

Magniber Ransomware Attempts to Bypass MOTW (Mark of the Web)

asec asec.ahnlab.com/en/41889/

November 11, 2022



The ASEC analysis team uploaded a post on October 25th to inform the users of the changes that have been made to the Magniber ransomware. Magniber, which is still actively being distributed, has undergone many changes to evade the detection of anti-malware software. Out of these changes, this blog will cover the script format found from September 8th to September 29th, 2022, which bypassed Mark of the Web (MOTW), a feature offered by Microsoft that identifies the source of files.

Date	Extension	Execution Process	Encryption Process	Recovery Environment Deactivation Process	Recovery Environment Deactivation (UAC Bypassing)
2022-05-07	msi	msiexec.exe	msiexec.exe	regsvr32.exe	Modifies reference registry upon execution of fodhelper.exe (HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command)
6/14/2022	msi	msiexec.exe	Running Process	regsvr32.exe	Modifies reference registry upon execution of fodhelper.exe (HKCU:\Software\Classes\(custom progID)\shell\open\command)
7/20/2022	cpl	rundll32.exe	rundll32.exe	X	X

Date	Extension	Execution Process	Encryption Process	Recovery Environment Deactivation Process	Recovery Environment Deactivation (UAC Bypassing)
8/8/2022	cpl	rundll32.exe	Running Process	wscript.exe	Modifies reference registry upon execution of fodhelper.exe (HKCU:\Software\Classes\(custom progID)\shell\open\command)
9/8/2022	jse	wscript.exe	Running Process	wscript.exe	Modifies reference registry upon execution of fodhelper.exe (HKCU:\Software\Classes\(custom progID)\shell\open\command)
9/16/2022	js	wscript.exe	Running Process	wscript.exe	Modifies reference registry upon execution of fodhelper.exe (HKCU:\Software\Classes\(custom progID)\shell\open\command)
9/28/2022	wsf	wscript.exe	Running Process	wscript.exe	Modifies reference registry upon execution of fodhelper.exe (HKCU:\Software\Classes\(custom progID)\shell\open\command)
9/30/2022	msi	msiexec.exe	Running Process	wscript.exe	Modifies reference registry upon execution of fodhelper.exe (HKCU:\Software\Classes\(custom progID)\shell\open\command)

Table 1. Major characteristics of Magniber ransomware by date (<https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/40422/>)

Table 1 shows the content of the [ASEC blog post](#) which covers the evolution of the Magniber ransomware. Among these changes, the threat operator used scripts as the distribution method during the period from September 8th to September 29th, 2022. Magniber was downloaded through the typosquatting method, which exploits typos made by the user when accessing domains (See Figure 1).




Figure 1. Typosquatting distribution method of Magniber

The downloaded file is identified to be from an external source by the Windows Mark of the Web (MOTW) feature.^[2] MOTW operates on New Technology File System (NTFS). The download URL is recorded in a stream in Windows of NTFS.^[3] The stream where the URL is saved is created in the file path in the format of “File Name:Zone.Identifier:\$DATA” and can be easily viewed with Notepad. When the downloaded files identified by MOTW are executed, a warning message is displayed.

Script File Detection

Ransomware/JS.Magniber (2022.09.08.02)

Ransomware/WSF.Magniber (2022.09.28.02)

Process Memory Detection

Ransomware/Win.Magniber.XM153 (2022.09.15.03)

AMSI Detection (.NET DLL)

Ransomware/Win.Magniber.R519329 (2022.09.15.02)

Reference

[1][Exploited Windows zero-day lets JavaScript files bypass security warnings](#)

[2][Macros from the internet will be blocked by default in Office](#)

[3][5.1 NTFS Streams](#)

[4][Digitally Signing Scripts](#)

Subscribe to AhnLab's next-generation threat intelligence platform 'AhnLab TIP' to check related IOC and detailed analysis information.

Categories:[Malware Information](#)

Tagged as:[malware](#), [Ransomware](#)