


Conti Leaks: Examining the Panama Papers of Ransomware

trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/conti-leaks-examining-the-panama-papers-of-ransomware.html



By [John Fokker](#), [Jambul Tologonov](#) · March 31, 2022

Introduction

It isn't often the whole world gets an inside look of the business operations of a top tier cybercriminal group. Very early on in the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis the predominantly Russian based ransomware group Conti made a public statement where they expressed their loyalty to the Russian Administration.



Figure 1. Conti expressing their support to the Russian Administration. Source: BleepingComputer

As a reaction to this statement and the current conflict, a Ukrainian security researcher, operating by the twitter handle @contileaks decided to publish years of Conti's internal Jabber conversations online. The chats that were dumped span across several years consisted of thousands of messages making this the "**Panama Papers of Ransomware**".

This wasn't the first time the Conti gang got hit, last summer a disgruntled affiliate posted their attack playbook online, which was full of very useful intelligence for our customers.

Since it was public, the whole security community jumped to review the chats and within hours the first findings appeared on Twitter. Trellix was also quick to obtain the dataset and realized that this might be one of the largest "crowd-sourced cyber investigations" ever seen. What this means is that as a research team you must devise a flexible dissemination strategy because findings by the crowd will appear online. So, it is constant balance between verification of the published findings by others, investing in your own research goals and adjusting some of these goals based on new information.

Even though it was very tempting to dive down the rabbit hole immediately we did make sure we attacked the dataset with a certain plan.

Dissemination strategy; How to avoid the rabbit hole

Attack infrastructure

The first batch of leaked chats were only a couple of days old and ranging back quite some time. From the start we realized that the criminals might have left valuable data on their attack infrastructure in the chats. We wrote a quick extraction script and compared the mentioned network artifacts to our current dataset and saw a lot of overlap. Not only did we see overlap with infrastructure we attributed to TrickBot and Cobalt Strike in the past, but a good portion of the systems we filtered out were still alive and kicking. To prevent any retaliation by the Conti group directed at our customers, blocking this infrastructure was top priority.

Some of these live systems were actually located in the countries where we have a good relationship with Law Enforcement, so naturally we reached out and made sure they got a heads-up to take appropriate measures quickly.

The intelligence gathered from this was very actionable, but with a short shelf life, the next stop for us was tradecraft.

TTPs and tradecraft

Due to the severity of the leaks, there was a good chance that the Conti gang would rebrand or disperse its members across other ransomware families. In the prior leak where Conti's playbook got dumped online there were excellent descriptions of the different tools and scripts they would use to attack their victims. So, looking at around 200 thousand leaked messages (Conti & TrickBot leaks combined) span over the period 2020-2022, it was likely members would share custom TTP's or tradecraft amongst each other.

By filtering tool names and command line structures we found several examples where members discussed tool usage. Given the crowd sourced nature of this dump we would also like to thank [The DFIR Report](#) for their excellent findings which they published via their Twitter account.

Affiliates might leave Conti and their network, but wherever they go they will take along their tradecraft. Without an external intervention, like an arrest, we should anticipate that cybercriminals won't stop their line of business, and thus we can expect to see their TTPs pop up in the future. However, through proper dissemination of the data we were able to empower many of our XDR product teams to improve the product efficacy against this tradecraft and incorporate our findings in MVISION Insights for customer visibility.

Did we ignore the juicy conversations completely? Not at all, fortunately we have a native Russian speaking research capability that made a huge difference while going down the rabbit hole. In the following section we will highlight some of the findings we found interesting to share.

Interesting chats

For transparency purposes we have included both the original Cyrillic and our human translated text to allow readers to delve into the intricacies of some of the Conti's discussions. For readability purposes we have put the original leaked messages into 1-2-1 conversations to make it easier to understand/follow the context.

Conti as an *enterprise*

It is fascinating how much Conti resembles an ordinary firm with an office building, HR and other departments (testers, reversers, OSINT, coders, training team, etc.) with their regular salaries on the 15th and 30th of each month. Working hours are 10.00-18.00 Moscow time, five days a week. **Stern** is the boss who oversees everything and has 100 people on the payroll. "*The weekend are the weekends. And nobody cancelled the vacations and sick days. All the other holidays - with the management's agreement*" says **Salmon** (recruiter) to new hire-coder **Core**. According to **Bentley** (manager), he worked there for a year, but the

company has existed for more than 10 years. Below are excerpts from various chats which provide a good glimpse into Conti's organization and the presence of a physical office(s) in Russia:

```
2020-09-11T02:32:55.040081 target "сейчас 8 трудятся это кем проф и думс довольны, остальных убрали
по итогу 50 - 3 офиса в ожидании профа и набору
новый набор под конец месяца, проф просил немного сбавить обороты
фот в неделю составляет 140 000 руб грязными без учета офиса, уборок, администрирования"
2020-09-11T02:32:55.041906 target "+ начальные расходы это аренда, депозит, техника, хоз расходы мелкие- камеры чашки чайники, без мебели,
+ ежедневные расходы это обеды по 1500-1700 на всех в офис"
2020-09-11T02:32:55.043542 target + субподрядчики кто помогает профу в лабе, кобе, еще что то настраивать
```

```
2020-09-11T02:32:55.040081 target "at the moment there are 8 people who work and prof and dums are happy about, the rest are removed
in total 50 - 3 offices are awaiting prof and recruitment
new recruitment towards the end of the month, prof asked to slow down a bit
expenses a month are 140 000 rubbles dirty money without office costs, cleaning, administration"
2020-09-11T02:32:55.041906 target "+ initial expenses which are rent, deposit, equipment, small household expenses- cameras, cups kettles, without furniture,
+ daily expenses which is lunch of 1500-1700 for the entire office"
2020-09-11T02:32:55.043542 target + subcontractors who help prof in lab, cob, and set up something else
```

Figure 2. Target's messages to Stern about office expenses

```
2020-09-28T00:21:13.572941 troy ponyal po dnu budu v office
2020-09-28T00:22:23.679788 troy odnogo rabotnika vignal nahuy
2020-09-28T00:22:30.526240 troy disciplinu rozlagal
2020-09-28T00:22:38.956771 target так по факту
2020-09-28T00:22:40.899449 troy как не priydu postoyanno spit
```

```
2020-09-28T00:21:13.572941 troy got it will be in the office during the day
2020-09-28T00:22:23.679788 troy I fucking fired one of the workers
2020-09-28T00:22:30.526240 troy was corrupting the discipline
2020-09-28T00:22:38.956771 target just as a fact
2020-09-28T00:22:40.899449 troy every time I arrive he is sleeping
```

```
2021-07-16T10:28:56.793831 mango "ЭП банде сюда bc1qkmyv5860pe24h9ytadkzqiltkjuuk9z9s02df
сумма общая 85k
-----
99947 основная команда 62 человека, зп у меня получают 54
33847 - команда реверса, 23 человека
8500 - новая команда кодеров, 6 человек, пока только 4 зп получают
12500 реверсы, 6 человек
10000 OSINT отдел 4 человека
3000 на расходы (серваки\прокладки\тестовые задания для новых людей)
-----
164.8k всего в месяц"
```

```
2021-07-16T10:28:56.793831 mango "salaries for the band here bc1qkmyv5860pe24h9ytadkzqiltkjuuk9z9s02df
total 85k
-----
99947 main team 62 people, 54 of them get salaries from me
33847 - reversing team, 23 people
8500 - new team of coders, 6 people, at the moment only 4 receive salaries
12500 reversers, 6 people
10000 OSINT department 4 people
3000 on expenses (servers\layers\testing assignments for new people)
-----
164.8k in total a month"
```

Figure 3. Mango to Stern about teams' monthly salary

```
2021-07-27T13:43:25.007728 mango "Значит так. Добавь:
revers@ - оператор хакера, нормальный чел, он даст кобу, будет держать связь от нас, даст доступ в чат как пойдут движения
hors@ - вторая команда хакеров, хорс тоже ровный тип, если вдруг там какие то проблемы у первых с пейлоадам - можно к вторым, они все знакомы, ниче страшного нет, я стараюсь всех нагружать равномерно.
bentley@ - собирает крипты на трик, лоадер, на кобы, повершеллы и прочее, если срочно что то надо можно сказать что от меня и он все сделает.
buz@ тимлид кодеров, если надо какие то доработки\консультации можно к нему. Он же начальник разведки OSINT у нас, можно через него запросить пробив какой то инфы по каким то компаниям.
По все, если надо будет дам еще хакеров или каких то других людей в помощь"
```

```
2021-07-27T13:43:25.007728 mango "So here it is. To add:
revers@ - hackers' operator, good fellow, he will give cob, will keep a connection from our end, will give an access to the chat when things start moving
hors@ - 2nd team of hackers, hors is also a good guy, in case there are problems with the payloads from the first group - the second one can also be approached, they all know each other, there is nothing to worry there, I try to load everyone evenly.
bentley@ - gather crypts for trick, loader, cob's, PowerShell, etc, if there is anything urgent, you can say it is from me and he will do everything needed.
buz@ teamlead of coders, if you need any development/consultation you can approach him. He is also the head of OSINT and you can request intel from him about certain companies.
That is it, if you need I will give you more hackers or some other people to help"
```

Figure 4. Mango to Qwerty about team composition

It is particularly interesting that in the Conti-TrickBot enterprise they are very careful about malware code overlapping. They have external experts who scrutinize developed illegal software code and ensure the code fingerprints are unique to each team of coders. Avoiding overlap seems to be important to segregate activities of different sub-teams and make it difficult for security researchers to piece various Russian speaking threat actors' campaigns together.

```
[30.11.21 13:46:27] salmon: Насчет политики компании по интеллектуальной собственности.
[30.11.21 13:46:45] salmon: Все принадлежит компании, как сам код, который разрабатывается, проекты и т.д., любая информация.
В том числе результаты программ (криптеры, что-то обфусцированное и т.д.).
Нигде нельзя ни публиковать ни распространять, ни как-либо иначе использовать наработки в своих интересах.
Это связано еще с совпадением отпечатков внутри исходного кода, внутри результатов.
Некоторые эксперты со стороны оценивают по отпечаткам принадлежность софта разным командам. Чтобы небыло лишних пересечений.
```

```
[30.11.21 13:46:27] salmon: Regarding the company's policy on intellectual property.
[30.11.21 13:46:45] salmon: Everything is owned by the company, the code itself which is being developed, projects and etc., any information.
Including the results of the programs (cryptors, obfuscators, etc.). It is forbidden to publish, distribute or use elsewhere anything developed, created here.
This is also related to overlap of fingerprints of the code and the results.
Some experts from outside evaluate the fingerprints to determine to which team the soft belongs to. So that there are no unnecessary overlaps.
```

Figure 5. Salmon to Core about company's policy on intellectual property

Possible government connections

According to **Angelo** (tester/coder), **Stern** is closely affiliated with FSB or other structures and works for 'Pu'. If **Stern** was not as almighty as God, they all would have ended up as Revil:

<pre>[17.09.21 09:41:40] hammer: stern в часах [17.09.21 09:41:49] hammer: долгих [17.09.21 09:43:09] angelo: может С на приёме у министров [17.09.21 09:43:42] hammer: а может он сам министр [17.09.21 09:44:39] hammer: клиенты не бухтат? [17.09.21 10:01:53] angelo: мое личное мнение, он приближенный к ФСБ или другим структурам [17.09.21 10:01:59] angelo: но не сам</pre>	<pre>[17.09.21 09:41:40] hammer: stern in hours [17.09.21 09:41:49] hammer: long ones [17.09.21 09:43:09] angelo: may be S at the ministers' reception [17.09.21 09:43:42] hammer: or may be he is himself a minister [17.09.21 09:44:39] hammer: anything from the clients? [17.09.21 10:01:53] angelo: my personal opinion is that he is close to FSB or other structures [17.09.21 10:01:59] angelo: but not himself</pre>
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Figure 6. Angelo saying to Hammer that Stern is close to FSB

<pre>[02.02.22 20:05:57] elroy: Приветствую [02.02.22 20:06:02] elroy: Повтори пожалуйста [02.02.22 20:06:13] angelo: да блин, вы со своими Приветствую меня пугаете уже [02.02.22 20:06:15] angelo: слишком большие мы, и расиздвства много ((плохо всё это пахнет [02.02.22 20:06:27] angelo: переживая я [02.02.22 20:06:32] elroy:)) [02.02.22 20:06:40] elroy: Да, пахнет плохо [02.02.22 20:07:09] angelo: я думал С всемогущь как господь БОГ [02.02.22 20:07:21] elroy: Мне сегодня пришлось административной работой заниматься, у меня в настройке маршрутизатор... [02.02.22 20:07:41] elroy: Будь он не всемогущь, мы пошли бы вслед за Ревилами [02.02.22 20:08:03] elroy: Там же написано, в статье, единственная в россии крупная компания [02.02.22 20:08:22] angelo: да я уже понял что С на службе у Пу [02.02.22 20:08:30] angelo: понимаю всё очень масштабно [02.02.22 20:08:38] angelo: что заказы мы делаем и кто порой наши клиенты</pre>	<pre>[02.02.22 20:05:57] elroy: Good day! [02.02.22 20:06:02] elroy: Can you repeat please [02.02.22 20:06:13] angelo: you guys with your Good day already scaring me [02.02.22 20:06:15] angelo: we are too big and there is a lot of fuck ups ((all smell bad [02.02.22 20:06:27] angelo: I am worried [02.02.22 20:06:32] elroy:)) [02.02.22 20:06:40] elroy: Yes, smells bad indeed [02.02.22 20:07:09] angelo: I thought S is almighty as God [02.02.22 20:07:21] elroy: I had to do today administrative work, my router is in Settings... [02.02.22 20:07:41] elroy: If he was not almighty, we all would have ended up as Revil [02.02.22 20:08:03] elroy: It is written there in the article, the only big organisation in Russia [02.02.22 20:08:22] angelo: yes, I already figured that S is in service of Pu [02.02.22 20:08:30] angelo: I understand that everything is on a large scale)) [02.02.22 20:08:38] angelo: what orders we do and who sometimes our clients are</pre>
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Figure 7. Elroy and Angelo discussing how almighty their boss Stern is

The Conti leadership was concerned over the situation surrounding the REvil ransomware group. However, Conti believed Russian authorities arrested only the lowest ranked members of REvil who were involved in the cash out.

It is worth mentioning that **Basil** (tester/coder) was asked if he is from FSB, he subsequently replied he had serious intelligence related to Ukrainian border activity. This statement was made seven days prior to Russia's incursion into Ukraine:

```
[21.02.22 13:46:47] elroy: Или из фсб?
[21.02.22 13:46:57] basil: Не буду говорить откуда (сам понимаю) Но у меня очень серьезные сведения что на границе не учения
[21.02.22 13:53:43] basil: Я думаю чт руководителя ситуация с ревилами напугала. А по мне так низшее звено взяли.
[21.02.22 13:55:10] basil: Байден Путин там поговорили. Россияне решили прогнуться взяли кого могли
[21.02.22 13:55:18] basil: И это многих напугало
[21.02.22 13:55:45] elroy: Обрати внимание, что Ревилам предьявили не разработку вредносных програми, а незаконны оборот средств, и только. А значит у них ничего не нашли, т.е. ребята хорошо работали. Их просто сдали...
[21.02.22 13:56:03] basil: Да-да-да я тоже обратил на это внимание
[21.02.22 13:56:11] basil: Низшее звено взяли
[21.02.22 13:56:26] basil: Тех кто обнал делал
[21.02.22 13:56:28] elroy: Будем надеяться что так
[21.02.22 13:56:58] elroy: Надеюсь у нас руководство очухается
[21.02.22 13:57:38] basil: Надеюсь....
[21.02.22 13:57:49] basil: Действительно надеюсь
[21.02.22 13:58:28] basil: Я думаю что с ревилами так как то через банковскую систему на них вышли (ну или кто-то сдал)
[21.02.22 13:59:05] basil: ВВП с Байденом переговоров. Вова решил сделать жест доброй воли - и показать как они борются
[21.02.22 13:59:30] basil: А Американский товарищ решил - что так и должно быть
[21.02.22 13:59:57] basil: т.е. "молоды" продолжайте дальше
[21.02.22 14:00:39] basil: Ну а теперь ничего этим товарищам из-за океана не отвалится
[21.02.22 14:00:48] basil: Мне почему то так кажется
[21.02.22 14:03:47] elroy: Отвалится им новая версия шифровальщика))
```

```

[21.02.22 13:46:47] elroy: Or are you from FSB?
[21.02.22 13:46:57] basil: I am not going to tell you where I am from (you understand that) but I have very serious intelligence that on the border is not a training
[21.02.22 13:53:43] basil: I think that the leaders got scared of the situation with Revil. As far as I am concerned, they got the lowest link in the chain.
[21.02.22 13:55:10] basil: Biden and Putin talked there, Russians decided to bend over and arrested whoever they could
[21.02.22 13:55:18] basil: And it scared lots of people
[21.02.22 13:55:45] elroy: Did you notice that Revil were charged not for developing malware, but illegal circulation of money, and only that. That means they could not find anything there, in other words the guys worked well. They have been just handed over...
[21.02.22 13:56:03] basil: Yes-yes-yes I also paid attention to that
[21.02.22 13:56:11] basil: They got the lowest link
[21.02.22 13:56:16] basil: Those who did the cashing out
[21.02.22 13:56:28] elroy: Let's hope that is the case
[21.02.22 13:56:58] elroy: I hope our leaders will recover
[21.02.22 13:57:38] basil: Nope so....
[21.02.22 13:57:49] basil: Really hope so
[21.02.22 13:58:28] basil: I think with Revil they managed somehow to locate them via the banking system (or indeed somebody handed them over)
[21.02.22 13:59:05] basil: WP discussed with Biden. Nova decided to do a goodwill gesture - and show how they are fighting
[21.02.22 13:59:30] basil: And the American comrade decided - that is the way how it should be
[21.02.22 13:59:57] basil: Meaning good job, carry on further
[21.02.22 14:00:39] basil: But now there is nothing the overseas comrades will get
[21.02.22 14:00:48] basil: I think so somehow
[21.02.22 14:03:47] elroy: They will get a new version of a ransomware))

```

Figure 8. Basil and Elroy on REvil arrest

In another conversation involving **Target** (manager) he stated if they indeed encrypted Credit One Bank **Troy** (tester/crypter) would get a reward in the Kremlin:

2020-09-28T13:56:10.053405	target	https://twitter.com/search?q=CreditOneBank	2020-09-28T13:56:10.053405	target	https://twitter.com/search?q=CreditOneBank
2020-09-28T13:56:10.971996	target	читай	2020-09-28T13:56:10.971996	target	read
2020-09-28T13:56:12.007579	target	тут пиздец	2020-09-28T13:56:12.007579	target	this is fucked up
2020-09-28T13:58:31.211954	troy	i tam vse backupi bili ubiti	2020-09-28T13:58:31.211954	troy	and all their backups were destroyed there
2020-09-28T13:58:35.856627	target	ну збс	2020-09-28T13:58:35.856627	target	ok awesome
2020-09-28T13:58:42.644034	target	если завтра не убедт	2020-09-28T13:58:42.644034	target	if tomorrow wont persuade (them)
2020-09-28T13:58:48.378897	target	вакцин у них	2020-09-28T13:58:48.378897	target	they have no vaccine
2020-09-28T13:58:52.446753	target	то наши с радостью	2020-09-28T13:58:52.446753	target	then ours happily
2020-09-28T13:58:54.124653	target	поставят им	2020-09-28T13:58:54.124653	target	will give them
2020-09-28T13:58:54.887103	target	свои	2020-09-28T13:58:54.887103	target	theirs
2020-09-28T13:59:00.229272	target	отечественного приозводства	2020-09-28T13:59:00.229272	target	of domestic/local production
2020-09-28T13:59:02.308328	troy	:blush:	2020-09-28T13:59:02.308328	troy	:blush:
2020-09-28T13:59:11.037739	target	тебе еще награду дадут	2020-09-28T13:59:11.037739	target	you will also get a reward/prize
2020-09-28T13:59:15.389737	target	пирожок с капустой	2020-09-28T13:59:15.389737	target	a cabbage bun
2020-09-28T13:59:16.655467	target	в кремле	2020-09-28T13:59:16.655467	target	in Kremlin
2020-09-28T13:59:18.476939	target)))))))))	2020-09-28T13:59:18.476939	target)))))))))
2020-09-28T13:59:22.251216	troy	:blush:	2020-09-28T13:59:22.251216	troy	:blush:
2020-09-28T13:59:27.313323	target	поделиться)	2020-09-28T13:59:27.313323	target	you will share
2020-09-28T13:59:28.947698	target	половиной)	2020-09-28T13:59:28.947698	target	half
2020-09-28T13:59:30.558407	target	третью	2020-09-28T13:59:30.558407	target	or third
2020-09-28T13:59:36.598037	troy	bez problem	2020-09-28T13:59:36.598037	troy	no problems

Figure 9. Target to Troy saying he gets a reward in the Kremlin

Occasionally Conti seems to be asked to do so-called 'pioneering' (volunteering) work on a special request from one of two 'offices'. As Soviet Pioneers (aka scouts) they do their fair share of work similarly to what Cozy Bear does:

2020-07-20T17:02:13.288029 professor че нам надо от академи?
2020-07-20T17:02:25.472364 professor это контора просила какая-то из двух известных?
2020-07-20T17:02:26.978371 stern отписал там реверсу
2020-07-20T17:02:28.775027 stern да
2020-07-20T17:02:33.493244 professor он поднял там
2020-07-20T17:02:33.892018 professor что искать надо?
2020-07-20T17:02:35.227086 stern переписка
2020-07-20T17:02:39.491168 professor платить будут? или в пионеров играем?
2020-07-20T17:02:40.613491 stern контракты
2020-07-20T17:02:42.493082 professor =)
2020-07-20T17:02:43.571499 stern бухгалтерия
2020-07-20T17:02:55.596933 stern да пофиг на деньги
2020-07-20T17:02:59.668147 stern поиграем)
2020-07-20T17:03:03.193255 professor да ноу проб
2020-07-20T17:03:08.928615 professor галстук красный одену значит
2020-07-20T17:03:13.363079 stern :)
2020-07-20T17:03:18.067217 professor задача то несложная при наличии прав
2020-07-20T17:03:27.699292 stern таргет там собрался отдельный офис делать у себя
2020-07-20T17:03:29.380011 stern под гос темы
2020-07-20T17:03:31.107425 stern ем понравилась
2020-07-20T17:03:48.261911 professor это эксклюзивно передать надо будет? или можно предложить тем кто заплатит в госах?
2020-07-20T17:04:09.948620 professor у меня есть кое кто по внешке кто платит помимо того что пеонерить просят)))
2020-07-20T17:04:19.099657 stern эксклюзивно желательно для начала
2020-07-20T17:04:27.917007 stern попробовать
2020-07-20T17:04:47.624958 professor окей, договор
2020-07-20T17:04:50.495262 stern а те сколько платят?
2020-07-20T17:04:52.118220 stern тебе платили?
2020-07-20T17:04:56.378572 professor да)
2020-07-20T17:05:03.617473 professor ну зависит от того насколько им будет интересно
2020-07-20T17:05:09.845052 stern тогда можно у них целей 10 взять
2020-07-20T17:05:11.999936 stern или 5
2020-07-20T17:05:14.892028 stern точно
2020-07-20T17:05:16.002384 stern для таргета
2020-07-20T17:05:16.857506 stern как раз
2020-07-20T17:05:18.545998 stern ему интересно
2020-07-20T17:05:22.319487 professor "не много, но типа ""все свои"""
2020-07-20T17:05:30.441540 professor по ковиду они хотят щас очень
2020-07-20T17:05:37.757289 professor кози медведи вон уже работают по списку

```

2020-07-20T17:02:13.288029 professor what do we need from academi?
2020-07-20T17:02:25.472364 professor is it an office request, from one of the two?
2020-07-20T17:02:26.978371 stern replied to revers
2020-07-20T17:02:28.775027 stern yes
2020-07-20T17:02:33.493244 professor he brought it up
2020-07-20T17:02:33.892018 professor what are we looking?
2020-07-20T17:02:35.227086 stern chat
2020-07-20T17:02:39.491168 professor are they paying or are we playing pioneers?
2020-07-20T17:02:40.613491 stern contracts
2020-07-20T17:02:42.493082 professor =)
2020-07-20T17:02:43.571499 stern accounting
2020-07-20T17:02:55.596933 stern yes fuck the money
2020-07-20T17:02:59.668147 stern we will play )
2020-07-20T17:03:03.193255 professor yes no probs
2020-07-20T17:03:08.928615 professor will wear a red tie then
2020-07-20T17:03:13.363079 stern :)
2020-07-20T17:03:18.067217 professor the task is not that difficult if you have the rights
2020-07-20T17:03:27.699292 stern target there has decided to build a new office at his
2020-07-20T17:03:29.380011 stern for gov themes/topics
2020-07-20T17:03:31.107425 stern he liked it
2020-07-20T17:03:48.261911 professor do we need to relay it exclusively? or this can be offered to those who pay in gov?
2020-07-20T17:04:09.948620 professor I have somebody externally who pays next to the pioneering we have been asked )))
2020-07-20T17:04:19.099657 stern preferably exclusively at the beginning
2020-07-20T17:04:27.917007 stern we should try to
2020-07-20T17:04:47.624958 professor ok agreed
2020-07-20T17:04:50.495262 stern and how much others pay?
2020-07-20T17:04:52.118220 stern did you get paid?
2020-07-20T17:04:56.378572 professor yes)
2020-07-20T17:05:03.617473 professor depends on how interested they are
2020-07-20T17:05:09.845052 stern then we can take from them 10 targets
2020-07-20T17:05:11.999936 stern or 5
2020-07-20T17:05:14.892028 stern appointed/specific
2020-07-20T17:05:16.002384 stern for Target
2020-07-20T17:05:16.857506 stern since
2020-07-20T17:05:18.545998 stern he is interested
2020-07-20T17:05:22.319487 professor "not much/many, but sort of ""we all know each other""
2020-07-20T17:05:30.441540 professor they want around covid now a lot
2020-07-20T17:05:37.757289 professor Cozy Bears already started down the list there

```

Figure 10. Stern and Professor discussing what they need from Academi hack

It is probable that one of the two offices is a so-called ‘Bolshoy Dom’ (Big House), an office building located at 4 Liteyny Avenue which serves as the headquarters of Saint Peterburg’s local branch of FSB:

```

2020-09-28T17:42:49.518165 target "Литейный пер. 4 - ответственный
ребята спрашивают на сколько задерживаемся, заказывать еду или нет, омар молчит"
2020-09-28T17:43:48.445641 professor сейчас узнаю что он там пропустить мог, я такого вопроса в конфе не видел
2020-09-28T17:47:32.283551 professor ты стерна на видел сегодня? не в курсе будет он/нет? там на мыло ответили а потом мыло абунулось

2020-09-28T17:42:49.518165 target "Liteyny av. 4 is in charge
the guys are asking how late we are going to be, should they order food or not, omar is not responding"
2020-09-28T17:43:48.445641 professor will now check what he might have missed there, I did not see such a question in the conference
2020-09-28T17:47:32.283551 professor did you see stern today? any clue whether he will be (in the office) or not? there is an email reply but the email got abused

```

Figure 11. Target to Professor mentioning FSB’s HQ address

In line with geo-political interests of Russia, Conti seems to have a ‘stop’ on China and get terrified every time they see a Russian company or ‘OOO’ abbreviation (equivalent of ‘LLC’ in CIS countries) in the list of their victims:

2020-09-22T19:40:24.169665	troy	RU ru.zohocorpin.com	2020-09-22T19:40:24.169665	troy	RU ru.zohocorpin.com
2020-09-22T19:40:36.688502	troy	etu ne stavim	2020-09-22T19:40:36.688502	troy	not this one
2020-09-22T19:40:40.888162	troy	udalyau	2020-09-22T19:40:40.888162	troy	removing it
2020-09-22T19:41:53.452053	target	вот мудак какого	2020-09-22T19:41:53.452053	target	such assholes/idiots
2020-09-22T19:41:55.108291	target	на аутсорсе	2020-09-22T19:41:55.108291	target	on outsource
2020-09-22T19:42:07.792856	target	это зохосрм	2020-09-22T19:42:07.792856	target	this is zohCRM
2020-09-22T19:42:09.630565	target	лидары	2020-09-22T19:42:09.630565	target	faggots
2020-09-22T19:42:14.064561	target	из ру что ли какой то аутсорсер	2020-09-22T19:42:14.064561	target	is it an outsourcer from RU
2020-09-22T19:42:14.775342	target	мудак	2020-09-22T19:42:14.775342	target	asshole
2020-09-22T19:42:17.895671	target	сука	2020-09-22T19:42:17.895671	target	bitch
2020-09-22T19:42:24.483896	troy	pizdi dat za takoe	2020-09-22T19:42:24.483896	troy	they should be beaten up for such a thing
2020-09-22T19:42:24.592551	target	это ебануто огромная корпорация	2020-09-22T19:42:24.592551	target	that is a fucking enormous corporation
2020-09-22T19:42:31.803072	troy	a esli bi ya ne usledil	2020-09-22T19:42:31.803072	troy	what if I did not notice that?
2020-09-22T19:42:35.091559	troy	to ebanuli bi	2020-09-22T19:42:35.091559	troy	then would have been fucked
2020-09-22T19:42:37.159864	target	сука и надо же было чтобы этот был урод из просторов ру	2020-09-22T19:42:37.159864	target	bitch and what a chance this freak is from RU internet space
2020-09-22T19:42:44.534086	target	да молодец	2020-09-22T19:42:44.534086	target	yeah good job!
2020-09-22T19:42:48.278498	target	слушай ну кто знал	2020-09-22T19:42:48.278498	target	listen, who would have known
2020-09-22T19:42:51.887320	target	что там будет домен у них	2020-09-22T19:42:51.887320	target	that they would have their domain there
2020-09-22T19:42:56.922116	target	из ру части. в сетке	2020-09-22T19:42:56.922116	target	from RU part in the network

Figure 12. Target and Troy discovered a RU entity in their list of potential victims

2020-10-08T02:49:59.520966	target	"я когда увидел что в отчете там 000 какая то у меня сердце остановилось	2020-10-08T02:49:59.520966	target	"when I saw an 000 in the report my heart stop beating
2020-10-08T02:53:14.963541	target	слава богу какой то приколист у вас ЛЛС перевел как 000"	2020-10-08T02:53:14.963541	target	Thanks god some pranker of yours translated LLC as 000"
2020-10-08T02:53:14.963541	target	"[05:49:53] <troy> chinu ne gruzi [05:49:58] <troy> mi ee ne stavim что еще за сетки"	2020-10-08T02:53:14.963541	target	"[05:49:53] <troy> don't load China [05:49:58] <troy> we don't put her what sort of networks are they"
2020-10-08T02:53:21.132783	target	конкретно о чем речь	2020-10-08T02:53:21.132783	target	what are you talking about
2020-10-08T02:53:42.404395	troy	tam chisto kitay	2020-10-08T02:53:42.404395	troy	there is purely China
2020-10-08T02:53:46.438901	troy	setki 3 est	2020-10-08T02:53:46.438901	troy	3 networks
2020-10-08T02:54:01.631849	target	так крупные	2020-10-08T02:54:01.631849	target	big ones
2020-10-08T02:54:02.414644	target	вроде	2020-10-08T02:54:02.414644	target	I think
2020-10-08T02:54:04.087883	target	по 4.5 ярда	2020-10-08T02:54:04.087883	target	around 4.5 bln
2020-10-08T02:54:04.917692	target	нет?	2020-10-08T02:54:04.917692	target	no?
2020-10-08T02:54:20.639868	target	если на память	2020-10-08T02:54:20.639868	target	from top of my head
2020-10-08T02:54:31.063120	troy	да	2020-10-08T02:54:31.063120	troy	yes
2020-10-08T02:54:49.959573	target	стрип	2020-10-08T02:54:49.959573	target	ctrip(corp)
2020-10-08T02:54:51.097368	target	да	2020-10-08T02:54:51.097368	target	yes
2020-10-08T02:55:04.458470	target	так	2020-10-08T02:55:04.458470	target	ok
2020-10-08T02:55:13.897722	target	у нас стоп на Китай?	2020-10-08T02:55:13.897722	target	do we have a stop on China?
2020-10-08T02:55:19.300923	troy	да	2020-10-08T02:55:19.300923	troy	yes
2020-10-08T02:56:28.762197	target	+	2020-10-08T02:56:28.762197	target	+
2020-10-08T02:56:41.504264	target	Китай +	2020-10-08T02:56:41.504264	target	China +

Figure 13. Troy confirms to Target they have a stop on China

All these messages corroborate the fact that Conti-TrickBot enterprise has a close relationship with Russian government and/or act in its interests.

Collaboration with other Malware families

Conti-Ryuk

Collaboration with Ryuk seemed to have started around August 2020 when **Stern** said, *"Ryuk is going start as of Monday."* **Target** seemed to responsible for updating **Stern** on how the Conti-Ryuk collaboration was going and if Ryuk team is able to work together and smoothly with his team:

```

2020-08-27T15:19:36.631199 target "по поводу рюка - на след неделе начнем и за 1-2 недели сработаются мои люди из офиса с его людьми по схеме:
чтобы делали объекты > сразу люди рюка их в работу брали из бк > что не так пошло или коба не погурзилась: они сразу решили ну или еще точки вход заразить какие то
начнем постепенно в таком режиме и к концу месяца с рюком устроимся от этих процессов: пусть сами мои и его взаимодействуют напрямую"
2020-08-27T15:19:36.633166 target ну и потестируем разные сетки с ним в обороте, пойдем что конкретно ему доставать лучше и из какого сектора
2020-08-27T15:19:36.636252 target "вообщем след недели
- рюк и наши начнут учиться взаимодействовать между собой: потихоньку начнем по немногу
- профу на его онлайн хакеров чтобы начать зарабатывать + обкатал для офис схему работы
- электрон то что просил полутно
с 10 по 20 чисел сентября
- рюк уже начнем увеличивать
- проф онлайн команде и немного офису уже делать
с 20 по 30 сентября
- рюк люди и мои старшие менеджеры сами уже взаимодействуют
- потихоньку начнем загружать офис работой с профом"
2020-08-27T15:19:36.638663 target "в октябре если все пойдет как планирует проф
- грузим рюку
- грузим нашим хакерам (офис)

```

```

2020-08-27T15:19:36.631199 target "As for Ryuk - as of next week we will kick off and for 1-2 weeks my people from the office will work together with his people according to the following scheme:
in order to do the objects > immediately Ryuk's people take them from the BC (backdoor controller) to work on > if something went wrong or coxa has not loaded: they immediately decide if they infect some points of access
we will start gradually in this regime and towards the end of the month Ryuk and I will remove ourselves: let my and his people to interact directly with each other"
2020-08-27T15:19:36.633166 target and will test different networks with him in the turn, will understand in concrete terms what is easy for him to reach and from what sector
2020-08-27T15:19:36.636252 target "to sum up the next week
- Ryuk and our people will learn how to interact with each other: will start slowly and little by little
- will give to prof for his online hackers so that they start earning + rolled out the work scheme for the office
- electron what he asked along the way
from 10 to 20 September
- will be increasing Ryuk
- will give to prof's online team and less to do for the office
from 20 to 30 September
- Ryuk's people and my senior managers are interacting on their own
- slowly will start loading the office with prof's work"
2020-08-27T15:19:36.638663 target "In October if everything works out as per prof's plan
- will load Ryuk
- will load our hackers (office)

```

Figure 14. Conti-Ryuk initial plans on collaboration

As per the chat between **Stern**, **Target** and **Troy**, it is evident that from September 2020 to October 2020 Conti-Ryuk successfully executed attacks on Sopra Steria, Steelcase, Merieux NutriSciences and Northern Trust and received 1.5 million (currency is unknown) in ransom payments:

```

2020-10-23T12:37:29.772988 target трой еще локнул 2 очень крупных конторы
2020-10-23T12:37:29.773886 target от 1 млрд
2020-10-23T12:37:29.774196 target и 3 млрд
2020-10-23T12:37:29.811482 target проф сказал выплатили нам 1,5 мл
2020-10-23T12:37:29.815636 target " fx1-16 | usa | server: 1200/1200 |computer: 3000/1000+ |
memory: 380+tb | revenue: 3bill | Employees: 12000 | Website: https://www.steelcase.com/"
2020-10-23T12:37:29.816853 target два
2020-10-23T12:37:29.818943 target два
2020-10-23T12:37:29.817273 target "fx3-16 | IP: 192.168.54.6 | USA, IT, ESP | server: 702/866 |
computer: 1000+/2300 | memory: 243TB revenue: 1B | Employees: 7,000 | site: www.merieuxnutrisciences.com"
2020-10-23T12:37:29.820244 target "FX1-10 | usaserver:5000/3000+ | comps 50000/1000+ | revenue: 9 bill
employees:50000 | website: www.soprasteria.com | www.soprabanking.com"
2020-10-23T12:37:29.820632 target три
2020-10-23T12:37:29.821616 target "fx2-12 | IP: 10.1.10.250 | USA | server: 5/5 | computer: 9/9
memory: 1 TB | revenue: 6b | Employees: 19,800 Website: www.northerntrust.com"
2020-10-23T12:37:29.822791 target четыре

```

```

2020-10-23T12:37:29.772988 target troy also locked 2 very big firms
2020-10-23T12:37:29.773886 target from 1 bln
2020-10-23T12:37:29.774196 target and 3 bln
2020-10-23T12:37:29.811482 target prof said they paid us 1.5 mln
2020-10-23T12:37:29.815636 target " fx1-16 | usa | server: 1200/1200 |computer: 3000/1000+ |
memory: 380+tb | revenue: 3bill | Employees: 12000 | Website: https://www.steelcase.com/"
2020-10-23T12:37:29.816853 target one
2020-10-23T12:37:29.818943 target two
2020-10-23T12:37:29.817273 target "fx3-16 | IP: 192.168.54.6 | USA, IT, ESP | server: 702/866 |
computer: 1000+/2300 | memory: 243TB revenue: 1B | Employees: 7,000 | site: www.merieuxnutrisciences.com"
2020-10-23T12:37:29.820244 target "FX1-10 | usaserver:5000/3000+ | comps 50000/1000+ | revenue: 9 bill
employees:50000 | website: www.soprasteria.com | www.soprabanking.com"
2020-10-23T12:37:29.820632 target three
2020-10-23T12:37:29.821616 target "fx2-12 | IP: 10.1.10.250 | USA | server: 5/5 | computer: 9/9
memory: 1 TB | revenue: 6b | Employees: 19,800 Website: www.northerntrust.com"
2020-10-23T12:37:29.822791 target four

```

Figure 15. Potential victims of Conti-Ryuk collaboration

The first mention of Conti-Maze potential connection dates back July 2020, when **Kevin** (coder/crypter) says to **Stern** "Prof took a different locker as far as I understood. Appears to be Maze. Said he has rolled it at night". Then **Kevin** suggests to **Prof** (team lead/manager) that Conti-Maze negotiation should be handled by **Stern** himself as he is more experienced. He then says Maze will take 25-30%. It seems that **Prof** contacted developers of Maze and managed to get the ransomware build which was later given to Conti reversers to figure out how it works and build a locker "not worse than Maze, and even better":

```

2020-07-09117:31:37.377763 stern "
[18:11:13] <professor> сделал первый мейз, просто случайную сетку небольшого - отписали сразу в течении суток
[18:30:32] <Stern> два варианта
[18:30:34] <Stern> либо
[18:30:42] <Stern> 1. локер
[18:30:43] <Stern> либо
[18:30:48] <Stern> 2. то что это ты локал
[18:31:05] <professor> первое...
разница очень ощутима, я смотрел за процессом
[18:31:15] <professor> не пропускает хендлы
[18:31:23] <professor> сам локер не падает аверами почти никакими
[18:31:29] <professor> большие файлы жрет только в путь"
2020-07-09117:31:51.177440 stern сделай чтобы локер работал лучше чем у мазе
2020-07-09117:32:54.684623 reshaev Ас чекну почаще обзоры
2020-07-09117:38:42.899785 reshaev А есть вариант мне билд скинуть?
2020-07-09117:38:45.781612 reshaev С декриптором
2020-07-09117:43:35.112728 stern декриптора нет пока
2020-07-09117:43:46.480707 stern а билд у профа спроси
...
2020-07-29118:40:23.353291 stern Привет
2020-07-29118:40:25.544119 stern как продвигается ?
2020-07-29118:40:51.577861 reshaev Привет, в работе все ок
2020-07-29118:41:05.334253 reshaev К след неделе будет
2020-07-29118:51:39.186577 stern ок
2020-07-29118:51:45.451872 stern надо сделать не хуже мейза
2020-07-29118:51:48.095686 stern а то и лучше
2020-07-29118:52:11.723947 reshaev думаю лучше будет

```

```

2020-07-09117:31:37.377763 stern "
[18:11:13] <professor> did the first one with maze, just a small random network - replied back within a day
[18:30:32] <Stern> two variants
[18:30:34] <Stern> either
[18:30:42] <Stern> 1. locker
[18:30:43] <Stern> or
[18:30:48] <Stern> 2. that it is you who locked
[18:31:05] <professor> first one...
the difference is noticeable, I was looking at the process
[18:31:15] <professor> does not allow/let handles
[18:31:23] <professor> the locker itself does not get detected by almost any AVs
[18:31:29] <professor> consumes large files only on its way"
2020-07-09117:31:51.177440 stern make that the locker works better than maze
2020-07-09117:32:54.684623 reshaev Will check now, check the reviews
2020-07-09117:38:42.899785 reshaev It is possible to send me the build?
2020-07-09117:38:45.781612 reshaev With the decryptor
2020-07-09117:43:35.112728 stern no decryptor at the moment
2020-07-09117:43:46.480707 stern for the build ask Prof
...
2020-07-29118:40:23.353291 stern Hi
2020-07-29118:40:25.544119 stern how it is going?
2020-07-29118:40:51.577861 reshaev Hi, worhaise everything is good
2020-07-29118:41:05.334253 reshaev Will be done around next week
2020-07-29118:51:39.186577 stern ok
2020-07-29118:51:45.451872 stern We need to make it not worse than maze
2020-07-29118:51:48.095686 stern and even better
2020-07-29118:52:11.723947 reshaev I think it will be better

```

Figure 16. Reshaev to Stern advising a new Maze-based locker will be better than Maze

When it comes to Conti-Maze victims, it seems that both were involved in hacking Academi (former Blackwater), a U.S. private military company who provides services to CIA. “*We [expletive] Academi for almost a year*” says **Target** to **Dandis** (tester). Academi and the affiliated Triple Canopy, Olive Group Capital Ltd, Strategic Social LLC and Constellis Group were all infected/hacked around mid-July 2020 and Maze had negotiations in one of the victim’s networks. **Stern** informed his subordinates that they are primarily looking for chats, contracts, PII, emails and accounting and that the request seems to be originating from one of the two ‘offices’ (see above, the chat where they mentioned Cozy Bear). **Target** reports to **Stern** they infected 30+ military companies along with some agencies, one of which is The US Environmental Protection Agency:

```

2020-07-22117:18:45.829546 stern как в академи дела?
2020-07-22117:18:53.472872 revers здарова так взяли домен
2020-07-22117:18:59.919845 revers академия )
2020-07-22117:19:01.816990 stern что там по итогу?
2020-07-22117:19:07.611475 stern данные выкачиваем?
2020-07-22117:19:19.298826 revers а вот с этим я профа жду
2020-07-22117:19:33.341137 revers там мид очень сложная я боюсь накоспорить
2020-07-22117:19:49.897102 stern а он когда будет
2020-07-22117:19:51.879561 revers просто есть некоторые вещи которые я не встречал
2020-07-22117:19:58.548108 stern ага
2020-07-22117:20:01.655596 revers обещался в конце недели быть
2020-07-22117:20:15.974949 revers да и отлежаться дать надо ей хотя бы пару дней что бы админы успокоились
2020-07-22117:20:25.476286 stern сколько там компов в сетке
2020-07-22117:20:25.479886 stern и серверов
2020-07-22117:20:31.791644 revers так же схему рисуем с таргетов
2020-07-22117:20:39.288289 revers а щас все дам он изолированный
2020-07-22117:20:43.136486 revers сек
2020-07-22117:20:45.981739 stern что в итоге там по мейл серверу
2020-07-22117:21:19.336040 revers "AD1.academi.com | AD3.academi.com | MWVC.academi.com | AD4.academi.com"
2020-07-22117:21:21.478277 revers все ок
2020-07-22117:21:24.480811 revers которые там есть
2020-07-22117:21:24.487865 revers которые там есть
2020-07-22117:21:46.076445 revers mykns.academi.com
2020-07-22117:21:48.182683 revers и это все well
2020-07-22117:21:55.610473 stern and what about 80 infected computers
2020-07-22117:21:57.504989 stern where is this from
2020-07-22117:22:07.056288 revers from the hq
2020-07-22117:22:19.762121 stern yes
2020-07-22117:22:25.279914 stern hq I guess is the academi
2020-07-22117:22:32.988802 stern academi is a large company
2020-07-22117:22:33.731212 revers no
2020-07-22117:22:40.349887 stern there must be thousand people working there
2020-07-22117:22:42.675562 revers no will show you now the trust
2020-07-22117:23:04.165380 revers dn:CN=hq,triplicanopy.com,CN=System,DC=jv,DC=nsps,DC=com

```

```

2020-07-22117:18:45.829546 stern how is it going with academi?
2020-07-22117:18:53.472872 revers hi we took a domain there
2020-07-22117:18:59.919845 revers academi )
2020-07-22117:19:01.816990 stern and what is the result?
2020-07-22117:19:07.611475 stern exfiltrating the data?
2020-07-22117:19:19.298826 revers for that indeed I am waiting for prof
2020-07-22117:19:33.341137 revers there is a complicated IDS and I am afraid I will fuck it up
2020-07-22117:19:49.897102 stern and when is he available?
2020-07-22117:19:51.879561 revers there are just certain things I never encountered
2020-07-22117:19:58.548108 stern ok
2020-07-22117:20:01.655596 revers he promised to be there at the end of the week
2020-07-22117:20:15.974949 revers plus we need to let it rest for few days so the admins are chilled down a bit
2020-07-22117:20:25.476286 stern how many computers are there in the network
2020-07-22117:20:25.479886 stern and servers
2020-07-22117:20:31.791644 revers also we are drawing a scheme from the targets
2020-07-22117:20:39.288289 revers ah ok now will give you all it is isolated
2020-07-22117:20:43.136486 revers sec
2020-07-22117:20:45.981739 stern what is there in the end with the mail server
2020-07-22117:21:19.336040 revers "AD1.academi.com | AD3.academi.com | MWVC.academi.com | AD4.academi.com"
2020-07-22117:21:21.478277 revers all PC
2020-07-22117:21:24.480811 revers what are there
2020-07-22117:21:24.487865 revers mykns.academi.com
2020-07-22117:21:46.076445 revers and this as well
2020-07-22117:21:48.182683 revers and what about 80 infected computers
2020-07-22117:21:55.610473 stern where is this from
2020-07-22117:21:57.504989 stern from the hq
2020-07-22117:22:07.056288 revers yes
2020-07-22117:22:25.279914 stern hq I guess is the academi
2020-07-22117:22:32.988802 stern academi is a large company
2020-07-22117:22:33.731212 revers no
2020-07-22117:22:40.349887 stern there must be thousand people working there
2020-07-22117:22:42.675562 revers no will show you now the trust
2020-07-22117:23:04.165380 revers dn:CN=hq,triplicanopy.com,CN=System,DC=jv,DC=nsps,DC=com

```

```

2020-07-22T17:23:04.165380 revers dn:CN=HQ,tripleanopy.com,CN=System,DC=Jv,DC=nsps,DC=com
2020-07-22T17:23:13.766903 revers вот это HQ
2020-07-22T17:23:22.103563 revers его я тоже взял
2020-07-22T17:23:46.970467 revers dn:CN=Academi.com,CN=System,DC=HQ,DC=tripleanopy,DC=com
2020-07-22T17:23:49.771153 revers академи
2020-07-22T17:24:08.513806 revers там нет 1000 человек
2020-07-22T17:24:18.663074 revers учетные записи дублируются
2020-07-22T17:24:24.609504 revers там большая часть
2020-07-22T17:24:32.250923 stern филиалы: Academi, Clayton International
2020-07-22T17:24:53.188749 stern Triple Canopy - это основная компания походу
2020-07-22T17:25:06.334994 revers сек я посмотрю что у них в трастах есть
2020-07-22T17:25:16.673438 stern да них есть админ?
2020-07-22T17:25:25.892225 revers да конечно
2020-07-22T17:25:27.108494 revers есть
2020-07-22T17:25:31.392661 revers и не только от них
2020-07-22T17:25:34.706280 stern "В июне 2014 года фирма объединилась с конкурирующей фирмой-подрядчиком по обеспечению безопасности, Academi, бывшей Blackwater, чтобы сформировать Constellis Group"
2020-07-22T17:25:43.951867 stern вот
2020-07-22T17:25:52.474672 stern надо вообще от всей Constellis Group переписки
2020-07-22T17:25:53.962842 stern revers
2020-07-22T17:25:54.247641 revers вот Blackwater такого в трастах нет
2020-07-22T17:25:55.802118 stern и там закрылись
2020-07-22T17:25:57.957131 revers остальное все есть
2020-07-22T17:26:05.485851 revers ну вот я закрепился там
2020-07-22T17:26:05.602641 stern и контракты
2020-07-22T17:26:06.705797 stern для начала
2020-07-22T17:26:20.070668 revers ну ад язер уже у таргета с какого домена
2020-07-22T17:26:24.002212 revers имя должность
2020-07-22T17:26:26.432043 revers и мило
2020-07-22T17:26:40.684145 revers которые трастах есть
2020-07-22T17:26:45.712714 revers а от HQ есть уже
2020-07-22T17:26:57.033045 revers в выходные буду уже данные смотреть
2020-07-22T17:27:09.832050 revers Constellis Group домен админ взял
2020-07-22T17:27:17.236700 revers Academi так же взял
2020-07-22T17:27:32.817774 revers triplecanopy ад взял тоже
2020-07-22T17:27:58.429744 revers так же еще там по сети 1
2020-07-22T17:28:06.052238 revers у мейба там переговоры
2020-07-22T17:23:04.165380 revers dn:CN=HQ,tripleanopy.com,CN=System,DC=Jv,DC=nsps,DC=com
2020-07-22T17:23:13.766903 revers this is the HQ
2020-07-22T17:23:22.103563 revers I also took it
2020-07-22T17:23:46.970467 revers dn:CN=Academi.com,CN=System,DC=HQ,DC=tripleanopy,DC=com
2020-07-22T17:23:49.771153 revers academi
2020-07-22T17:24:08.513806 revers there are not 1000
2020-07-22T17:24:18.663074 revers the account details are duplicated
2020-07-22T17:24:24.609504 revers there is a big chunk
2020-07-22T17:24:32.250923 stern Branches: Academi, Clayton International
2020-07-22T17:24:53.188749 stern Triple Canopy - is the main company
2020-07-22T17:25:06.334994 revers sec I will have a look what they have in their trusts
2020-07-22T17:25:16.673438 stern is there an admin from them?
2020-07-22T17:25:25.892225 revers yes sure
2020-07-22T17:25:27.108494 revers there is
2020-07-22T17:25:31.392661 revers and not only from them
2020-07-22T17:25:34.706280 stern "In June 2014 the firm got merged with the competitor firm-subcontractor in the field of security Academi, former Blackwater, to form Constellis Group"
2020-07-22T17:25:43.951867 stern here
2020-07-22T17:25:52.474672 stern we need from all Constellis Group then
2020-07-22T17:25:53.962842 stern chats
2020-07-22T17:25:54.247641 revers as for Blackwater it is not in the trusts
2020-07-22T17:25:55.802118 stern and gain a foothold there
2020-07-22T17:25:57.957131 revers all the others are there
2020-07-22T17:26:05.485851 revers and indeed I already set a foothold there
2020-07-22T17:26:05.602641 stern and contracts
2020-07-22T17:26:06.705797 stern for the start
2020-07-22T17:26:20.070668 revers Target already has AD users from every domain
2020-07-22T17:26:24.002212 revers name position
2020-07-22T17:26:26.432043 revers and mail address
2020-07-22T17:26:40.684145 revers which are in the trusts
2020-07-22T17:26:45.712714 revers and we have already from the HQ
2020-07-22T17:26:57.033045 revers in the weekend I am gonna have a look into the data
2020-07-22T17:27:09.832050 revers Constellis Group domain is already taken
2020-07-22T17:27:17.236700 revers Academi we took it too
2020-07-22T17:27:32.817774 revers triplecanopy AD is taken by us
2020-07-22T17:27:58.429744 revers also there in the network 1
2020-07-22T17:28:06.052238 revers Maze has negotiations there

```

Figure 17. Stern and Revers's discussion around Academi hack

```

2020-07-15T15:16:05.156179 target у меня два тела хорошая новость
2020-07-15T15:16:05.157315 target думаю очень
2020-07-15T15:16:05.158182 target "Triple Canopy, Inc. is an American private security company that provides integrated security, mission support and risk management services to corporate, government and nonprofit clients. The firm was founded in May 2003 by the Army Special Forces veterans, including former Delta Force operators. Wikipedia Parent organization: Constellis Number of employees: 22,000+ (2020)*"
2020-07-15T15:16:05.159006 target Triple Canopy, Academi, Olive Group Capital Ltd., Strategic Social LLC
2020-07-15T15:16:05.167034 target все заражены
2020-07-15T15:16:05.170025 target сетки
2020-07-15T15:16:05.174157 target это все военна
2020-07-15T15:16:05.176763 target "+ с запасом заражены, чтобы точки входа были разные хакерам по несколько ботов везде"
...
2020-07-15T15:16:05.180049 target и еще +30 разник по военке
2020-07-15T15:16:05.187027 target "U.S. Environmental Protection Agency тоже заражены"
2020-07-15T15:16:05.188407 target сетка
2020-07-15T15:16:05.189267 target AA is the network name
2020-07-15T15:16:05.190005 target сейчас посчитали
2020-07-15T15:16:05.190825 target 60+ сеток (именно сеток) академи, констеликс, агенств
2020-07-15T15:16:05.156179 target I have a good news for you
2020-07-15T15:16:05.157315 target I think very good
2020-07-15T15:16:05.158182 target "Triple Canopy, Inc. is an American private security company that provides integrated security, mission support and risk management services to corporate, government and nonprofit clients. The firm was founded in May 2003 by the Army Special Forces veterans, including former Delta Force operators. Wikipedia Parent organization: Constellis Number of employees: 22,000+ (2020)*"
2020-07-15T15:16:05.159006 target Triple Canopy, Academi, Olive Group Capital Ltd., Strategic Social LLC
2020-07-15T15:16:05.167034 target all infected
2020-07-15T15:16:05.170025 target networks
2020-07-15T15:16:05.174157 target these are all military
2020-07-15T15:16:05.176763 target "+ we infect with some reserves so that hackers have different access points there are several bots everywhere"
...
2020-07-15T15:16:05.180049 target and also +30 different in military
2020-07-15T15:16:05.187027 target "U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is also infected"
2020-07-15T15:16:05.188407 target network
2020-07-15T15:16:05.189267 target AA is the network name
2020-07-15T15:16:05.190005 target just counted now
2020-07-15T15:16:05.190825 target 60+ networks (namely the networks) academi, constellis, agencies

```

Figure 18. Target to Stern about 30+ military companies they infected Conti-Netwalker

Mid-April 2021 **Stern** asked **Bentley** and **Professor** to add **Netwalker's** jabber account to their contact list. In mid-2020, **Trellix** wrote an in-depth [blog on Netwalker](#) explaining not only their military malware but how we uncovered a large portion of their funds. In January 2021, Law Enforcement managed to takedown the **Netwalker's** dark web site and arrested an affiliate based in Canada. After these interventions, it got really quiet around **Netwalker**. Given the appearance date of the **Netwalker** moniker within the **Conti** jabber server, it is possible that **Netwalker** affiliates found a new home within the **Conti** group.

According to **Stern**, **Netwalker** will use the **TrickBot** botnet to distribute their malware. **Bentley** was in charge of onboarding **Netwalker** to their admin panel, VNC, etc. and providing them with tested LNK/XLS files with payload to use in their campaigns. It looks like there was friction in the beginning of the collaboration and **Netwalker** did not get the promised bonus from **Stern**, and **Stern** did not like that **Netwalker** was passing the **Citrix's** given to him to other parties:

```

2021-04-30T13:52:52.243054 netwalker Arma 300k poprosil
2021-04-30T13:52:52.259520 netwalker Ty eshe govovil nam bonus sdelaesh posle loka pervogo! O4en' v nem nujdaemysa bratishka.
2021-04-30T14:17:25.655589 netwalker Videl 4o pisal ?
2021-04-30T15:23:32.929502 netwalker Eshe raz priv bratish ty videl 4to pisal ?
2021-04-30T15:37:36.586261 stern чел дал цитриксy, хорс скинул тебе, а ты другому челу который их дал в итоге) круговорот такой )
2021-04-30T15:44:47.243076 netwalker Какой ? Щас узнаю кто по лбу получит. Ну да все ведь друг друга знают.
2021-04-30T15:45:26.281785 netwalker Ты чекал мой спам потихоньку грузит.
2021-04-30T15:45:48.189872 stern посмотрю сегодня
2021-04-30T17:03:11.985721 netwalker Разобрались. Извенились все друг перед другом .
Моя вина, все хочу тебе результата больше показать т.к. без таргов сидим.
И пока все заняты разбором и выгрузкой ,попросили чела всего лишь прочекаь, а он оказывается их и дал.
Смешно. Но суть никто никого обманывать не хотел это факт. Не повториться такого никогда.
Больше чем рук целей не возьму. Выше головы прыгать не буду.

```

```

2021-04-30T13:52:52.243054 netwalker Arma asked 300k
2021-04-30T13:52:52.259520 netwalker You said that you will give us some bonus after the first lock! We really need it bro.
2021-04-30T14:17:25.655589 netwalker Did you see what I wrote ?
2021-04-30T15:23:32.929502 netwalker Again hi bro did you see what I wrote here ?
2021-04-30T15:37:36.586261 stern a guy gave some citrix'es, hors passed them to you, and you gave it to another person from whom they actually originated from) a kind of a circle )
2021-04-30T15:44:47.243076 netwalker What ? I will find out who gets a slap on the forehead. Although everyone anyway knows each other.
2021-04-30T15:45:26.281785 netwalker Did you check, my spam is slowly loading.
2021-04-30T15:45:48.189872 stern will have a look today
2021-04-30T17:03:11.985721 netwalker We figured things out. Apologized to each other .
My bad, all I want is to show you more results cause we are sitting here without any targets.
And while everyone is busy with loading/analysing and exfiltrating, we asked the guy just to check, and he apparently passed it further.
Funny. But the truth is nobody wanted to fool anyone that is the fact. It is not going to happen again ever.
I am not going to take more targets than the hands I have. I am not gonna jump over the head.

```

Figure 19. Initial friction between Netwalker and Stern

Later in May 2021 **Netwalker** provided **Stern** the details of their two potential victims, Blackbaud, Inc. and Ellsworth Adhesives, and asked him to pay to his team as they worked hard:

```

2021-05-21T19:40:48.232042 netwalker "173.167.160.17 DEV1 (\\PGMDC) blackbaud.com blackbaud.com 900кк хорсику отдал в разбор
у меня все 196.155.13.118 ellsworth.com 700кк заняты.
Не забудь плиз спамилке закинуть. Он так порадовал."
2021-05-21T19:53:39.872258 netwalker Братишка прием.
2021-05-21T20:18:48.329290 netwalker "[21:44:35] <netwalker> )> 16evvEiZ6HKkV9WAbysJfJG1Qa7DzJGUfP koshelek.
Очень прошу не забудь челу закинуть мотивацию он на славу постарался. и нужно дать ему стимула. А то мы ему да же базу не всю оплатили бро."
2021-05-21T20:34:08.012841 stern скинул 1бтц

```

```

2021-05-21T19:40:48.232042 netwalker "173.167.160.17 DEV1 (\\PGMDC) blackbaud.com blackbaud.com 900кк gave it to hors for further work
I have all 196.155.13.118 ellsworth.com 700кк busy with.
Dont forget please to pay to spamilka. He was so joyful."
2021-05-21T19:53:39.872258 netwalker Bro ping.
2021-05-21T20:18:48.329290 netwalker "[21:44:35] <netwalker> )> 16evvEiZ6HKkV9WAbysJfJG1Qa7DzJGUfP wallet.
Please dont forget to send the motivation to the guy, he did his best. and we need to give him some incentive. We did not even pay him the whole base bro."
2021-05-21T20:34:08.012841 stern sent 1BTC

```

Figure 20. Potential Conti-Netwalker victims

Blackbaud, Inc. disclosed that they indeed paid ransom to the perpetrators but never mentioned who they actually were nor the amount of ransom they paid.

Conti-Lockbit

There is a hint of Conti-TrickBot potentially collaborating with LockBit group. At the beginning of November 2021, **Defender** (manager) said to **Stern** that the account **Brom** was (re)created in Group 6 for LockbitSupp (an alias strongly associated with LockBit ransomware group):

```

2021-11-02T19:59:00.348544 defender "акк brom в бгр для LockBitSupp
taker сказал ты в курсе"
2021-11-02T19:59:22.465835 stern ок
2021-11-02T19:59:22.936942 stern да
2021-11-04T16:13:16.270026 stern а какой контакт тут у локбита?
2021-11-05T12:12:18.436808 stern lockbit там и не зашел
2021-11-05T12:12:21.348413 stern дай ему инструкцию
2021-11-05T12:12:42.737073 defender все давал
2021-11-05T12:12:47.893440 defender и расписывал что и как
2021-11-05T12:13:03.271718 defender он еще обижался что слишком подробно
2021-11-05T12:13:09.953723 defender сейчас спишу с ним еще
...
2021-11-10T08:49:40.912881 stern что там с локбитом кстате? он так и не вышел сюда
...
2021-11-10T10:53:21.062944 defender по локбиту, вчера написал ему еще подробнее,
все поля как у меня заполнены, пока не отписался...
еще предложил по тимке все ему настроить, он сказал пока не надо

```

```

2021-11-02T19:22:29.937726 defender "acc brom into 6gr for LockBitSupp
taker said you are aware"
2021-11-02T19:59:22.465835 stern ок
2021-11-02T19:59:22.936942 stern yes
2021-11-04T16:13:16.270026 stern what is the lockbit's contact here?
2021-11-05T12:12:18.436808 stern lockbit did not enter there
2021-11-05T12:12:21.348413 stern give him the instruction
2021-11-05T12:12:42.737073 defender i gave him all
2021-11-05T12:12:47.893440 defender and described what and how
2021-11-05T12:13:03.271718 defender he was even offended that everything is so detailed
2021-11-05T12:13:09.953723 defender I am gonna now ping him
...
2021-11-10T08:49:40.912881 stern what about lockbit by the way? did he reply here.
...
2021-11-10T10:53:21.062944 defender as for lockbit, y'day I wrote him even more details,
all the fields the way I have them filled in, so far he has not replied...
even suggested to configure everything for him via team, he said that is not needed for now

```

Figure 21. Defender advising to Stern he added LockBitSupp to their Jabber
Two weeks after, **Mango** (team lead/manager) told **Stern** that there was misunderstanding with LockBit and asked him about the percentage of networks and revenue they will take from LockBit in case of successful collaboration:

```

2021-11-16T12:00:22.179558 mango С локбитом мы че то друг друга не поняли...
ты писал что им надо сеток дать в работу, он пишет что ему трой вообще нужен)
И на каких условиях тоже я не понял, дал ему твой контакт тут, сказал сам с тобой пишется
2021-11-16T12:08:22.447384 stern ага
2021-11-16T12:08:27.255171 stern ну может ему тогда бузы контакт
2021-11-16T12:10:35.125046 mango на каких условиях ему если что трой то давать?
2021-11-16T12:10:50.527021 mango я ему писал что обычно мы часть ботов с сетками забираем, но какую часть я не знаю))
2021-11-16T12:11:14.965930 stern скажи 20 проц
2021-11-16T12:11:17.203329 stern попробуем там
2021-11-16T12:11:29.849370 mango 20% ботов с сетками нави
2021-11-16T12:11:30.586461 mango ок
2021-11-16T12:11:49.936641 mango отлучусь на 20 минут на процедуры
2021-11-16T12:11:57.578311 stern ок
2021-11-16T12:12:09.354262 stern 20 проц не ботов а прибыли
2021-11-16T12:12:09.747463 stern туской сами отработывает

```

```

2021-11-16T12:00:22.179558 mango We did not understand each other with lockbit...
You wrote to give him networks for work, he is writing that he actually needs troy)
And on what terms also not clear, I gave him your contact here, he said he will reach out to you himself
2021-11-16T12:08:22.447384 stern yes
2021-11-16T12:08:27.255171 stern may be then we should give him buza's contact
2021-11-16T12:10:35.125046 mango On what terms in case we need to give him troy?
2021-11-16T12:10:50.527021 mango I wrote him that usually we take a part of the botnet, but what part I do not know))
2021-11-16T12:11:14.965930 stern say 20 percent
2021-11-16T12:11:17.203329 stern let's try that
2021-11-16T12:11:29.849370 mango 20% bots with the networks are ours
2021-11-16T12:11:30.586461 mango ok
2021-11-16T12:12:09.354262 stern 20 percent of revenue not the bots
2021-11-16T12:12:09.747463 stern let them do the work themselves

```

Figure 22. Stern to Mango on percentage of revenue they take from Conti-LockBit collaboration
TrickBot, Buer, Amadey and IcedID

On June 26, 2020, **Taker** (tester) who just began the conversation with **Stern** asked questions around what TrickBot was and how it got started. “*It started as a banking bot, gathering logs, logins, and passwords. It was a financial matter*” replied **Stern**. Later in October 2020, **Target** said to **Troy**, “*They managed to connect Cobalt, Bazar and TrickBot together. They figured that TrickBot is us.*” On the August 19, 2021, **Professor** got furious when somebody mistakenly included the TrickBot module designed to not infect CIS countries into Diavol ransomware (aka Conti) build, which allowed security researchers to attribute TrickBot and Conti teams to the same threat actor:

```

2021-09-01T07:52:36.582270 stern "
[20:07:20] <professor> ты видел как они обфаккапились ?
[20:07:24] <professor> по поводу аффиляции ?
[20:07:30] <professor> я чуть блять не лопнул нахуй
[20:07:37] <professor> они врезали кусок кода трикбота который отвечает за отстук на СНГ
[20:07:41] <professor> в билд дивола
[20:07:48] <professor> хотя я конкретно просил ваще не трогать задачу с определением гео
[20:07:58] <professor> и сразу весь проект в новостях всплыл как полностью аффилированный

```

```

2021-09-01T07:52:36.582270 stern "
[20:07:20] <professor> did you see how they fucked it up ?
[20:07:24] <professor> regarding the affiliation ?
[20:07:30] <professor> I fucking almost exploded
[20:07:37] <professor> they put a part of trickbot's code which is responsible for the reply on CIS
[20:07:41] <professor> into the build of Diavol
[20:07:48] <professor> Although I specifically asked do not touch the task with determining the geo at all
[20:07:58] <professor> and immediately the entire project is on the news as fully affiliated

```

Figure 23. Professor advising Stern TrickBot module was added into Conti ransomware build

Amadey and Buer were also mentioned multiple time in Conti chats as alternative loaders. In June 2020, **Price** (coder) said to **Target**, “*Hof referred me to a hacker forum, I got access to it (for money) and copied Buer’s entire ins and outs from there.*” As for Amadey loader, it

looks that Conti team bought it and every time Amadey required a 're-crypt' they would pay for that.

Furthermore, **Leo** (coder) from Conti gang appears to be the creator of IcedID loader which in May 2021 was 'on the first place among infections':

```
2021-05-01T03:44:47.528482 stern а твой крутой бот ICEDId
2021-05-01T03:44:48.094838 leo ну флаг им )
2021-05-01T03:44:52.191578 stern про него пишут исследователи
2021-05-01T03:44:58.773338 stern что ты сейчас на первом месте)
2021-05-01T03:44:59.708578 leo не не
2021-05-01T03:45:03.226391 leo не мое)
2021-05-01T03:45:13.407216 leo а на первом месте среди чего? )
2021-05-01T03:45:20.908140 stern ну среди размножений )
2021-05-01T03:45:25.991724 stern что не твое ? )
2021-05-01T03:45:45.399755 leo ))
2021-05-01T03:45:56.913981 leo я так не называл )
2021-05-01T03:46:01.705932 leo айсйди )
2021-05-01T03:46:12.588351 leo нашли мы наконец качество
2021-05-01T03:46:13.202797 stern тебя так исследователи назвали )
2021-05-01T03:46:20.930734 stern идиот )

2021-05-01T03:44:47.528482 stern But your bot is cool ICEDId
2021-05-01T03:44:48.094838 leo give them then a flag)
2021-05-01T03:44:52.191578 stern researchers are writing about it
2021-05-01T03:44:58.773338 stern that you are now on the first place )
2021-05-01T03:44:59.708578 leo no no
2021-05-01T03:45:03.226391 leo not mine
2021-05-01T03:45:13.407216 leo on the first place among what? )
2021-05-01T03:45:20.908140 stern amongst infections )
2021-05-01T03:45:25.991724 stern what is not yours ? )
2021-05-01T03:45:45.399755 leo ))
2021-05-01T03:45:56.913981 leo I did not call it like that )
2021-05-01T03:46:01.705932 leo icedid )
2021-05-01T03:46:12.588351 leo we finally found a quality
2021-05-01T03:46:13.202797 stern the researchers called you like that )
2021-05-01T03:46:20.930734 stern idiot )
```

**Figure 24. Leo is the creator of IcedID malware
Conti's victims: NGO, Medical institutions among others**

We went through the Conti leaked messages and compiled a list of their potential victims which mainly includes EU and U.S. entities across various sectors. Most of the 103 potential victims we have identified were located via a Zoominfo URL Conti used to check a company's size and revenue to determine a ransom amount to ask. *"Found a way of buying a Zoominfo account, 2 managers for Buza, for his pricing research, the price is 2k"* advised **Mango** to **Stern**. Later **Stern** said to **Mavelek** (coder/tester), *"@ali has a script to check domains on Zoominfo to get data on number of employees and the revenue of the company."*

Between 2020-2022 Conti and its affiliates targeted and potentially attacked twelve healthcare organizations (clinics, hospitals, care houses including UHS, Prodemica, Geo Group), five educational institutions (schools, colleges, universities, etc.), a charitable organization, a governmental agency, and numerous companies in financial, retail, business services, manufacturing, and other industries:




Figure 25. The chart gives an overview of the Conti’s potential victims by sector
Call center services

Among other departments, Conti has a team of callers. A caller is required to have a good knowledge of spoken English (level B2-C1) and between age 18 and 25. They are recruited by Conti’s HR team to work remotely for ‘an online store’ abroad. The callers earn \$450-500 a month (salary increases by \$100 - \$200 - \$300, depending on the success of the call-centre), working hours are 18:00-2:00 Moscow time (correspond to usual working hours in Western hemisphere), and they receive paid holidays but get no official contract as per the Labour Code.

Below are **Mango’s** messages to **Stern** where he suggests some improvements around blackmailing/call-center and explains a concept which is ‘more or less’ working for them:

```

2021-06-02102118:23:49198 mango С хорошим тем муссами тому выкупом, я так понимаю платят все очень недорого, надо сильнее давить.. По срокам ограничивать их конечно как, идеаль 2 это вполне допустимо, тк многие берут кредиты и тд.. Думаю, что надо глубже анализировать и комментировать именно тем, что совсем что то коротко для них, а не для партнеров, надо сделать зонирование, досрочно погашенную, описать в ссн.. Предлагаю вообще организовать работу так, чтобы все и жестко под отчет по анализу: своевременности, контактов, все персональные данные, что найдем, подотчет, все контакты в своем графике .. высчитана стратегия как давить, что для каких таргетов допустимо. Мы сейчас мнем, торгуемся как выключника, гангстеры себя так не ведут, все эти услуги ни в чем, а от нас такого не ожидай даже как то :-D Надо просто реально изначально ставить выкупы и твердо стоять на своем. А мы начинаем с лица и соглашався на 100%. С учетом того, что там вроде 800 скрит мониторит все эти переговоры - и дальше они на нами глумится. Не просто так они знают все эти переговоры, изучают нас, кошельки и тд.. А раз они черт так расслабились и не хотят платить - давай какую нить жесткую вещь протеста устроим. Может большой слив какой то гримей или еще что то, что внимание привлечет, может даже сделать локос в слобов вообще без выкупов - показателная порка типо) Скажут там компаний 30 50 100 - выкинуть все данные, кого сливаем похотеть.. можно даже не крупнее, но так чтоб на слуху было, чтоб все остальные насторожились и меньше думали.. И цвет выключника поменять, на ж кошер, а не тиффани :-D

...

2021-06-202111:08:00:394568 mango "У нас работаете больше всего компетенции по анализу данных и зонированию; и провалил Буза такую схему:
У нас rockets под разведку отдельная, есть группа по запросам - там хакеры просят надавать или подготовить ту или иную компанию, мы прощаем эти аналитиками, они составляют отчет-досье, если требуется ванитизация - мы передаем это задание зооинкам. Чтобы зооинкам эффективно работать и зонировать не в воздух как вас это происходит - они на связи с аналитиками, могут запросить у них любые дополнительные данные
допустим часть инстинга дати, или какая то инфо о компании/информации
Если компания не идет на контакт - мы данные передаем дальше, для публикации на сайте. (для этого надо подтянуть либо рейтинг либо какого то его скриншот в этот чат)
суть провала со зооинкам такова, что чаще всего при провале зооинкам попадает на ресепшн где какая то тупая вообще не владеющая ситуацией, и по сути мы просто бас из милограда при таком зооинке, нуно какие то прифы чтоб был результат, а не чтоб просто трубка ревели или зооинка послалась..
В принципе все уже работает, надо только достроить и чтоб хакеры начали этим пользоваться. Я подтянул туда банку дерек, херса, еще подтяну реверса.."

...

2021-06-021721:08:00:394568 mango With hers we are also working on fine-tuning the topic of ransoms, as I understand if they pay very reluctantly, we need to push harder .. Of course, it is difficult to pressure in terms of time, but 2 weeks is quite acceptable, because many take loans and so on. I think that we need to analyse them more deeply and frighten that we'll leak something that is dear to them, and not just everything, plus we need to push harder, annoy with calls, OOO's partners, cover them in media .. I propose to organize the work in a way that already by the time of locking, we have a victim's complete analysis report: top management, contacts, their personal data, to the extent we can find, the data on partners, their contacts, and most importantly, we need to come up with the strategy on how to pressure, what is acceptable and for what targets. We press hoobs, bargain like schoolchildren, gangsters don't behave like that, all these concessions are useless, I didn't expect this from even you somehow :-D We just need to set ransoms more realistically from the very beginning and stand our ground, whereas we start with a million and agree to lower. Taking into account the fact that the FBI is everywhere monitoring all these negotiations, I think they are mocking us. There is a reason that they draw all these negotiations, they study us, our habits, etc.. And since these details get so relaxed and do not want to pay - lets do a sort of a tough protest. Maybe a big and loud leak of some kind or something else that will attract the attention, may be even do locks and leaks without ransoms at all - an exemplary smacking) Leak 30 50 100 companies data there - throw out all the data we can get .. maybe not even large ones, but so that it is heard, so that everyone else would tense up and think less .. And change the colour of the admin panel, we are a locker, not tiffany :-D

...

2021-06-202111:08:00:394568 mango "We have more or less developed a concept for data analysis and calls / blackmailing. I proposed to Buza the following scheme:
We have a separate reconnaissance rocket, there is a requesting group - there hackers ask to put pressure on or prepare information on a specific company, we pass it on to analysts, they make a dossier report. If blackmail/calls are required - we transfer this task to the callers. In order for the callers to work effectively and not to call into the air, as it is happening right now - they are in touch with the analyst and they can request any additional data from them
It can be part of the data listing, or some kind of info about company's resources.
If the company does not make any contact, their data is transferred further for publication on the site. (to do this, you need to pull up either reshaw or somebody from his support into this chat)
the essence of the problem with calls is that often when calling, the call goes to the reception where it is being picked up by some kind of a stupid girl/boy who does not know the situation at all, and in fact we get nowhere with such a call, you need some kind of proof to get a result, and not just that they hang up on our callers.
In principle, everything is already working, you just need to tune it up so that hackers can start using it. I pulled a gang of derek, hors there, I'll pull up reverse too .."

```

Figure 26. Mango’s vision on how their call center should operate

Here is a call sample from Conti’s caller to one of their victims, courtesy of Northwave Security:

Conti call sample.mp3

Your browser does not support the **audio** element.

Cybercriminal entrepreneurship (crypto and Forum)

By end of May 2021 **Stern** instructed **Mango** to get in touch with the administrators of exploit forums to see if they were willing to sell to Conti. “Also get a list of forums which can be considered for sale. XSS - find out a list of active users, per day, week, month. The same for Antichat and WWH,” continued **Stern**. Later **Mango** replied that WWH had laughed out loud at their offer and that `hxxp://korovka32xc3t5cg[.]onion` and `hxxp://crdclub4wraumez4[.]onion` were available for sale. However, he advised those forums are rubbish, a hotbed of grifters, and instead of trying to buy a forum they should create one on their own. The following is **Mango’s** suggestion to which he got a ‘go-ahead’ from **Stern**:

2021-06-08T10:07:13.315627 mango "Я вчера разогнал, функций нафантазировал прикольных, типа личного файлового хранилища, с возможностью расширять отдельные файлы, закрытые клубы по интересам, вступление в которые рассматривалось бы на голосовании, открытые публич. группы для общего обсуждения.. Система репутаций пользователей, чтоб куда и посреда искоренять и оставить только реально работающих ребят.. Сиди же и кучу сервисов подключить можно, типа как бабушки сделали на прошлой неделе, когда дали возможность выкладывать дату все владельцам хакером на свои ресурсы, даже если они сами по себе и к их локару отношения не имеют - небось может туда любую дату записать на хренотле..
Вот под этой системой можно все твои проектные фантазии в одном месте осуществлять, и биржу, и файловоюку в блокчейне..
Работы гигабайты объема, без опыта минимально администрирования мы сами не потянем, а думаю что надо привлекать каких то коллег типа XSS.. это будет эволюция нашего андеграунда во что то более серьезное..
Та дядя это все обаяние лишь, тема интересная, но очень непростая.. Давай будем реалистами, мы своими силами весь обсяк работы не потянем, нам не людей не опыта не хватат, поэтому кооперация с какими то администраторами хотя бы небольших площадок будет очень жирным плюсом нам.."
2021-06-08T07:13:315627 mango "Yesterday I got excited and fantasized few cool features, such as personal file storage, with the ability to share separate files, closed clubs based on interests, entrance to which is a subject for voting, public groups for general discussions.. A reputation system for users, so that we get rid of grifters and intermediaries and leave only the real working guys.. here we can also add bunch of services similar to what babus did last week, when they allowed all hackers who want to post the data to their own resources, even if they are on their own and have nothing to do with their locker.. anyone can add any data there for storage..
In such a social network one can realize all their erotic fantasies, and trading and file sharing in blockchain..
It is a gigantic amount of work, without the administration experience we can't pull it through, I think we should involve some colleagues such as XSS.. It is gonna be an evolution of our underground in to something more serious..
"You, uncle, think through all of these please, the idea is interesting, but not very easy to realize, let's be realistic, we won't pull the entire volume of work on our own, we have not enough people and experience for that, therefore a cooperation with some administrators at least of such platforms will be a big plus for us.."

Figure 27. Mango to Stern on their new hacker forum and it’s functionalities

In July 2021, **Mango** sent two design suggestions for the social network (aka forum) to **Stern** – one in dark-green and another in dark-blue color schemes. **Stern** approved the dark-green variant for the forum and suggested it was ready to make it available with a minimum functionality:





Figure 28. Two design suggestions for the hacker forum

Below are the conversation extracts between **Stern** and **Mango**, full of entrepreneurial spirit, where they brainstorm what functionalities the forum should have and what might potentially work for it and what might not:

```

2021-07-05T13:51:57.391754 stern я думаю ее надо запустить пока с минимальным функционалом
2021-07-05T13:52:21.749159 mango ну пока это форум только красивый и ближе к соц сети
2021-07-05T13:52:25.742388 mango вот пока
2021-07-05T13:52:31.344986 mango балансы, депозиты темы люди
2021-07-05T13:52:38.540559 mango сообщения там , гаранты и тд
2021-07-05T13:52:40.936751 stern бтс, эфи и монеро на прием платежей добавит
2021-07-05T13:52:45.114903 mango функционал по ходу боя
2021-07-05T13:52:46.570765 stern а не только бтс
2021-07-05T13:52:50.568980 mango угу
2021-07-05T13:52:58.017811 stern надо понять как должна быть соц сеть
2021-07-05T13:53:01.050469 stern где там продажа чего-то
2021-07-05T13:53:09.049748 stern где аукционы и тд;
2021-07-05T13:53:09.049748 mango пока только прием депозитов(платежа между участниками) без биржи и тд
2021-07-05T13:53:12.079562 stern может ее объединить с like-to или чем-то
2021-07-05T13:53:23.017483 stern может туда обменивки выводить как-то
2021-07-05T13:53:27.425168 stern подумай
2021-07-05T14:10:54.723318 stern вообще на соц сети должно быть не менее 1 млн человек
2021-07-05T14:11:55.987039 stern там все бугдт
2021-07-05T14:11:55.987039 stern репортеры
2021-07-05T14:12:03.376822 stern обычные пользователи
2021-07-05T14:12:04.568660 stern покупатели
2021-07-05T14:12:06.022133 stern продавцы
2021-07-05T14:12:15.945314 stern хакеры
2021-07-05T14:12:16.303264 stern кардены
2021-07-05T14:12:27.868977 stern надо придумать чтобы все магазины были в одном месте
2021-07-05T14:12:31.086148 stern делать им оплату там
2021-07-05T14:12:38.941295 stern и свой процент
2021-07-05T14:12:44.029811 stern закладывать 20 процентов
2021-07-05T14:14:17.032789 mango специализироваться именно на хакера и кардерах то есть не будем?
2021-07-05T14:18:10.077151 stern да
2021-07-05T14:18:18.094393 stern типа гидра только для украденных данных
2021-07-05T14:18:22.070821 stern плюс форум
2021-07-05T14:18:28.071777 stern на разных языках
2021-07-05T14:18:42.073658 stern форум это не основная тема
2021-07-05T14:18:45.012463 stern основное это торговля
2021-07-05T14:18:51.462105 stern общение на втором месте
2021-07-05T14:18:54.324488 stern плюс новости
2021-07-05T14:18:56.171998 stern и обсуждения ндд
2021-07-05T14:18:59.011207 stern это уже потом навесим
2021-07-05T14:19:05.028958 stern может казино еще сделаем.
2021-07-05T14:19:11.053853 stern там же
2021-07-05T14:23:32.022802 mango вот а тебя просил же реши что там соц сеть, централизованная или нет, с открытым кодом или нет
2021-07-05T14:23:39.126618 mango а ты не вспомнишь даже ..
2021-07-05T14:23:56.007384 stern централизованная
2021-07-05T14:23:58.563509 stern код закрыт
2021-07-05T14:24:01.062296 stern только у нас
2021-07-05T14:24:02.202099 stern пока так

```

```

2021-07-05T13:51:57.391754 stern I think we should already issue it with the minimum functionality
2021-07-05T13:52:21.749159 mango at the moment the forum only looks nice and closer to a social network
2021-07-05T13:52:25.742388 mango so
2021-07-05T13:52:31.344986 mango balances, deposits themes people
2021-07-05T13:52:38.540559 mango messages , guarantors etc
2021-07-05T13:52:40.936751 stern add BTC, Ethereum and Monero for accepting payments
2021-07-05T13:52:45.114903 mango functionality as it is goes
2021-07-05T13:52:46.570765 stern and not only the BTC
2021-07-05T13:52:50.568980 mango ok
2021-07-05T13:52:58.017811 stern we need to figure out how the social network should look like
2021-07-05T13:53:01.050469 stern where is the sale of what sort
2021-07-05T13:53:09.049748 stern where are the auctions and etc;
2021-07-05T13:53:09.049748 mango for now is it only accepting deposits/payments between the users? without trading and etc
2021-07-05T13:53:12.079562 stern perhaps we should combine it with somebody or something?
2021-07-05T13:53:23.017483 stern may be we should integrate money exchange into it?
2021-07-05T13:53:27.425168 stern give it a thought
2021-07-05T14:10:54.723318 stern overall for the social network there should be at least 1 million people
2021-07-05T14:11:55.987039 stern there will be everyone
2021-07-05T14:11:55.987039 stern reporters
2021-07-05T14:12:03.376822 stern regular users
2021-07-05T14:12:04.568660 stern buyers
2021-07-05T14:12:06.022133 stern sellers
2021-07-05T14:12:15.945314 stern hackers
2021-07-05T14:12:16.303264 stern carders
2021-07-05T14:12:27.868977 stern we should figure out how to have all the shops in one place
2021-07-05T14:12:31.086148 stern do the payment for them
2021-07-05T14:12:38.941295 stern and get our percentage
2021-07-05T14:12:44.029811 stern 20 percent
2021-07-05T14:14:17.032789 mango so are you saying we are not going to only focus on hackers and carders?
2021-07-05T14:18:10.077151 stern yes
2021-07-05T14:18:18.094393 stern sort of hydra but for stolen data
2021-07-05T14:18:22.070821 stern plus forum
2021-07-05T14:18:28.071777 stern with different languages
2021-07-05T14:18:42.073658 stern forum is not the main thing
2021-07-05T14:18:45.012463 stern the main thing is a trading
2021-07-05T14:18:51.462105 stern conversations are on the second place
2021-07-05T14:18:54.324488 stern plus news
2021-07-05T14:18:56.171998 stern and discussions etc
2021-07-05T14:18:59.011207 stern which we will add later
2021-07-05T14:19:05.028958 stern may be we can do the casino
2021-07-05T14:19:11.053853 stern there as well
2021-07-05T14:23:32.022802 mango I asked you earlier to decide about the social network, centralized or not, with open code or not
2021-07-05T14:23:39.126618 mango and you don't even remember ..
2021-07-05T14:23:56.007384 stern centralized
2021-07-05T14:23:58.563509 stern closed code
2021-07-05T14:24:01.062296 stern which only we possess
2021-07-05T14:24:02.202099 stern so far like that

```

Figure 29. Mango and Stern discussing their new hacker forum

Later **Mango** suggested a potential domain for the forum and a logo for it:

“matryoshka[.]space (already with the domain:)) and as a logo matryoshka but angry, in our color scheme, dark-green, and may be draw a laptop next to it. In principle matches the theme. We are one big system amongst the multiple other sub-systems in one place. And it is clear that it is a Russian theme. It is going to be cool, and easy to remember, I think it will resonate with everyone”.

Purchase of Carbon Black and SonicWall

In March 2021 **Stern** said to **Defender** that he needs Carbon Black AV. In April 2021 **Mango** asked **Professor** if 60k (currency is unknown) is a lot for Carbon, 30k for the firm who buys and 30k for the Carbon itself for 250 PCs. A week later it seems that **Mango** managed to purchase Carbon Black via a firm in France for 14.8k euros (plus 20% for BTC conversion and 30k for the firm as promised). However, **Stern** did not take Carbon Black AV and in July 2021 **Mango** asked him why they aren't doing anything with Carbon Black to which **Stern** replied that originally Ryuk needed it and now for some reason they no longer do:

```

2021-07-05T13:48:35.702285 stern вернем им деньги, и карбон пускай лежит, вдрут что потом понадобится
2021-07-05T13:49:16.385799 mango а почему он не нужен то в итоге?
2021-07-05T13:49:21.673749 mango комуто заниматься или что?;
2021-07-05T13:49:31.821164 mango давай продадим его, на него спрос как бы есть
2021-07-05T13:49:33.299378 stern да просто это рык надо было
2021-07-05T13:49:37.346530 stern они его хотели исследовать
2021-07-05T13:49:39.078459 stern его долго тогда делали
2021-07-05T13:49:42.001253 stern и они отказались потом
2021-07-05T13:49:50.010715 stern или сами себе сделали хз
2021-07-05T13:49:52.377198 mango давай сами исследуем
2021-07-05T13:50:00.337276 stern ну в итоге им эту тему с ними не поднимали
2021-07-05T13:50:03.776311 stern а у прова спроси
2021-07-05T13:50:07.643538 stern нужны ли ему карбон
2021-07-05T13:50:13.259583 stern он сказал что нет пока
2021-07-05T13:50:15.314072 stern ну типа можно
2021-07-05T13:50:19.071060 stern но времени нет
2021-07-05T13:50:22.917442 stern буза хочет сам исследовать
2021-07-05T13:50:27.068485 stern но у него нет цели зачем

```

```

2021-07-05T13:48:35.702285 stern we will give them money, and let Carbon lay there, may be it will be as of use later
2021-07-05T13:49:16.385799 mango why did not we need Carbon at the end?
2021-07-05T13:49:21.673749 mango nobody can work with it?;
2021-07-05T13:49:31.821164 mango let's sell it then, there is a demand for it
2021-07-05T13:49:33.299378 stern it was Ryuk who needed it
2021-07-05T13:49:37.346530 stern they wanted to research it
2021-07-05T13:49:39.078459 stern they wanted it for a long time
2021-07-05T13:49:42.001253 stern and later they rejected it
2021-07-05T13:49:50.010715 stern or may be they made it themselves, fuck knows
2021-07-05T13:49:52.377198 mango let's research it ourselves
2021-07-05T13:49:50.010715 stern and ultimately we did not raise this question again with them
2021-07-05T13:50:03.776311 stern I asked prof
2021-07-05T13:50:07.643538 stern whether he needs Carbon
2021-07-05T13:50:13.259583 stern he said no, not now
2021-07-05T13:50:15.314072 stern in principle yes we can
2021-07-05T13:50:19.071060 stern but we have no time for that
2021-07-05T13:50:22.917442 stern buza wants to research it himself
2021-07-05T13:50:27.068485 stern but he has no targets for that

```

Figure 30. Stern advising to Mango Carbon Black AV was bought for Ryuk team

In February 2021 **Stern** said to **Swift** (tester/coder) that he also needs SonicWall solution. He broadcast to all the contacts in Jabber “Who can figure out the vulnerability in SonicWall and make a working scanner for it?” to which **Ghost** (tester/coder) replied “*This one, CVE-2020-5135: Critical SonicWall VPN Portal Stack-based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability, right?*”. The CVE-2020-5135 is a CVSSv3 9.4/10 critical vulnerability which was fixed around November 2020 and according to SonicWall PSIRT there was no exploitation observed in the wild. Mid-April 2021 **Mango** advised **Stern** there are several ways to buy SonicWall (even a new model SMA 410) and later that they manage to buy new as well as refurbished ones:

```
2021-04-13T20:40:04.882883 mango По соникалам - то что мне скинул наш ресерчер - ВОССТАНОВЛЕННЫЕ, бывшие, поэтому и стоят по 1к. Продаются только в ЮС на eBay. Я нашел новые у производителя в ЮК. Стоят 2,5к фунтов штука. Если вести недели три в Севастополе к этому чуваку в лучшем случае, то из за ковида там большие проблемы с доставкой. С Англии если новые брать - быстрее, и там можно взять новую модель 410. Будут в Севастополе через неделю. ...
2021-04-15T20:40:02.105820 mango соникалы сегодня уже купили, там все четко через неделю будет
2021-04-15T20:40:32.497696 stern отлично
```

```
2021-04-13T20:40:04.882883 mango Regarding SonicWalls - the ones I got from my researcher - REFURBISHED, second hand. that is why they cost 1k each. They are sold only in the US on eBay. I found new ones from a manufacturer in the UK. They cost 2,5 pounds each. In a best case scenario from the US it takes three weeks to reach this guy in Sevastopol, as due to COVID there are big issues with the delivery. From England if we buy new ones - it is faster. And there you can get the new model 410. They will be in Sevastopol in a week. ...
2021-04-15T20:40:02.105820 mango today we bought SonicWalls, everything will be there exactly in a week
2021-04-15T20:40:32.497696 stern great
```

Figure 31. Mango to Stern on the purchase of SonicWall

There is not much further information regarding SonicWall, except that in June 2021 **Subzero** (tester/coder) advised to **Stern** that he “*figured out the SonicWall*”.

Conclusion

Financially motivated cyber criminals have a history of collaboration across borders and often stay away from politics. However, the current Russia-Ukraine conflict isn’t one to ignore, not even for cybercriminals, as they are forced to choose sides.

The ContiLeaks and TrickBotLeaks were a direct result of this conflict. The leaks are of an unprecedented level and show the world how a government backed, multimillion-dollar ransomware gang operates. In some fashion it was almost like a normal business; wages needed to be paid, software licenses obtained, customer service initiated, and strategic alliances had to be formed. However, make no mistake, this business is dealing in top level cybercrime, with a strategic alliance to an intelligence apparatus responsible for several nation-state attacks.

In our line of work, we are often aware of technical innerworkings, partnerships between malware families and suspected nation state relationships but reading the internal conversations and having our suspicions confirmed was very insightful.