

A Look Back at BazarLoader's DGA

 malwarebookreports.com/a-look-back-at-bazarloaders-dga/

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I was recently asked a question about DGA and I was unsatisfied with my explanation, so I wanted to write a quick post on DGA, what it is, and how it works. I learned a lot going through this exercise and I hope you enjoy it.

What is DGA?

A Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) is a technique used by malware authors to generate new domain names for malware command and control. Typically malware will contain a configuration which will house any number of things, including the Command and Control (C2) domains/IPs. While these configurations are typically encrypted within the binary, malware analysts and reverse engineers can often extract these C2s through sandboxes or configuration extractors. This makes it fairly easy, if not trivial, to extract these C2s and put in network blocks. To combat this, malware authors use DGAs to generate domains over time, allowing for a sometimes infinite stream of C2s. This allows for increased persistence if C2 infrastructure is taken down and makes it more difficult to block network traffic.

How Does a DGA Work?

DGAs generate domains over time according to the particular algorithm written in the malware. DGAs often produce their own distinct patterns in the domains they generate. Some DGAs may generate domains by combining multiple words or numbers from a hardcoded dictionary included in the malware. Others will use a seed value to generate a more random looking domain name. Once the domain name has been created, the DGA will then add a top-level domain (TLD), such as .com or .net, to finalize the DGA C2. Because a DGA is capable of producing infinite domains, threat actors do not need to register every domain potentially generated. The threat actor holds the algorithm and therefore can identify when a domain would be generated according to the routine and can register that domain as needed, such as a situation where previous C2 infrastructure is taken down and communication to the implant is lost.

Defend Against DGAs

DGAs can pose a difficult problem to the blue team. Extracting configurations and putting in network blocks is often times trivial, but DGAs present the challenge of preventing virtually infinite combinations of C2 addresses. DGAs embedded in malware can be reverse engineered, the DGA emulated and network blocks put into place, but that task is time consuming and network blocks will quickly get out of hand. The main advantage of DGAs in the modern era is longer lasting infrastructure, as host-based firewalls and EDR products

make network containment of endpoints significantly easier. Threat Researchers and law enforcement often work together to reverse engineer the C2 network protocols and C2 DGA in order to register future domains. In some cases, commands can be sent to the botnet to uninstall the malware, remove critical files, etc. to takedown particular botnets.

BazarLoader Domain Generation Algorithm

A while back I wrote a blog post about BazarLoader, which had been quite prevalent in those days. In more recent times, BazarLoader as all but disappeared in favor of the newer BumbleBee malware. In that blog post, I briefly highlighted the existence of the domain generation algorithm included with BazarLoader, but I did not dive into how it works. Let's take a look at the algorithm and see if we can replicate the algorithm in Python.

BazarLoader's DGA




Figure 1: Generate Emercoin – BazarLoader’s DGA Algorithm

Algorithm Breakdown

Before I break this down, I want to give credit where credit is due. I’m not experienced when it comes to reversing DGAs and working through this algorithm was tough. I came across [this blog post](#) and the author does an incredible job breaking down the algorithm. I heavily relied on it as a reference as I debugged and learned how the algorithm works. I highly recommend reading that post, and others by the author, for an in-depth understanding of BazarLoader’s DGA and how it has evolved over time. With that said, let’s dive into the algorithm.

1. BazarLoader first separates the 26 letter alphabet into two characters classes containing 25 characters total. (j is omitted)
 - o 6 vowels `aeiouy`
 - o 19 consonants `bcd fghklmnpqrstvwxyz`
2. The two sets are then combined into $2 * 6 * 19$ ordered pairs that contain one vowel and one consonant (Cartesian Product).
3. The 228 resulting pairs are then rearranged with a permutation that is hard-coded into BazarLoader. This permutation is the seed of the BazarLoader DGA.
4. Four pairs are chosen from the 228 pairs and appended together to create the second level domain. The pairs are selected based on the current date (MM-YYYY), where the 2 month digits and last 2 digits of the year are significant. For example, given August 5, 2022, 0822 would be the significant digits used to select the pairs.

Character Pool Pairs

Before we jump into our pair selection, let's take a look at our embedded pairs so we understand the character pool pairs the algorithm selects from. When pairs are being selected, bytes are selected from the following two structures, with the two selections being XORed to produce an ASCII character. Each of the two structures were of length 0x1C8 (456), the length expected for 228 character pairs. In order to generate the total character pool, the two structures can be extracted and XORed to produce the pool of character pairs.

ciphertext =

```
bytearray(b'\x10\x9C\x57\xCD\x64\xB2\x33\xCA\x51\xF1\x1E\xF6\x55\xAF\x48\xDC\x4D\x87\x76\xFE\x17\x91\x2E\x89\x35\xC9\x58\xF6\x25\xDB\x25\xB8\x69\xA9\x56\x8F\x1D\x9B\x67\xC9\x33\x83\x72\x86\x66\x92\x68\xBD\x46\x96\x2F\xB4\x1F\xC8\x1B\xE6\x72\x8B\x1C\xFB\x1A\xF1\x52\x9D\x62\xE9\x33\xBD\x59\x98\x0B\xAB\x4E\xF5\x42\xA7\x51\xEC\x70\xBF\x1E\xCC\x2A\xFF\x38\xAF\x5C\xBA\x2F\x82\x3E\xC7\x79\xC4\x5F\xD0\x09\xCA\x79\xB2\x22\xE3\x77\xD3\x72\xD5\x78\xD3\x5E\xF5\x25\xF2\x0D\x8D\x0D\x9C\x79\xED\x00\xBF\x0E\xB4\x4B\xED\x77\x87\x2A\xE9\x59\xC1\x09\xCC\x49\x81\x59\xED\x4D\xB6\x65\xDE\x14\xB7\x2F\xB0\x30\xFE\x4F\xC4\x2D\xF2\x25\x91\x7F\x9E\x5D\xBE\x1B\xA8\x6D\xE9\x22\xB2\x6E\xA8\x74\xA8\x7F\x9A\x49\xB3\x28\x8C\x1C\xEB\x0B\xC1\x6C\xA8\x18\xD4\x05\xDE\x58\xA7\x74\xDA\x3B\x92\x58\xA8\x18\x8C\x4D\xDB\x4D\x9F\x43\xCD\x62\x93\x0D\xF6\x2A\xC0\x3C\x92\x5B\x83\x3D\xBD\x25\xF2\x70\xEF\x5E\xFA\x1E\xE8\x7D\x9A\x34\xDC\x6A\xEA\x6C\xEB\x6A\xF7\x51\xC1\x3F\xC6\x19\xA5\x0B\xBB\x74\xDB\x04\x80\x04\x96\x4C\xD2\x65\xB9\x3D\xD0\x51\xF8\x06\xEA\x5B\xA6\x5C\xC0\x5D\x8A\x72\xF1\x09\x87\x32\x8D\x3F\xDC\x55\xFF\x25\xC7\x34\xB6\x74\xAA\x4D\x88\x07\x97\x6A\xC3\x2B\x80\x78\x8E\x7A\x84\x75\xA5\x5F\x88\x3B\xAA\x12\xCA\x12\xF6\x78\x88\x1B\xE6\x0D\xF7\x44\x9A\x77\xEB\x27\xA1\x5D\x9C\x0A\xA3\x50\xE9\x4C\xAA\x53\xFE\x78\xA8\x12\xC7\x20\xF0\x20\xBC\x51\xA3\x21\x8A\x3E\xDE\x7F\xCA\x5C\xDF\x07\xC9\x7A\xB8\x26\xF4\x6A\xDB\x6F\xCE\x6E\xDA\x49\xF5\x25\xF1\x17\x87\x07\x92\x79\xE1\x17\xAD\x0E\xB9\x4E\xE3\x70\x8A\x3E\xFF\x5F\xCD\x11\xD4\x52\x8D\x55\xF2\x42\xAD\x6B\xCB\x04\xAA\x28\xB2\x20\xEB\x46\xDD\x27\xF3\x31\x9B\x7D\x8E\x4B\xBA\x15\xA8\x65\xFD\x3E\xAC\x62\xAF\x7A\xB5\x74\x8A\x59\xA6\x28\x84\x0D\xE6\x09\xD5\x63\xAB\x1F\xDA\x1D\xC5\x58\xAB\x73\xCA\x2F\x9D\x48\xA4\x13\x80\x5E\xCC\x5C\x94\x5B\xD8\x7A\x9A\x13\xF7\x38\xC6\x36\x9B\x43\x9B\x23\xA0\x20\xE4\x66\xE9\x4D\xEF')
```

key =

```
bytearray(b'\x68\xF9\x2D\xA8\x0A\xDD\x49\xBF\x38\x8B\x6E\x9F\x3A\xDE\x3E\xA9\x28\xEC\x1F\x98\x6F\xE8\x5B\xFA\x5A\xAF\x39\x9A\x5C\xAF\x4E\xD9\x0D\xCC\x3F\xED\x68\xF9\x1E\xBA\x5E\xFA\x1E\xEF\x1F\xFE\x1E\xDC\x2F\xFD\x5A\xD8\x6B\xBD\x7C\x8F\x19\xFE\x69\x9F\x7E\x9E\x2B\xEC\x0E\x88\x5D\xD8\x2F\xFD\x69\xCA\x3F\x9A\x2B\xDF\x3E\x8B\x19\xDC\x6B\xBD\x4F\x9D\x4D\xD9\x3E\xCF\x59\xEB\x5B\xAF\x1B\xAB\x39\xA9\x6C\xAC\x0A\xDD\x49\x8C\x19\xBA\x1A\xBA\x0B\xAA\x39\x9A\x5C\x9C\x6F\xE8\x68\xE8\x0E\x88\x6E\xCA\x7B\xDA\x3E\x9A\x18\xEF\x5B\x9C\x2B\xA8\x7D\xAD\x28\xEC\x2C\x8A\x3B\xCF\x0C\xAA\x7D\xDA\x49\xD9\x49\x8C\x2A\xA8\x4E\x9D\x5C\xFA\x1E\xEF\x2C\xDF\x7A\xCB\x0C\x99\x4D\xD9\x0D\xDD\x0D\xCC\x0C\xFF\x3C\xDE\x49\xEA\x79\x8F\x6E\xAC\x0A\xDD\x7A\xAD\x6C\xAC\x39\xCF\x1D\xAB\x4E\xEA\x3D\xCF\x7B\xE9\x2C\xB9\x38\xED\x2C\xB9\x0B\xFF\x78\x9E\x5C\xAF\x5F\xEB\x2C\xEC\x4A\xC8\x48\x9D\x09\x99\x2B\x8A\x7F\x8F\x19\xEF\x5B\xBE\x0B\x99\x09\x99\x18\x98\x2B\xA8\x4E\xBF\x7C\xCB\x7B\xDA\x1C\xBA\x7C\xE9\x68\xF9\x2D\xA8\x0A\xDD\x49\xBF\x38\x8B\x6E\x9F\x3A\xDE\x3E\xA9\x28\xEC\x1F\x98\x6F\xE8\x5B\xFA\x5A\xAF\x39\x9A\x5C\xAF\x4E\xD9\x0D\xCC\x3F\xED\x68\xF9\x1E\xBA\x5E\xFA\x1E\xE9\x1F\xFE\x1E\xDC\x2F\xFD\x5A\xD8\x6B\xBD\x7C\x8F\x19\xFE\x69\x9F\x7E\x9E\x2B\xEC\x0E\x88\x5D\xD8\x2F\xFD\x69\xCA\x3F\x9A\x2B\xDF')
```

```
\x3E\x8B\x19\xDC\x6B\xBD\x4F\x9D\x4D\xD9\x3E\xCF\x59\xEB\x5B\xAF\x1B\xAB\x39\xA9\x6C\xAC\x0A\xDD\x49\x8C\x19\xBA\x1A\xBA\x0B\xAA\x39\x9A\x5C\x9C\x6F\xE8\x68\xE8\x0E\x88\x6E\xCA\x7B\xDA\x3E\x9A\x18\xEF\x5B\x9C\x2B\xA8\x7D\xAD\x28\xEC\x2C\x8A\x3B\xCF\x0C\xAA\x7D\xDA\x49\xD9\x49\x8C\x2A\xA8\x4E\x9D\x5C\xFA\x1E\xEF\x2C\xDF\x7A\xCB\x0C\x99\x4D\xD9\x0D\xDD\x0D\xCC\x0C\xFF\x3C\xDE\x49\xEA\x79\x8F\x6E\xAC\x0A\xDD\x7A\xAD\x6C\xAC\x39\xCF\x1D\xAB\x4E\xEA\x3D\xCF\x7B\xE9\x2C\xB9\x38\xED\x2C\xB9\x0B\xFF\x78\x9E\x5C\xAF\x5F\xEB\x2C\xEC\x4A\xC8\x48\x9D\x09\x99\x2B\x8A')
```

```
for i in range(len(ciphertext)):  
    ciphertext[i] ^= key[i%len(key)]
```

Resulting Char Pool:

xezenozuizpioqviekifxyusofalytkadeibubysmyliylvaikultugikuuddoyqlanevebaqoixogicube
vbuviehbobyefsfokonihosygoynbeetwenuunuwohquritaamugvyitimfiyrelcoykaqqaacapokcuydseum
afedemfubyrarahiqxegceaburotiluhvocywumoyvupagduobaserroziqyenpahaxiloazodtoishuaxb
iufmifoibesleyhzoyfreontyuzfaezkypuarywnyavrysiovczyraciosgumuatyzommeolxaeqdaevkepe
oxsauteppoymxoozwygucpyheectelyzayxybgaypakigluinmacageocidsuorwyxuexantigyivewqiadn
aawukhirudywaqekidiipowihhyopfe

Date Seed

As mentioned above, the current date is used to select character pairs. The analysis below was performed August 04, 2022, meaning **0822** will be used to calculate the pairs.

First Pair

The first pair is selected by splitting the character pool pairs into groups of 19. The first digit of the date is then used as the index of the groups to select. Since the first digit of a month will either be a 0 or 1 (01, 02, 03...10, 11, 12), only two groups can be selected from.

Note: I will use a DGA domain generated during a debugging session as a visual example. To denote which character pair was chosen during this session, the pair will be highlighted in bold font.

xe ze no zu iz **pi** oq vu ek if xy us of al yt ka de ib ub
ys my li yl va ik ul tu gi ku ud do yq la ne ve ba qo ix

Below is what this selection looks like in the debugger.




Figure 2: Calculate first char of first pair == 'p'




Figure 3: Calculate second char of first pair == 'i'
Second Pair

The second pair is selected in the same way as the first pair, but groups are picked based on the second digit. The second digit can range from 0-9, so ten different groups are possible.

xe ze no zu iz pi oq vu ek if xy us of al yt ka de ib ub
 ys my li yl va ik ul tu gi ku ud do yq la ne ve ba qo ix
 og ic uq eb uv bu vi eh bo fy ef so ko ni ho sy go yn be
 et we nu un uw oh qu ri ta am ug vy it im fi yr el co yk
 aq qa ac ap ok cu yd se um af ed em fu by ir ah iq ux eg
 ce ab ur ot il uh vo cy wo wu mo yv up ag du ob as er ro
 zi qy en pa ha xi lo az od to is hu ax bi uf mi fo iw es
 le yh zo yf re on ty uz fa ez ky pu ar yw ny av ry si ov
 yc zy ra ci os gu mu at yz om me ol xa eq da ev ke **pe** ox
 sa ut ep po ym xo oz wi yg uc py he ec te ly za yx yb ga




Figure 4: Calculate first char of second pair == 'p'

RIP →	• 0000000180007165 • 000000018000716A • 000000018000716F • 0000000180007173 • 0000000180007176 • 0000000180007179 • 000000018000717D	42:8A5441 01 42:325440 01 48:8B43 20 8850 03 41:8BC2 48:8B57 20 41:83E2 03	mov dl,byte ptr ds:[rcx+r8*2+1] xor dl,byte ptr ds:[rax+r8*2+1] mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20] mov byte ptr ds:[rax+3],dl mov eax,r10d mov rdx,qword ptr ds:[rdi+20] and r10d,3
-------	--	--	--

```

d1=DD 'ÿ'
byte ptr [rax+r8*2+1]=[000000002c8BF83]=B8 ', '
000000018000716A

```

Figure 5: Calculate second char of first pair == 'e'
Third Pair

The third pair is selected from groups with a size of 4 pairs. The third digit can range from 0-9, so ten different groups are possible. This digit represents the current decade and therefore the group of 4 pairs *ek if xy us* will remain the same for quite some time.

```

xe ze no zu
iz pi oq vu
ek if xy us
of al yt ka
de ib ub ys
my li yl va
ik ul tu gi
ku ud do yq
la ne ve ba
qo ix og ic

```


RIP	Address	Disassembly	Comment
→	00000001800071B0	42:321448	xor dl,byte ptr ds:[rax+r9*2]
	00000001800071B4	48:8B43 20	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20]
	00000001800071B8	8850 04	mov byte ptr ds:[rax+4],dl
	00000001800071BB	49:8B4F 10	mov rcx,qword ptr ds:[r15+10]
	00000001800071BF	49:8B46 10	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[r14+10]
	00000001800071C3	42:8A5449 01	mov dl,byte ptr ds:[rcx+r9*2+1]
	00000001800071C8	42:325448 01	xor dl,byte ptr ds:[rax+r9*2+1]
	00000001800071CD	48:8B43 20	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20]
	00000001800071D1	8850 05	mov byte ptr ds:[rax+5],dl
	00000001800071D4	49:8B46 10	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[r14+10]
	00000001800071D8	49:8B4F 10	mov rcx,qword ptr ds:[r15+10]
	00000001800071DC	42:8A1441	mov dl,byte ptr ds:[rcx+r8*2]
	00000001800071E0	42:321440	xor dl,byte ptr ds:[rax+r8*2]
	00000001800071E4	48:8B43 20	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20]
	00000001800071E8	8850 06	mov byte ptr ds:[rax+6],dl
	00000001800071EB	49:8B46 10	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[r14+10]
	00000001800071EF	49:8B4F 10	mov rcx,qword ptr ds:[r15+10]
	00000001800071F3	4C:895D E0	mov qword ptr ss:[rbp-20],r11
	00000001800071F7	4C:895D E8	mov qword ptr ss:[rbp-18],r11
	00000001800071FB	4C:895D F0	mov qword ptr ss:[rbp-10],r11
	00000001800071FF	42:8A5441 01	mov dl,byte ptr ds:[rcx+r8*2+1]
	0000000180007204	42:325440 01	xor dl,byte ptr ds:[rax+r8*2+1]
	0000000180007209	48:8B43 20	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20]
	000000018000720D	8850 07	mov byte ptr ds:[rax+7],dl
	0000000180007210	48:8B43 20	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20]
	0000000180007214	44:8858 08	mov byte ptr ds:[rax+8],r11b
	0000000180007218	44:885D D0	mov byte ptr ss:[rbp-30],r11b
	000000018000721C	C745 D4 1A69E657	mov dword ptr ss:[rbp-2C],57E6691A
	0000000180007223	C745 D8 5579872D	mov dword ptr ss:[rbp-28],2D877955
	000000018000722A	8B45 D4	mov eax,dword ptr ss:[rbp-2C]
	000000018000722D	8A45 D0	mov al,byte ptr ss:[rbp-30]
	0000000180007230	84C0	test al,al
	0000000180007232	75 18	jne 18000724C

d1=6F 'o'
byte ptr [rax+r9*2]=[000000002c8BE44]=17
00000001800071B0

Figure 6: Calculate first char of third pair == 'x'

RIP	Address	Disassembly	Comment
→	00000001800071C8	42:325448 01	xor dl,byte ptr ds:[rax+r9*2+1]
	00000001800071CD	48:8B43 20	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20]
	00000001800071D1	8850 05	mov byte ptr ds:[rax+5],dl
	00000001800071D4	49:8B46 10	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[r14+10]
	00000001800071D8	49:8B4F 10	mov rcx,qword ptr ds:[r15+10]
	00000001800071DC	42:8A1441	mov dl,byte ptr ds:[rcx+r8*2]
	00000001800071E0	42:321440	xor dl,byte ptr ds:[rax+r8*2]
	00000001800071E4	48:8B43 20	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20]
	00000001800071E8	8850 06	mov byte ptr ds:[rax+6],dl
	00000001800071EB	49:8B46 10	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[r14+10]
	00000001800071EF	49:8B4F 10	mov rcx,qword ptr ds:[r15+10]
	00000001800071F3	4C:895D E0	mov qword ptr ss:[rbp-20],r11
	00000001800071F7	4C:895D E8	mov qword ptr ss:[rbp-18],r11
	00000001800071FB	4C:895D F0	mov qword ptr ss:[rbp-10],r11
	00000001800071FF	42:8A5441 01	mov dl,byte ptr ds:[rcx+r8*2+1]
	0000000180007204	42:325440 01	xor dl,byte ptr ds:[rax+r8*2+1]
	0000000180007209	48:8B43 20	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20]
	000000018000720D	8850 07	mov byte ptr ds:[rax+7],dl
	0000000180007210	48:8B43 20	mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rbx+20]
	0000000180007214	44:8858 08	mov byte ptr ds:[rax+8],r11b
	0000000180007218	44:885D D0	mov byte ptr ss:[rbp-30],r11b
	000000018000721C	C745 D4 1A69E657	mov dword ptr ss:[rbp-2C],57E6691A
	0000000180007223	C745 D8 5579872D	mov dword ptr ss:[rbp-28],2D877955
	000000018000722A	8B45 D4	mov eax,dword ptr ss:[rbp-2C]
	000000018000722D	8A45 D0	mov al,byte ptr ss:[rbp-30]
	0000000180007230	84C0	test al,al
	0000000180007232	75 18	jne 18000724C

d1=E8 'è'
byte ptr [rax+r9*2+1]=[000000002c8BE45]=91
00000001800071C8

Figure 7: Calculate second char of third pair == 'y'
Fourth Pair

The fourth and final pair are selected in the same manner as the third pair. Again, there are 10 potential groups of 4 pairs.

```

xe ze no zu
iz pi oq vu
ek if xy us
of al yt ka
de ib ub ys
my li yl va
ik ul tu gi
ku ud do yq
la ne ve ba
qo ix og ic

```




Figure 8: Calculate first char of fourth pair == 'e'




Figure 9: Calculate second char of fourth pair == 'k'

Combine Second Level Domain with Top Level Domain

Now that the second level domain of **pipexyek** as been generated, the top level domain of **.bazar** is appended to complete the DGA. “.bazar” can be seen in the above figure as a “tight string.” The two hex-values of **0x57E6691A** and **0x2D877955** are combined and XORed with

0x2D870B34, resulting in .bazar.

The image shows a web-based XOR decryption tool interface. It is divided into two main sections: 'From Hex' and 'XOR'. The 'From Hex' section has a 'Delimiter' dropdown set to 'Auto'. The 'XOR' section has a 'Key' input field containing '340B872D' and a dropdown menu set to 'HEX'. Below the key field is a 'Scheme' dropdown set to 'Standard' and a checkbox for 'Null preserving' which is currently unchecked. On the right side of the interface, there is a large text area displaying the hex string '1A69E6575579872'. At the bottom right, there is an 'Output' section displaying the result '.bazar..'. The interface has a light green header and a light gray footer.

Figure 10: Bazar tight string XOR decrypted

Algorithm Replication in Python

Once again, I would like to link this [blog post](#) that contained a Python script to emulate this DGA. I learned a ton from this blog and look forward to reading and reversing more DGAs in the future.

```

from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify
import argparse
import logging
import traceback
import os
from datetime import datetime
from collections import namedtuple
from itertools import product

def configure_logger(log_level):
    log_file = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__)),
    'bazardga.log')
    log_levels = {0: logging.ERROR, 1: logging.WARNING, 2: logging.INFO, 3:
logging.DEBUG}
    log_level = min(max(log_level, 0), 3) #clamp to 0-3 inclusive
    logging.basicConfig(level=log_levels[log_level],
        format='%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)-8s %
(message)s',
        handlers=[
            logging.FileHandler(log_file, 'a'),
            logging.StreamHandler()
        ])

class DGA:

    def __init__(self, date: datetime):
        self.logger = logging.getLogger('BazarLoader DGA Generator')
        self.seed = datetime.strftime(date, '%m%Y')

    def decrypt_permutation(self):

        ciphertext =
bytearray(b'\x10\x9C\x57\xCD\x64\xB2\x33\xCA\x51\xF1\x1E\xF6\x55\xAF\x48\xDC\x4D\x87\x
x76\xFE\x17\x91\x2E\x89\x35\xC9\x58\xF6\x25\xDB\x25\xB8\x69\xA9\x56\x8F\x1D\x9B\x67\x
C9\x33\x83\x72\x86\x66\x92\x68\xBD\x46\x96\x2F\xB4\x1F\xC8\x1B\xE6\x72\x8B\x1C\xFB\x1
A\xF1\x52\x9D\x62\xE9\x33\xBD\x59\x98\x0B\xAB\x4E\xF5\x42\xA7\x51\xEC\x70\xBF\x1E\xCC
\x2A\xFF\x38\xAF\x5C\xBA\x2F\x82\x3E\xC7\x79\xC4\x5F\xD0\x09\xCA\x79\xB2\x22\xE3\x77\x
xD3\x72\xD5\x78\xD3\x5E\xF5\x25\xF2\x0D\x8D\x0D\x9C\x79\xED\x00\xBF\x0E\xB4\x4B\xED\x
77\x87\x2A\xE9\x59\xC1\x09\xCC\x49\x81\x59\xED\x4D\xB6\x65\xDE\x14\xB7\x2F\xB0\x30\xF
E\x4F\xC4\x2D\xF2\x25\x91\x7F\x9E\x5D\xBE\x1B\xA8\x6D\xE9\x22\xB2\x6E\xA8\x74\xA8\x7F
\x9A\x49\xB3\x28\x8C\x1C\xEB\x0B\xC1\x6C\xA8\x18\xD4\x05\xDE\x58\xA7\x74\xDA\x3B\x92\x
x58\xA8\x18\x8C\x4D\xDB\x4D\x9F\x43\xCD\x62\x93\x0D\xF6\x2A\xC0\x3C\x92\x5B\x83\x3D\x
BD\x25\xF2\x70\xEF\x5E\xFA\x1E\xE8\x7D\x9A\x34\xDC\x6A\xEA\x6C\xEB\x6A\xF7\x51\xC1\x3
F\xC6\x19\xA5\x0B\xBB\x74\xDB\x04\x80\x04\x96\x4C\xD2\x65\xB9\x3D\xD0\x51\xF8\x06\xEA
\x5B\xA6\x5C\xC0\x5D\x8A\x72\xF1\x09\x87\x32\x8D\x3F\xDC\x55\xFF\x25\xC7\x34\xB6\x74\x
xAA\x4D\x88\x07\x97\x6A\xC3\x2B\x80\x78\x8E\x7A\x84\x75\xA5\x5F\x88\x3B\xAA\x12\xCA\x
12\xF6\x78\x88\x1B\xE6\x0D\xF7\x44\x9A\x77\xEB\x27\xA1\x5D\x9C\x0A\xA3\x50\xE9\x4C\xA
A\x53\xFE\x78\xA8\x12\xC7\x20\xF0\x20\xBC\x51\xA3\x21\x8A\x3E\xDE\x7F\xCA\x5C\xDF\x07
\xC9\x7A\xB8\x26\xF4\x6A\xDB\x6F\xCE\x6E\xDA\x49\xF5\x25\xF1\x17\x87\x07\x92\x79\xE1\x
x17\xAD\x0E\xB9\x4E\xE3\x70\x8A\x3E\xFF\x5F\xCD\x11\xD4\x52\x8D\x55\xF2\x42\xAD\x6B\x
CB\x04\xAA\x28\xB2\x20\xEB\x46\xDD\x27\xF3\x31\x9B\x7D\x8E\x4B\xBA\x15\xA8\x65\xFD\x3
E\xAC\x62\xAF\x7A\xB5\x74\x8A\x59\xA6\x28\x84\x0D\xE6\x09\xD5\x63\xAB\x1F\xDA\x1D\xC5

```

```
\x58\xAB\x73\xCA\x2F\x9D\x48\xA4\x13\x80\x5E\xCC\x5C\x94\x5B\xD8\x7A\x9A\x13\xF7\x38\xC6\x36\x9B\x43\x9B\x23\xA0\x20\xE4\x66\xE9\x4D\xEF')
```

```
key =
```

```
bytearray(b'\x68\xf9\x2D\xa8\x0a\xdd\x49\xbf\x38\x8b\x6e\x9f\x3a\xde\x3e\xa9\x28\xec\x1f\x98\x6f\xe8\x5b\xfa\x5a\xaf\x39\x9a\x5c\xaf\x4e\xd9\x0d\xcc\x3f\xed\x68\xf9\x1e\xba\x5e\xfa\x1e\xef\x1f\xfe\x1e\xdc\x2f\xfd\x5a\xd8\x6b\xbd\x7c\x8f\x19\xfe\x69\x9f\x7e\x9e\x2b\xec\x0e\x88\x5d\xd8\x2f\xfd\x69\xca\x3f\x9a\x2b\xdf\x3e\x8b\x19\xdc\x6b\xbd\x4f\x9d\x4d\xd9\x3e\xcf\x59\xeb\x5b\xaf\x1b\xab\x39\xa9\x6c\xac\x0a\xdd\x49\x8c\x19\xba\x1a\xba\x0b\xaa\x39\x9a\x5c\x9c\x6f\xe8\x68\xe8\x0e\x88\x6e\xca\x7b\nda\x3e\x9a\x18\xef\x5b\x9c\x2b\xa8\x7d\xad\x28\xec\x2c\x8a\x3b\xcf\x0c\xaa\x7d\nda\x49\xd9\x49\x8c\x2a\xa8\x4e\x9d\x5c\xfa\x1e\xef\x2c\xdf\x7a\xcb\x0c\x99\x4d\xd9\x0d\xdd\x0d\xcc\x0c\xff\x3c\xde\x49\xea\x79\x8f\x6e\xac\x0a\xdd\x7a\xad\x6c\xac\x39\xcf\x1d\xab\x4e\xea\x3d\xcf\x7b\xe9\x2c\xb9\x38\xed\x2c\xb9\x0b\xff\x78\x9e\x5c\xaf\x5f\xeb\x2c\xec\x4a\xc8\x48\x9d\x09\x99\x2b\xa8\x7f\x8f\x19\xef\x5b\xbe\x0b\x99\x09\x99\x18\x98\x2b\xa8\x4e\xbf\x7c\xcb\x7b\nda\x1c\xba\x7c\xe9\x68\xf9\x2d\xa8\x0a\xdd\x49\xbf\x38\x8b\x6e\x9f\x3a\xde\x3e\xa9\x28\xec\x1f\x98\x6f\xe8\x5b\xfa\x5a\xaf\x39\x9a\x5c\xaf\x4e\xd9\x0d\xcc\x3f\xed\x68\xf9\x1e\xba\x5e\xfa\x1e\xef\x1f\xfe\x1e\xdc\x2f\xfd\x5a\xd8\x6b\xbd\x7c\x8f\x19\xfe\x69\x9f\x7e\x9e\x2b\xec\x0e\x88\x5d\xd8\x2f\xfd\x69\xca\x3f\x9a\x2b\xdf\x3e\x8b\x19\xdc\x6b\xbd\x4f\x9d\x4d\xd9\x3e\xcf\x59\xeb\x5b\xaf\x1b\xab\x39\xa9\x6c\xac\x0a\xdd\x49\x8c\x19\xba\x1a\xba\x0b\xaa\x39\x9a\x5c\x9c\x6f\xe8\x68\xe8\x0e\x88\x6e\xca\x7b\nda\x3e\x9a\x18\xef\x5b\x9c\x2b\xa8\x7d\xad\x28\xec\x2c\x8a\x3b\xcf\x0c\xaa\x7d\nda\x49\xd9\x49\x8c\x2a\xa8\x4e\x9d\x5c\xfa\x1e\xef\x2c\xdf\x7a\xcb\x0c\x99\x4d\xd9\x0d\xdd\x0d\xcc\x0c\xff\x3c\xde\x49\xea\x79\x8f\x6e\xac\x0a\xdd\x7a\xad\x6c\xac\x39\xcf\x1d\xab\x4e\xea\x3d\xcf\x7b\xe9\x2c\xb9\x38\xed\x2c\xb9\x0b\xff\x78\x9e\x5c\xaf\x5f\xeb\x2c\xec\x4a\xc8\x48\x9d\x09\x99\x2b\xa8')
```

```
# XOR decrypt to reveal char pool
for i in range(len(ciphertext)):
    ciphertext[i] ^= key[i%len(key)]
self.logger.debug(f"Character Pair Pool: \n {ciphertext.decode('utf-8')}")
return ciphertext
```

```
def generate_domains(self):
```

```
    """
```

```
    Generate DGA domains using BazarLoader DGA algorithm.
```

```
    """
```

```
# Calculate pairs (ciphertext and key are hardcoded into Bazarloader)
```

```
charpool = self.decrypt_permutation().decode('utf-8')
```

```
# Print out seed
```

```
self.logger.critical(f'Seed is: {self.seed}')
```

```
print(f'Seed is: {self.seed}')
```

```
# Generate Possible Ranges
```

```
Param = namedtuple('Param', 'mul mod idx')
```

```
params = [Param(19, 19, 0), Param(19, 19, 1), Param(4, 4, 4), Param(4, 4, 5)]
```

```
ranges = []
```

```
for p in params:
```

```
    s = int(self.seed[p.idx])
```

```
    lower = p.mul * s
```

```

        upper = lower + p.mod
        ranges.append(list(range(lower, upper)))

self.logger.debug(ranges)

# Generate Domains looping indices of Cartesian product
domains = set()
for indices in product(*ranges):
    self.logger.debug(indices)
    domain = ""
    for index in indices:
        domain += charpool[index * 2 : index * 2 + 2]
    domain += '.bazar'
    domains.add(domain)

for domain in domains:
    print(domain)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='BazarLoader String Decryptor')
    parser.add_argument('-v', '--verbose', action='count', default=0,
        help='Increase verbosity. Can specify multiple times for more verbose
output')
    parser.add_argument('-d', '--date', default=datetime.now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d'),
        help='Date used for seeding. (e.g. 2022-08-05)')
    args = parser.parse_args()
    configure_logger(args.verbose)
    date = datetime.strptime(args.date, '%Y-%m-%d')
    dga = DGA(date)
    try:
        dga.generate_domains()
    except Exception as e:
        print(f'Exception generating DGA domains.')
        print(traceback.format_exc())

```

Finally, now that we have a list of all the domains and know the algorithm used to generate them, a simple regex can be used to identify any network communications:

```
[a-ik-z]{8}\.bazar
```

bazar bazarloader dga