carver_main 0x10000badd [DATA] lea rcx, [sym._is_file_target]
main 0x10000c586 [CALL] call sym._s_is_high_time
[0x100007bc0]> axt @@f:get
sym.__dispatch 0x10000a7f0 [CALL] call sym.__check_if_targeted
sym.__check_if_running 0x100007e9d [CALL] call sym.__get_process_list
sym._kill_unwanted 0x1000081e7 [CALL] call sym.__get_process_list
sym.__check_if_targeted 0x10000a6a8 [CALL] call sym.__get_host_identifier
sym._get_targets 0x10000e516 [CALL] call sym.__is_target
sym._eiht_get_update 0x10000ad36 [CALL] call sym._ei_get_host_info
sym.__get_host_identifier 0x10000a55f [CALL] call sym._ei_get_macaddr
main 0x10000c2c1 [CALL] call sym._eiht_get_update
main 0x10000c56a [CALL] call sym._eiht_get_update
main 0x10000c074 [CALL] call sym._run_target
```

Using a for-each in radare2

Since we see that `is_virtual_mchn` is called in `main`, we should start by disassembling the entire `main` function to see what's going on, but first I'm going to change the r2 color theme to something a bit more reader-friendly with the `eco` command (try `eco` and hit the `tab` key to see a list of available themes).

```
eco focus
pdf @ main
```

Visual Graph Mode and Renaming Functions with Radare2

```


< 0x1000bdc0 0f8529000000 jne 0x1000bdef
0x1000bdc6 488b45f0 mov rax, qword [var_10h]
0x1000bdca 488b7808 mov rdi, qword [rax + 8]
0x1000bdce 488d35774b00. lea rsi, str.__silent ; 0x10001094c ; "--silent"
0x1000bdd5 e8da410000 call fcn.1000ffb4
0x1000bdda 83f800 cmp eax, 0
< 0x1000bddd 0f850c000000 jne 0x1000bdef
0x1000bde3 c745e8000000. mov dword [var_18h], 0
0x1000bdea e96b000000 jmp 0x1000be5a
; CODE XREFS from main @ 0x1000bdc0, 0x1000bddd
0x1000bdef 837df802 cmp dword [var_8h], 2
< 0x1000bdf3 0f8529000000 jne 0x1000be22
0x1000bdf9 488b45f0 mov rax, qword [var_10h]
0x1000bdfd 488b7808 mov rdi, qword [rax + 8]
0x1000be01 488d35b25c00. lea rsi, str.__noroot ; 0x100011aba ; "--noroot"
0x1000be08 e8a7410000 call fcn.1000ffb4
0x1000be0d 83f800 cmp eax, 0
< 0x1000be10 0f850c000000 jne 0x1000be22
0x1000be16 c745e0010000. mov dword [var_20h], 1
0x1000be1d e933000000 jmp 0x1000be55
; CODE XREFS from main @ 0x1000bdf3, 0x1000be10
0x1000be22 837df802 cmp dword [var_8h], 2
< 0x1000be26 0f8524000000 jne 0x1000be50
0x1000be2c 488b45f0 mov rax, qword [var_10h]
0x1000be30 488b7808 mov rdi, qword [rax + 8]
0x1000be34 488d35885c00. lea rsi, str.__ignrp ; 0x100011ac3 ; "--ignrp"
0x1000be3b e874410000 call fcn.1000ffb4
0x1000be40 83f800 cmp eax, 0
< 0x1000be43 0f8507000000 jne 0x1000be50
0x1000be49 c745dc010000. mov dword [var_24h], 1
; CODE XREFS from main @ 0x1000be26, 0x1000be43
0x1000be50 e900000000 jmp 0x1000be55
; CODE XREFS from main @ 0x1000be1d, 0x1000be50
< 0x1000be55 e900000000 jmp 0x1000be5a
; CODE XREFS from main @ 0x1000bdea, 0x1000be55
0x1000be5a bf02000000 mov edi, 2 ; int64_t arg1
0x1000be5f e85cbdffff call sym.__is_virtual_mchn
0x1000be64 83f800 cmp eax, 0
< 0x1000be67 0f840a000000 je 0x1000be77
0x1000be6d bfffffff mov edi, 0xffffffff ; -1
0x1000be72 e83b400000 call fcn.1000feb2

```

As we scroll back up to the beginning of the function, we can see the disassembly provides pretty interesting reading. At the beginning of `main`, we can see some unnamed functions are called. We're going to jump into Visual Graph mode and start renaming code as this will give us a good idea of the malware's execution flow and indicate what we need to do to beat the anti-analysis.

Hit `vv` to enter Visual Graph mode. I will try to walk you through the commands, but if you get lost at any point, don't feel bad. It happens to us all and is part of the r2 learning curve! You can just quit out and start again if needs be (part of the beauty of r2's speed; you can also save your project: type uppercase `P?` to see project options).

I prefer to view the graph as a horizontal, left-to-right flow; you can toggle between horizontal and vertical by pressing the `@` key.



Viewing the sample's visual graph horizontally

Here's a quick summary of some useful commands (there are many more as you'll see if you play around):

- hjkl (arrow keys) – move the graph around
- -/+0 – reduce, enlarge, return to default size
- ' – toggle graph comments
- tab/shift-tab – move to next/previous function
- dr – rename function
- q – back to visual mode
- t/f – follow the true/false execution chain
- u – go back
- ? – help/available options

Hit `'` once or twice make sure graph comments are on.

Use the tab key to move to the first function after `main()` (the border will be highlighted), where we can see an unnamed function and a reference in square brackets that begins with the letter 'o' (for example, `[ob]`), though it may be different in your sample). Type the letters (without the square brackets) to go to that function. Type `p` to rotate between different display modes till you see something similar to the next image.

```
[0x10000ffb4]
6: fcn.10000ffb4 ();
bp: 0 (vars 0, args 0)
sp: 0 (vars 0, args 0)
rg: 0 (vars 0, args 0)
0x10000ffb4 ff25de320000 jmp qword [reloc.strcmp]
```

As we can see, this function call is actually a call to the standard C library function `strcmp()`, so let's rename it.

Type `dr` and at the prompt type in the name you want to use and hit 'enter'. Unsurprisingly, I'm going to call it `strcmp`.

```
[0x10000ffb4]
;-- strcmp__:
6: int strcmp (const char *s1, const char *s2);
bp: 0 (vars 0, args 0)
sp: 0 (vars 0, args 0)
rg: 0 (vars 0, args 0)
0x10000ffb4 ff25de320000 jmp qword [reloc.strcmp]
```

To return to the main graph, type `u` and you should see that all references to that previously unnamed function now show `strcmp`, making things much clearer.

If you scroll through the graph (hjkl, remember) you will see many other unnamed functions that, once you explore them in the same way, are just relocations of standard C library calls such as `exit`, `time`, `sleep`, `printf`, `malloc`, `srandom` and more. I suggest you repeat the above exercise and rename as many as you can. This will both make the malware's behaviour easier to understand and build up some valuable muscle-memory for working in r2!

Beating Anti-Analysis Without Patching

There are two approaches you can take to interrupt a program's designed logic. One is to identify functions you want to avoid and patch the binary statically. This is fairly easy to do in r2 and there's quite a few tutorials on how to patch binaries already out there. We're not going to look at patching today because our entire objective is to run the sample dynamically, so we might as well interact with the program dynamically as well. Patching is really only worth considering if you need to create a sample for repeated use that avoids some kind of unwanted behaviour.

We basically have two easy options in terms of affecting control flow dynamically. We can either execute the function but manipulate the returned value (like put 0 in rax instead of 1) or skip execution of the function altogether.

We'll see just how easy it is to do each of these, but we should first think about the different consequences of each choice based on the malware we're dealing with.

If we NOP a function or skip over it, we're going to lose any behaviour or memory states invoked by that function. If the function doesn't do anything that affects the state of our program later on, this can be a good choice.

By the same token, if we execute the function but manipulate the value it returns, we may be allowing execution of code buried in that function that might trip us up. For example, if our function contains jumps to subroutines that do further anti-analysis tests, then we might get blocked before the parent function even returns, so this strategy wouldn't help us. Clearly then, we need to take a look around the code to figure out which is the best strategy in each particular case.

Let's take a look inside the `_is_virtual_mchn` function to see what it would do and work out our strategy.

If you're still in Visual Graph mode, hit `q` to get back to the r2 prompt. Regardless of where you are, you can disassemble a function with `pdf` and the `@` symbol and provide a flag or address. Remember, you can also use tab expansion to get a list of possible symbols.

```

[0x100007bc0]> pdf @ sym._is_
sym._is_lfsc_target      sym._is_executable      sym._is_debugging      sym._is_virtual_mchn    sym._is_carved
sym._is_file_target
[0x100007bc0]> pdf @ sym._is_virtual_mchn
;-- func.100007bc0:
; CALL XREF from main @ 0x10000be5f
83: sym._is_virtual_mchn (int64_t arg1);
; var int64_t var_1ch @ rbp-0x1c
; var int64_t var_18h @ rbp-0x18
; var int64_t var_10h @ rbp-0x10
; var int64_t var_4h @ rbp-0x4
; arg int64_t arg1 @ rdi
0x100007bc0      55          push rbp
0x100007bc1      4889e5      mov rbp, rsp
0x100007bc4      4883ec20    sub rsp, 0x20
0x100007bc8      31c0       xor eax, eax
0x100007bca      89c1       mov ecx, eax
0x100007bcc      897dfc     mov dword [var_4h], edi ; arg1
0x100007bcf      4889cf     mov rdi, rcx
0x100007bd2      e807840000 call time()
0x100007bd7      488945f0   mov qword [var_10h], rax
0x100007bdb      8b7dfc     mov edi, dword [var_4h]
0x100007bde      e8b3830000 call sleep ; int sleep(int s)
0x100007be3      31ff      xor edi, edi
0x100007be5      8945e4     mov dword [var_1ch], eax
0x100007be8      e8f1830000 call time()
0x100007bed      31d2      xor edx, edx
0x100007bef      488945e8   mov qword [var_18h], rax
0x100007bf3      488b45e8   mov rax, qword [var_18h]
0x100007bf7      482b45f0   sub rax, qword [var_10h]
0x100007bfb      8b75fc     mov esi, dword [var_4h]
0x100007bfe      89f1      mov ecx, esi
0x100007c00      4839c8     cmp rax, rcx
0x100007c03      be01000000 mov esi, 1
0x100007c08      0f4cd6    cmovl edx, esi
0x100007c0b      89d0      mov eax, edx
0x100007c0d      4883c420   add rsp, 0x20
0x100007c11      5d        pop rbp
0x100007c12      c3        ret
[0x100007bc0]>

```

It seems this function subtracts the sleep interval from the second timestamp, then compares it against the first timestamp. Jumping back out to how this result is consumed in `main`, it seems that if the result is not '0', the malware calls `exit()` with '-1'.

```

└─> 0x10000be5a      bf02000000 mov edi, 2 ; int64_t arg1
0x10000be5f      e85cbdf000 call sym._is_virtual_mchn
0x10000be64      83f800     cmp eax, 0
└─< 0x10000be67      0f840a000000 je 0x10000be77
0x10000be6d      bfffffff   mov edi, 0xffffffff ; -1
0x10000be72      e83b400000 call exit()
; CODE XREF from main @ 0x10000be67
└─> 0x10000be77      48c745d00000 mov qword [var_30h], 0
0x10000be7f      c745cc000000 mov dword [var_34h], 0
0x10000be86      c745c8000000 mov dword [var_38h], 0
0x10000be8d      488d7dd0   lea rdi, [var_30h] ; int64_t arg1
0x10000be91      488d75cc   lea rsi, [var_34h] ; int64_t arg2
0x10000be95      e8866dffff call sym._user_info
0x10000be9a      83f800     cmp eax, 0

```

The `is_virtual_mchn` function causes the malware to exit unless it returns '0'

The function appears to be somewhat misnamed as we don't see the kind of tests that we would normally expect for VM detection. In fact, it looks like an attempt to evade automated sandboxes that patch the `sleep` function, and we're not likely to fall foul of it just by executing

in our VM. However, we can also see that the next function, `user_info`, also exits if it doesn't return the expected value, so let's practice both the techniques discussed above so that we can learn how to use the debugger whichever one we need to use.

Manipulating Execution with the radare2 Debugger

If you are at the command prompt, type `Vp` to go into radare2 visual mode (yup, this is another mode, and not the last!).

```

EvilQuest -- radare2 - sudo -- 151x30
[0x10c82600 [xdVc]0 0% 150 /Users/auser/Downloads/EvilQuest/patch]> diq;?t0;f .. @ sym._syncsem+77879496 # 0x10c82600
stopped at 0x00000000
- offset -      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x7ffee7e32e58 00d0 dc07 0100 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 .....
0x7ffee7e32e68 e02e e3e7 fe7f 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
0x7ffee7e32e78 0000 0000 0000 0000 c82e e3e7 fe7f 0000 .....
0x7ffee7e32e88 e82e e3e7 fe7f 0000 fb2e e3e7 fe7f 0000 .....
rax 0x00000000      rbx 0x00000000      rcx 0x00000000
rdx 0x00000000      rdi 0x00000000      rsi 0x00000000
rbp 0x00000000      rsp 0x7ffee7e32e58  r8 0x00000000
r9 0x00000000      r10 0x00000000     r11 0x00000000
r12 0x00000000     r13 0x00000000     r14 0x00000000
r15 0x00000000     rip 0x10c82600     rflags 0x00000200
s:0 z:0 c:0 o:0 p:0
;-- rip:
0x10c82600 5f          pop rdi
0x10c82601 6a00       push 0
0x10c82603 4889e5     mov rbp, rsp
0x10c82606 4883e4f0   and rsp, 0xfffffffffff0
0x10c8260a 4883ec10   sub rsp, 0x10
0x10c8260e 8b7508     mov esi, dword [rbp + 8]
0x10c82611 488d5510   lea rdx, [rbp + 0x10]
0x10c82615 488d0de4efff. lea rcx, [0x10c825000]
0x10c8261c 4c8d45f8   lea r8, [rbp - 8]
0x10c82620 e83d000000 call fcn.10c826062 ;[1]
0x10c82625 488b7df8   mov rdi, qword [rbp - 8]
0x10c82629 4883ff00   cmp rdi, 0
|< 0x10c8262d 7510      jne 0x10c82603f
| 0x10c8262f 4889ec     mov rsp, rbp
| 0x10c82632 4883c408   add rsp, 8

```

The Visual Debugger in radare2

Ooh, this is nice! We get registers at the top, and source code underneath. The current line where we're stopped in the debugger is highlighted. If you don't see that, hit uppercase `S` once (i.e., `shift-s`), which steps over one source line, and – in case you lose your way – also brings you back to the debugger view.

Let's step smartly through the source with repeated uppercase `S` commands (by the way, in visual mode, lowercase 's' steps in, whereas uppercase 'S' steps over). After a dozen or so rapid step overs, you should find yourself inside this familiar code, which is `main()`.

```

[0x107dd8d84 [xaDvc]0 0% 170 /Users/auser/Downloads/EvilQuest/patch]> diq;?t0;f .. @ main+4 # 0x107dd8d84
step at 0x107dd8d81
- offset -      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x7ffee7e32e40 582e e3e7 fe7f 0000 c97c ef70 ff7f 0000 X.....l.p....
0x7ffee7e32e50 c97c ef70 ff7f 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .l.p.....
0x7ffee7e32e60 0100 0000 0000 0000 e02e e3e7 fe7f 0000 .....
0x7ffee7e32e70 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
rax 0x107dd8d80      rbx 0x00000000      rcx 0x7ffee7e32e80
rdx 0x7ffee7e32e78  rdi 0x00000001      rsi 0x7ffee7e32e68
rbp 0x7ffee7e32e40  rsp 0x7ffee7e32e40  r8 0x00000000
r9 0x00000000      r10 0x00000000     r11 0x00000000
r12 0x00000000     r13 0x00000000     r14 0x00000000
r15 0x00000000     rip 0x107dd8d84     rflags 0x00000346
s:0 z:1 c:0 o:0 p:1
|-- rip:
| 0x107dd8d84 4881ec500200. sub rsp, 0x250
| 0x107dd8d8b c745fc000000. mov dword [var_4h], 0
| 0x107dd8d92 897df8      mov dword [var_8h], edi ; argc
| 0x107dd8d95 488975f0    mov qword [var_10h], rsi ; argv
| 0x107dd8d99 c745ec020000. mov dword [var_14h], 2
| 0x107dd8da0 c745e8000000. mov dword [var_18h], 0
| 0x107dd8da7 c745e4000000. mov dword [var_1ch], 0
| 0x107dd8dae c745e0000000. mov dword [var_20h], 0
| 0x107dd8db5 c745dc000000. mov dword [var_24h], 0
| 0x107dd8dbc 837df802    cmp dword [var_8h], 2
|   |< 0x107dd8dc0 0f8529000000 jne 0x107dd8def
|   | 0x107dd8dc6 488b45f0    mov rax, qword [var_10h]
|   | 0x107dd8dca 488b7808    mov rdi, qword [rax + 8]
|   | 0x107dd8dce 488d35774b00. lea rsi, str.__silent ; 0x107ddd94c ; "--silent"
|   | 0x107dd8dd5 e8da410000 call fcn.107ddcfb4 ;[1]
|   | 0x107dd8dda 83f800     cmp eax, 0
|   |< 0x107dd8ddd 0f850c000000 jne 0x107dd8def
|   || 0x107dd8de3 c745e8000000. mov dword [var_18h], 0
|   |< 0x107dd8dea e96b000000 jmp 0x107dd8e5a

```

main() in Visual Debugger mode

Note the highlighted dword, which is holding the value of `argc`. It should be '2', but we can see from the register above that `rdi` is only 1. The code will jump over the next function call, which if you hit the '1' key on the keyboard you can inspect (hit `u` to come back) and see this is a string comparison. Let's continue stepping over and let the jump happen, as it doesn't appear to block us. We'll stop just short of the `is_virtual_mchn` function.


```

[0x101028e50 [xAdvC]0 0% 183 /Users/auser/Downloads/EvilQuest/patch]> pd $r @ main+208 # 0x101028e50
├─▶ 0x101028e50 e900000000 jmp 0x101028e55
│   ; CODE XREFS from main @ 0x101028e1d, 0x101028e50
├─▶ 0x101028e55 e900000000 jmp 0x101028e5a
│   ;-- rip:
├─▶ ; CODE XREFS from main @ 0x101028dea, 0x101028e55
│   0x101028e5a bf02000000 mov edi, 2
│   0x101028e5f e85cbdffff call sym._is_virtual_mchn ;[1]
│   0x101028e64 83f800    cmp eax, 0
│   0x101028e67 0f840a000000 je 0x101028e77
│   0x101028e6d bfffffff mov edi, 0xffffffff ; -1
│   0x101028e72 e83b400000 call 0x10102ceb2 ;[2]
│   0x101028e77 48c745d00000 mov qword [var_30h], 0
│   0x101028e7f c745cc000000 mov dword [var_34h], 0
│   0x101028e86 c745c8000000 mov dword [var_38h], 0
│   0x101028e8d 488d7dd0    lea rdi, [var_30h]
│   0x101028e91 488d75cc    lea rsi, [var_34h]
│   0x101028e95 e8866dffff call sym._user_info ;[3]
│   0x101028e9a 83f800    cmp eax, 0
│   0x101028e9d 0f840a000000 je 0x101028ead
│   0x101028ea3 bfffffff mov edi, 0xffffffff ; -1
│   0x101028ea8 e805400000 call 0x10102ceb2 ;[2]
│   0x101028ead 48c745c00000 mov qword [var_40h], 0
│   0x101028eb5 488b45f0    mov rax, qword [var_10h]

```

Seek and break locations are two different things!

We know from our earlier discussion what's going to happen here, so let's see how to take each of our options.

The first thing to note is that although the highlighted address is where the debugger is, that's not where you are if you enter an r2 command prompt, unless it's a debugger command. To see what I mean, hit the colon key to enter the command line.

From there, print out one line of disassembly with this command:

```
> pd 1
```

Note that the line printed out is r2's current seek position, shown at the top of the visual view. This is good. It means you can move around the program, seek to other functions and run other r2 commands without disturbing the debugger.

On the other hand, if you execute a debugger command on the command line it will operate on the source code where the debugger is currently parked, not on the current seek at the top of your view (unless they happen to be the same).

OK, let's entirely skip execution of the `_is_virtual_mchn` function by entering the command line with `:` and then:

```
> dss 2
```

Hit 'return' twice. As you can see, the `dss` command skips the number of source lines specified by the integer you gave it, making it a very easy way to bypass unwanted code execution!

Alternatively, if we want to execute the function then manipulate the register, stop the debugger on the line where the register is compared, and enter the command line again. This time, we can use `dr` to both inspect and write values to our chosen register.

```
> dr eax // see eax's current value
> dr eax = 0 // set eax to 0
> drr // view all the registers
> dro // see the previous values of the registers
```

```
| 0x109b56e9a 83f800 cmp eax, 0
|  | 0x109b56e9d 0f840a000000 je 0x109b56ead
|  | 0x109b56ea3 bfffffff mov edi, 0xffffffff ; -1
|  | 0x109b56ea8 e805400000 call 0x109b5aeb2 ;[2]
|  | 0x109b56ead 48c745c00000 mov qword [var_40h], 0
|  | 0x109b56eb5 488b45f0 mov rax, qword [var_10h]
|  | 0x109b56eb9 488b38 mov rdi, qword [rax]
|  | 0x109b56ebc 488d75c0 lea rsi, [var_40h]
|  | 0x109b56ec0 e85b97ffff call sym._extract_ei ;[3]
|  | 0x109b56ec5 488945b8 mov qword [var_48h], rax
|  | 0x109b56ec9 48837db800 cmp qword [var_48h], 0
|  | 0x109b56ece 0f84b2010000 je 0x109b57086
|  | 0x109b56ed4 488b7db8 mov rdi, qword [var_48h]
|  | 0x109b56ed8 488b75c0 mov rsi, qword [var_40h]
|  | 0x109b56edc 488b55d0 mov rdx, qword [var_30h]
|  | 0x109b56ee0 488b45f0 mov rax, qword [var_10h]
|  | 0x109b56ee4 488b08 mov rcx, qword [rax]
|  | 0x109b56ee7 e804cfffff call sym._persist_executable_frombundle ;[4]
|> dr eax
0x00000000
|> dr eax = 1
0x00000000 ->0x00000001
|> dr eax
0x00000001
|> _
```

Viewing and changing register values

And that, pretty much, is all you need to defeat anti-analysis code in terms of manipulating execution. Of course, the fun part is finding the code you need to manipulate, which is why we spent some time learning how to move around in radare2 in both visual graph mode and visual mode. Remember that in either mode you can get back to the regular command prompt by hitting `q`. As a bonus, you might play around with hitting `p` and `tab` when in the visual modes.

At this point, what I suggest you do is go back to the list of functions we identified at the beginning of the post and see what they do, and whether it's best to skip them or modify their return values (or whether either option will do). You might want to look up the built-in help for listing and setting breakpoints (from a command prompt, try `db?`) to move quickly through the code. By the time you've done this a few times, you'll be feeling pretty comfortable about tackling other samples in radare2's debugger.

```
EvilQuest — radare2 + sudo — 139x23
[0x10e00ee50 [xAdvC]0 0% 137 /Users/auser/Downloads/EvilQuest/patch]> pd $r @ main+208 #
|
|   └─< 0x10e00ee50 e900000000 jmp 0x10e00ee55
|   |   ; CODE XREFS from main @ 0x10e00ee1d, 0x10e00ee50
|   └─> 0x10e00ee55 e900000000 jmp 0x10e00ee5a
|   |   ; CODE XREFS from main @ 0x10e00eeda, 0x10e00ee55
|   └─> 0x10e00ee5a bf02000000 mov edi, 2
|   |   ;-- rip:
|   └─> 0x10e00ee5f e85cbdf000 call sym._is_virtual_mchn ;[1]
|   |   0x10e00ee64 83f800 cmp eax, 0
|   |   └─< 0x10e00ee67 0f840a000000 je 0x10e00ee77
|   |   |   0x10e00ee6d bfffffff mov edi, 0xffffffff ; -1
|   |   |   0x10e00ee72 e83b400000 call 0x10e012eb2 ;[2]
|   |   └─> 0x10e00ee77 48c745d00000 mov qword [var_30h], 0
|   |   |   0x10e00ee7f c745cc000000 mov dword [var_34h], 0
|   |   |   0x10e00ee86 c745c8000000 mov dword [var_38h], 0
|   |   |   0x10e00ee8d 488d7dd0 lea rdi, [var_30h]
|   |   |   0x10e00ee91 488d75cc lea rsi, [var_34h]
|   |   |   0x10e00ee95 e8866df000 call sym._user_info ;[3]
|   |   |   0x10e00ee9a 83f800 cmp eax, 0
|   |   |   └─< 0x10e00ee9d 0f840a000000 je 0x10e00eedad
|   |   |   |   0x10e00eea3 bfffffff mov edi, 0xffffffff ; -1
|   |   |   |   0x10e00eea8 e805400000 call 0x10e012eb2 ;[2]
|   |   └─> 0x10e00eedad 48c745c00000 mov qword [var_40h], 0
```

Conclusion

If you're starting to see the potential power of r2, I strongly suggest you read the [free online radare2 book](#), which will be well worth investing the time in. By now you should be starting to get the feel of r2 and exploring more on your own with the help of the [?](#) and other resources. As we go into further challenges, we'll be spending less time going over the r2 basics and digging more into the actual malware code.

In the [next part of our series](#), we're going to start looking at one of the major challenges in reversing macOS malware that you are bound to face on a regular basis: dealing with [encrypted and obfuscated strings](#). I hope you'll join us there and practice your r2 skills in the meantime!